

# THE MONIST

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## TRAGEDY AND THE ENJOYMENT OF IT.

HOW is it that we can take a refined pleasure in the mimic representation of scenes that would make us faint with horror if we saw them off the stage? What is the psychological basis and the ancient history of this curious phenomenon?

If you go to Aristotle, as men have been doing for more than two thousand years, with the question, What is tragedy? you will find him basing his famous definition on a highly-developed art-form, the early stages of which were largely hidden from him and are almost entirely hidden from us. Aristotle thought that tragedy, like other kinds of poetry, depended on two fundamental propensities of human nature, namely, the love of imitation and the love of "harmony" (we should rather say rhythm). But we of to-day, who have learned to operate in imagination with a long lapse of ages during which the *genus homo* was slowly acquiring the characters we find him fitted out with when we first make his acquaintance in historical records,—we of to-day are not at all certain that the love of imitation and the love of rhythm are primitive instincts of human nature. Very certainly they are less primitive than, say, the instinct of self-preservation or the instinct of reproduction. Nevertheless, our modern study of savages and of childhood, in which race experience to some extent repeats itself, makes it quite certain that the love of imitation, with a concomitant pleasure in the successful-

ness of the imitation, is a universal and a very ancient development. Somewhat later, one may guess, came the love of rhythm, which seems to have grown out of the primitive dance. I use the word "dance," for lack of a better, to cover any sort of common activity in which a number of persons move their bodies or their limbs together and try to keep time with one another.<sup>1</sup> But while the love of rhythm would seem to be a comparatively late acquisition, it is nevertheless very ancient and well-nigh universal.

But is rhythm essential to tragedy? For Aristotle it certainly was. A tragic drama in prose would have been for him a contradiction in terms—much like an opera without music for us. We, however, are very familiar with the idea of tragedies in prose, albeit we recognize that the greatest tragedies have always been written in verse. It must be said, then, that from our point of view measured language is not altogether essential to the notion of tragedy. On the other hand, for us as for Aristotle, no tragedy is thinkable as a form of art without imitation.

What, then, is the real essence of the thing? If we take Aristotle's celebrated definition and omit what he says about measured language, and if we also omit a qualifying clause which merely affirms something about which there is no room for debate, namely, that the imitation must take the form of action rather than narrative,—we have the following remainder (I quote from Butcher's

<sup>1</sup> In his new book on Euripides, page 227, Prof. Gilbert Murray speaks thus of the primitive dance: "The ancient dance was not, like our ballets, rooted in sexual emotion. It was religious: it was a form of prayer. It consisted in the use of the whole body, every limb and every muscle, to express somehow that overflow of emotion for which a man has no words. And primitive man had less command of words than we have. When the men were away on the warpath, the women prayed for them with all their bodies. They danced for the men's safe return. When the tribe's land was parched for lack of rain the tribesmen danced for the rain to come. The dance did not necessarily imply movement. It might consist in simply maintaining the same rigid attitude, as when Moses held out his arms during the battle with the Amalekites, or Ahure in the Egyptian story waited kneeling and fasting for Nefrekepta's return."

well-known translation of the *Poetics*, Chapter 6): "Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude. . . . through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions."

In the main this language is perfectly clear. A tragedy—so Aristotle thought—must be "serious," provocative of grave thought and feeling. It must have "a certain magnitude," that is, it must not be too brief, and it must not be trivial. Again, it must be "complete"; that is, it must have a beginning, a middle and an end, and the end must be a real finality, so far as the principal personage is concerned. Finally, the purpose of the imitation is to arouse the emotions of "pity" and "fear" and to effect the "purgation" of these emotions. Just exactly what Aristotle meant by his far-famed *kátharsis*, or purgation, is a very stale moot-question, which fortunately does not need to be considered here. I have dwelt a little on Aristotle's formula simply that I might bring out this fact: That in the earliest type of tragedy known to us—one, moreover, which has had great influence on modern developments—the essence of the art consisted in the *formal enactment of suffering and calamity*. This would appear to be the simplest, most fundamental account of the matter at which it is possible to arrive.

But if tragedy in its ultimate essence is the enactment of suffering and calamity, then the question arises, How is it that we can take pleasure at all in painful representations? This *crux* has had, on the whole, rather too little attention from the esthetic philosophers. Schiller indeed saw its importance at the very beginning of his studies in esthetic theory and dealt with the subject in a paper entitled *Ueber den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen*, that is, the basis of our pleasure in tragic themes. But Schiller, here as in his other philosophic writings, presupposes a highly developed humanity. He

has in mind an audience imbued with something of his own ethical idealism; possessed by a feeling for moral heroism, for noble and sublime conduct, for the beauty of self-sacrifice. It is, however, indubitable that the human propensity to find pleasure in painful representations is not a product of advanced culture and has little to do with moral philosophy. It is something far older and more fundamental. It is, in fact, an inheritance from a very remote past, when our forbears took pleasure not only in the fictitious enactment of suffering, but also in the actual infliction of it before their face and eyes. Our problem is one of primitive psychology, in other words, of anthropology; and it is from the anthropologists that we get our best light on the subject. This was recognized by Wilhelm Scherer, when he wrote his *Poetik*—a book which is full of good things about the beginnings of poetry.

Scherer thought that poetry in its first rude beginnings was always a manifestation of joy. He came to the conclusion that it originated partly in the natural expression of pleasant emotions—dance and song having evolved out of leaping, shouting and wooing—and partly in the anticipatory and therefore symbolic performance of pleasant acts. A species of primitive poetry would thus be represented for us, according to this view, by the small boy riding a stick and so anticipating the future pleasure of equestrianship; or by the little girl playing with her doll and so anticipating the coming delight of motherhood. The youngsters know very well that the cane is not a horse, and the bag of sawdust not a baby; but they delight in the exercise of the imagination and in the symbolic performance of the acts which strengthen their pleasant self-deception and make it plausible. Scherer was further of the opinion that poetry, having thus become permanently associated with pleasant feelings and pleasant actions, came to be employed, by transference, in the expression of feelings

and the representation of actions which were in themselves unpleasant, but became pleasant by association. He discusses at some length the ways and means by which this *might* have happened; enough to say that it is very acute and suggestive. I doubt, however, whether Scherer is right in his chronology. It seems to me on the whole more probable that from the beginning, that is, as far back as there was any poetry at all, or any acting of symbolic scenes the paradox of pleasure in pain was already an every-day affair. To be sure, the words pleasure and pain, as used in this connection, do not exactly hit the mark, since pain is apt to suggest something from which one must necessarily shrink. But there is a kind of pleasure which consists in the mere putting forth of energy, in the mere exercise of the faculties. Such exercise seems to be a part of that instinctive love of life which is a biologic necessity and the fundamental law of our being; for a race that did not love life and dread death would long ago have become extinct. But what is it to live? Physically it is to move, psychically it is to feel, imagine and think—feeling and imagination being the more fundamental. Not without reason do we say of a person who has never felt much and has no imagination that he has never truly lived. Just as the child has a certain pleasure in moving, in using its muscles and its voice, so it has pleasure in exercising the psychic functions; in feeling strongly and expressing its feeling, in satisfying curiosity and imagining and representing that which is not. Now in seeking this pleasure which consists in the mere putting forth of psychic energy we by no means go in search of the so-called pleasant things. On the contrary, we are apt to prefer things that are painful, gruesome, dangerous; for these give the greater shock, that is, the more of that emotional excitement which is life. We

are too apt to think of pleasure and pain as if they were distinct, antipodal and mutually exclusive.

Do I seem to be straying into the blue mists? Let me elucidate the matter with an illustration which at any rate shall not be misty. Imagine yourself at a baseball game. A man is running home from third base. At the distance of ten feet from the plate he hurls himself headlong to the ground, slides in on his belly, and touches the plate just as the ball reaches the hands of the catcher, which are too high to reach him. The runner gets up with face bleeding, with his mouth full of sand and gravel, and with his wrist badly sprained. Is it pleasure or pain? That depends on the point of view. To an elderly and inert philosopher in the grand-stand it will probably seem a very good example of pain. To the kid watching the game from the bleachers it will be an epitome of all that is glorious in life. As for the runner himself, the experience will probably take on for the moment a mixed aspect; but after a day or two, especially if his run has won the game and filled the newspapers with his renown, it will become an altogether pleasurable memory.

In our boyish sports we by no means prefer to occupy our imaginations with things sweet and nice—with candy and pop and Sunday-school rewards of merit; instead of that we like to provide ourselves with make-believe deadly weapons to shoot and kill one another, or we fight with savage beasts and ferocious men. A little girl, playing with her doll, may let the doll die, and may then celebrate its funeral, if she happen to have seen one, taking a solemn delight in providing satisfactory obsequies. Of such illustrations there is no end. One might also adduce the universal interest taken in gruesome ghost-stories and tales of horror, or the fascination of brutal sports, accidents, executions, morgues, battles, and so forth.

Now for our remote forbears, as death was the great

disaster, the supreme object of dread, so it was the most powerful of magnets for the imagination. That emotional excitement which was life was to be had pre-eminently in thinking about death; in dwelling mentally on the dangers that might lead up to it, the heroism of defying it, the rewards that might follow it. We must suppose too that such exercise of the imaginative faculty made for alertness and resourcefulness in time of danger, and so contributed to the sum total of life-preserving agency. A race imaginatively indifferent to death would have stood but a poor chance in the ancient battle of life.

Such I believe to be the general anthropologic basis of our interest in tragic themes. It is of course mainly a matter of speculation. We can really *know* nothing about it, because such glimmerings of fact as we get, on which to base an opinion, are as it were of the day before yesterday. Fifty thousand years ago, for aught we know, there may have been mimicry, accompanied by song and dance and words. If so, there were the elements of drama. But nothing shows conclusively that gay elements preceded the grave, or that solemn mimicry is younger than mirthful. We do not know how many millenniums may have swept by before the rustic festival of the Attic wine-god Dionysus developed, in a favored corner of the earth, into that stately and impressive art-form that we call Greek tragedy.

The early stages of the evolution are known to us but dimly. At the end of autumn, when the wine was first tasted, the so-called rural Dionysia were held throughout Attica. The favorite sport was the *askolia*, which consisted in dancing on one leg on greased bags of inflated goatskin. "There were singing processions of the tribesmen to the altars of the god, where goats were sacrificed."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from G. C. W. Warr, *The Oresteia of Æschylus*, page xx. Sir Gilbert Murray, in the fascinating book on Euripides, previously referred to, page 179, thus describes what he calls the "ancient rite" of Dionysus: "The daemon

The song itself, at first a wild orgiastic affair, with the singers half or wholly drunk, was called a "dithyramb." In the course of time singers were masked as "satyrs," that is, they wore goat-skins and tails; *satyroi* being the name of the ancient goat-like demons of the field and forest, who were thought of as belonging to the household of Dionysus. Thus the dithyramb acquired the name of *tragōdia*, or goat-song. Presently a leader was found necessary for the proper regulation of the music and dancing. Then a responsive or dialogue element was introduced, the leader discoursing with his chorus in measured speech. Then the poet-leader became a real actor, who personated different characters by changing his mask. While he was out of sight, changing his mask, the chorus, under a new leader, took up the time with choral songs which commented on the action.

We know that by the time of Pisistratus these rustic festivals had become so popular that that enlightened tyrant brought them to the city and made them a public charge. Henceforth "goat-songs" were performed with great splendor at the city Dionysia in the spring. Æschylus introduced a second actor, Sophocles a third; and this small cast of actors was able, by change of mask during the performance, to represent all the characters needed for a somewhat elaborate action. Just how it came about that the main performance presently lost touch in a great degree—never entirely—with the riotous cult of the wine-god, we do not precisely know. It is an open field for speculation. At any rate that which had been a rustic orgy quickly evolved into a national dramatic festival in which all Hellas took an interest.

The enormous prestige of Greek tragedy, as the most im-

must have his enemy who is like himself; then we must have the contest, the tearing asunder, the messenger, the lamentation mixed with joy-cries, the discovery of the scattered members—and by a sort of doubling the discovery of the true God—and the epiphany of the dæmon in glory."

pressive artistic fact in the life of the most artistic people that ever lived, has so bewitched the modern imagination since the Renaissance that we easily overlook the essential ugliness of the raw material out of which Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides built up their stately illusions. The *Stoff* of a Greek tragedy is nearly always a tale of revolting crime and horrible expiation. Nearly one-half of all the extant dramas relate to the loathsome history of two royal lines, that of Pelops and that of Labdacus. And what a chamber of horrors it is into which we are ushered! Tantalus, the son of Zeus, kills his son Pelops, boils the body and serves it up as a feast for the gods. Restored to life, Pelops wantonly kills the charioteer Myrtilus, who had helped him by fraud to win a kingdom. Atreus, son of Pelops, kills the children of his brother Thyestes and gives them to his father to eat. Agamemnon, son of Atreus, is killed by his faithless wife Clytemnestra, who in turn is murdered by her son Orestes. Such is the order of facts which occupied the imagination of Æschylus when he wrote his magnificent trilogy.

Again, King Laius of Thebes is warned by an oracle that he will die at the hands of his own son. To defeat the oracle he exposes the infant Œdipus to death; but the child is saved, grows up to manhood, slays his father unwittingly, marries his mother Jocasta, and has by her two daughters and two sons, the latter of whom kill each other in battle. The horrified mother hangs herself. Œdipus puts out his own eyes and wanders about in helpless misery.—This revolting story underlies the three greatest plays of Sophocles. It is true that in a few plays there is no element of loathsome horror. But they are inferior in poetic power as in dramatic interest. The greatest Greek plays are visualized tales of abominable crime and its consequences, or else of excruciating agony.

But after all, that which interested the Greek poet and

the Greek spectator was not so much the visible horror and the visible agony as the relation of crime and suffering to the moral government of the world. How can such things happen if there be gods who rule the world wisely and well? The central problem of the great Oresteian trilogy is simply this: If a son kill his mother because she has killed his father after dishonoring his bed, shall that son be justified of the higher powers or not? Æschylus answers in the affirmative. As is well known, the mind of Sophocles was ever turning on the ethical bearings of his theme. And what wonder if he accepted the idea of an over-ruling *moira* or fate, to which the gods themselves were subject—a mysterious destiny which must work itself out, even if sometimes, as in the case of Œdipus, the man himself was conscious of no wrong-doing.

The peculiar type of performance which the Greeks developed out of their Dionysia has not only furnished the modern world with its customary name for the serious drama, but has had an important share in fixing the mental associations of the word "tragedy." In their miscellaneous borrowing of things Greek the Romans never really borrowed Greek tragedy, but they did develop a literary interest in it. This interest appears in the tragedies of Seneca, for whom the essence of the matter seems to have been the excitation of nerve-thrilling horror. He borrows the staple Greek themes of fiendish crime and awful retribution, and his characters express themselves in pompous rant. It should be remembered that Seneca lived in an age when monstrous murders were very common in high circles, and that he held suicide to be the noblest mode of self-rescue from an intolerable situation.

It is now well understood that the real parent of the modern drama, which sprang up in the wake of the Renaissance, first in Spain, then in England, then in France, was the medieval popular drama which had existed in the

various forms of mystery, miracle-play, morality, chronicle play and shrovetide farce. But in the latter stages of the slow and gradual process whereby an artistic drama of literary importance evolved out of these crude medieval forms, the classical tradition came in as an influence making for compactness, dignity and concentration. It was weakest in Spain, strongest in France. Nowhere, however, was what we call the classical tradition a body of ideas deriving directly from the Greeks. The ideas came rather from the humanists, who harked back to Roman literature. It was not the peerless playwright Sophocles, but the ranting horror-monger Seneca who represented for the humanists the perfection of the tragic art as practised by the idolized ancients.

It was partly for this reason that the new tragedy became in the main a tragedy of blood and vengeance. Of course this was not the only reason. By virtue of his evolution man is a fighting and blood-letting animal. We may wish it were not so, but the fact remains. For mankind taken by and large nothing is so interesting as a spectacle of fierce passion leading up to bloodshed. In looking at such a spectacle, in vividly realizing its details, in thinking about it, they get that emotional excitement which is life, and which is, at the same time, the ultimate ground of the universal passion for mimic representations. No wonder, then, when the early English playwrights began to make plays for people who had paid their money to see a show; when the main purpose was no longer to better morals or to build men up in the religious life, but to provide emotional excitement, so that people would come again and bring their friends and swell the receipts—no wonder that the early playwrights saw the advantage of providing plenty of murder. This much they hardly needed to learn from abroad. But some of them were young scholars fresh from the university, who found in play-writ-

ing the shortest road to livelihood and fame. For such men it was natural to eke out their own supply of atrocities by drawing on the supply of antiquity, and especially to take hints from the great horror-monger Seneca.

In the hands of Shakespeare, as all the world knows, the tragedy of blood and vengeance speedily developed into an incomparable art-form which, like that of Sophocles, marks a new culminating-point in the history of dramatic achievement. And is it not a little singular, when one pauses to think of it, that all the wealth of thought and the imaginative splendor which we admire in the Shakespearian tragedy should have been largely called into being by the contemplation of murder and vengeance? That the noblest of all our literary forms should be thus deeply rooted in the subsoil of man's inhumanity to man?

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## THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

THE theory of the non-historicity of the central figure of the New Testament is to-day in the position of the stone spoken of in the scriptures as having been refused by the builders of the temple. Those who profess to be builders of the temple of modern Christianity will have nothing to do with it. One calls it "a negligible extravagance," another describes it as "grotesque," another avers that any one who professes to hold it "ought to have his bumps examined." It is verily disallowed of men. Whether it is "chosen of God and precious" does not, of course, necessarily follow; all that is claimed here is that the fact of its being rejected by the builders does not of itself prove that it is worthless. That can only be determined by the fact whether or not it fits into the vacant place in the wall where the stone is needed. In the legend to which reference has been made the rejected stone became the chief stone of the corner. It was the one stone needed to complete the building. It is the belief of the writer that the theory of the non-historicity of the central figure of the New Testament is the only theory which will explain the New Testament, the only theory which will introduce coherency and intelligibility to contemporary Christian theology, the only theory which will heal the divisions between liberal and orthodox and present a rational Christianity to the modern mind which will accept no other.

It is not claimed that the non-historicity of the central figure of the New Testament has been proved or can be proved. No one can prove a negative, and certainly no one could prove a negative such as this would be. It would amount to a claim that one had examined every nook and cranny of the Greek and Roman world in the first century and before, and found no Jesus. Such a thing is clearly preposterous, and no such thing is even hinted at here. What is claimed is that the central figure described and implied in the New Testament is not a person who could have lived within the range and limits of history, that the attempt to interpret the New Testament on the theory that its central figure was historical breaks down. The New Testament refuses to be explained on such a supposition. To explain the New Testament one must begin with some working theory or hypothesis. Such working hypothesis or theory is not proved to begin with, but taken for granted with a view to seeing whether it will account for certain facts. The strength of the theory lies in its power to account for the facts involved. If it does account for them completely, this is regarded as the strongest possible evidence of its truth and the theory is then considered proved. For example, the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy which assumed that the earth is the center of the solar system, and that the sun revolves round the earth, was for centuries regarded as proved because it seemed to account for the movements of the heavenly bodies. It was seen to be a complicated theory,

"With centric and eccentric scribbled o'er,  
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb,"

and there were not wanting those who doubted its truth. It held its place, however, till the sixteenth century when the monk Copernicus propounded another theory, its direct reversal, inasmuch as it assumed the centrality of the sun and the revolution of the earth round it. Since then the

Copernican theory has been everywhere regarded as proved, because it is seen to fit into the facts of the universe as a key fits into the wards of its lock.

When an increasing number of facts is left unaccounted for by a theory which has long been accepted, it is time to doubt the validity of that theory and seek another. This is the condition in which the Christian world at present finds itself in relation to the question of the origin of Christianity. Up to the present time the New Testament has been read on the supposition that its central figure was historical. There have been occasional protests throughout the ages, but these have been silenced by the authoritative voice of the dominant church. It will be granted that if this supposition be not well founded there will be no possibility of understanding the New Testament. This is not to say that it will be wholly misunderstood, that no good will be got out of its perusal or study, for the spiritual quality of the precepts and parables and incidents of the Gospels, the ethics of the Epistles, remains the same whatever theory of the origin of the literature be held. At the same time the New Testament will be thoroughly misunderstood if the presupposition that the central figure of it on which all study of it has been based hitherto was a historical person be not well founded. This is not a question of either ability or scholarship. No amount of ability or of scholarship will avail if a radically wrong point of view be taken at the start. This may be illustrated by a reference to the Old Testament. The higher criticism has taught us to read the Old Testament by showing the birth-succession of Israel's thought concerning God and man. We are enabled to see that that thought was a true development according to the law of normal evolution. As the books of the Old Testament are arranged in our Bible the natural order is reversed, and everything is topsy-turvy. It is as if in the arrangement of English literature we should place the

scientific books of the nineteenth century before the dramatic literature of the Elizabethan age, and attempt to read and understand the literature in that order. We might, of course, get some good from such a reading and appreciate many beautiful individual gems of poetry and prose, but we could not understand the literature as a whole. To understand the Old Testament we must follow the order in which the higher criticism places the books. The one central fact which the higher criticism has made clear is the priority of the prophets, and the late authorship of the so-called books of Moses. We now understand that the order in which the books stand shows the order in which they became holy scripture, the order in which reverence began to attach itself to the literature, not the order in which it arose. But to read it intelligently we must read it in the latter order, and not the first. The stories of "beginnings," of creation, of the flood, of the Patriarchs, of the migrations, of the exodus, the elaborate legislation of Leviticus and Numbers, Deuteronomy or second law, the histories of the kings of Judah and Israel—all are developments of the principles laid down by Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, and their successors. All this illustrates the importance of a right point of view, and the impossibility of understanding any piece of literature until that is gained.

Suppose now that the authors of the New Testament did not mean that their account of the central figure of the Gospels and Epistles should be taken as historical, or that, as a matter of fact, actual investigation shows that it is not historical, then no ability or scholarship will avail; the study of the New Testament will be very largely misdirected effort, and the results of such study will be confusing and misleading, and that in spite of the purity of motive and earnestness of purpose that have gone into the study.

There has been an uneasy feeling in the minds of many earnest students of the New Testament for some time that something was wrong. The results of such study are so contradictory and confusing. It is a commonplace to-day in all intelligent circles that the theology of the churches is in a very unsatisfactory state. No clear, well understood message comes from the pulpits of these churches. There is a perfect passion for vague statements, and what seems a deliberate attempt to ignore even the well established results of the higher criticism so far at least as these bear upon the New Testament. There is a willingness to admit these results in regard to the Old Testament, but it is no exaggeration to affirm that the leaders of the official churches are trying to go on as though nothing had happened. Texts are quoted from the Fourth Gospel as proving what Jesus said, when every one knows that the critics have given up that Gospel as being in any sense a history of Jesus. The same may be said, in truth, of the Synoptics and Epistles, though it is not so widely acknowledged. The length to which the policy of ignoring the results of well established scholarship is carried even by those who profess to be liberal is amazing. There seems to be a veritable conspiracy of silence entered into by the leaders of the official churches of Christendom in regard to New Testament criticism. The people, generally, feel the unreality which has smitten the churches, though of course they cannot tell the cause of it. The leaders of the churches, for example, wish it to be still understood that the "gospel" they preach is the story of a divine being who had his abode in heaven prior to his incarnation, that he came to earth to suffer and die for man, that his sufferings lasted only a few hours or a few years, and that after they were over he was received into heaven with the acclaim of angels and archangels and the approval of his father. They imply that this story is historically true, and they present it

as the most wonderful manifestation of love and sacrifice in all the world. They expect the people to prostrate themselves before this "story" and worship it. But the people feel the unreality of it, though they may say little about it. They easily see that thousands of men and women in every age have done far more than this, and that too with no expectation of reward, having had to die in the dark. Many reasons are given why the people are leaving the churches; may not the chief reason be here,—the failure of the message of the churches to produce in the minds of the people any sense of reality? The "gospel" as presented by the churches does not "ring true" as history. The cause of all this is really not far to seek. The intelligent study of the New Testament is only about one hundred years old. Albert Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus* sums up the attempts that have been made during that time to write the life of the central figure of Gospels and Epistles. The book has been well described as "a cemetery of discarded hypotheses." The main result of the book is to show the utter failure of the attempt to write a Life of Jesus. This is a most remarkable result when we remember that the ablest and most consecrated minds of Christendom have been engaged upon the task. It surely suggests the query whether the point of view occupied by the writers is the correct one, and it makes reasonable the attempt to see whether another and radically different standpoint will not give better results.

We have gone far enough to know where the trouble lies. There is an inner contradiction in the way the Christian church has conceived of him whom it has called its Lord. It has worshiped him as God and it has tried to follow him as a man, and it has been justified in this by the New Testament itself. The writers of the New Testament worship Jesus as a God, and they portray him with human traits of character which are to be imitated by his fol-

lowers. Nowhere, perhaps, has this inner contradiction been more clearly set forth than in a book almost forgotten now, published thirty-five years ago, *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ* by Reginald W. Macan. The author shows that both members of the inner contradiction have remained beside and outside each other "false in its special oneness, and each justified in its oneness against the other. If Christ is God, he is not man; if man, not God." He finds a parallel to this contradiction in the antithesis of matter and mind which has dominated modern philosophy ever since Descartes; "the same process of one-sided assertion repeats itself here, with the same solution, which is no solution." The progress of metaphysics exhibited, just as the progress of theology had done, "the continual separation and driving out of one another of the two elements originally set in juxtaposition, now the exclusive assertion of the one, now the exclusive assertion of the other, and then their attempted reunion by means of a third, which in its turn must fall into the same elementary antithesis, or finally, their bare reassertion, one beside the other." The right standpoint for the solution of the inner contradiction in science and philosophy is the principle of unity, of metaphysical monism, because it abolishes the absolute dualism which implies a contradiction in the ultimate nature of things. The same contradiction is involved in the church doctrine of the divine and human in the person of the Jesus of the Gospels and Epistles, a contradiction "before which nothing awaits us but permanent intellectual confusion." The only legitimate metaphysics must be monistic; so the only legitimate theology must be monistic, and also the only legitimate Christology must be monistic; and the question of questions is how this monism is to be reached.

The way of the liberal theology has been to emphasize the human side of the central figure of the New Testament

to the exclusion of the divine side. It began its course by repudiating the supernatural Christ of the church in the interest of a Jesus who was purely human, and the whole effort of the liberal critics for the last half-century has been to find this human Jesus. The result is stated succinctly by Schweitzer in the last chapter of his book. "There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the life of Jesus. The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the ethic of the kingdom of God, who founded the kingdom of heaven on earth and died to give his work its final consecration, never had any existence. He is a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in a historical garb." This is not meant to deny that a Jesus of some sort existed at the beginning of our era; it denies that the Jesus of the liberal critics existed then; it affirms that the Jesus of the liberal critics is the product of the imagination of the liberal theologians themselves.

This failure of the liberal theology to reduce the central figure of the New Testament to the dimensions of a man ought at least to justify the attempt to interpret the New Testament on the theory that that central figure is a God. The situation is very curious. No attempt is made on the part of the strictly orthodox to show that their Christ was historical. It seems to be taken for granted that such a task is impossible of accomplishment. It is left to the liberals to prove the historicity of Jesus. And the reason of this is that the only Jesus who can be historical is a human Jesus. "The Absolute," said Lessing long ago, "never descends into history." "God never speaks," says Emerson. The meaning of these great sayings is plain. They do not deny the presence of God in history, or that God speaks through the lives of men; they mean that God does not, as God, descend into history and that

God does not speak in articulate words. Whenever any words are represented as having been uttered by God, it will be found that they have come through the lips and heart of some man. And this at once answers the objection that the non-historicity of the central figure of the New Testament implies his unreality, the implication being that what is not historical cannot be real. There is a type of mind that cannot see any reality in a story unless it be historically true. It is akin to the type of mind that asks what a poem proves! Both Lessing and Emerson could be cited to show that both believed in the reality of deity. Both believed that the universe is the manifestation of deity, and that in a higher sense God is continually speaking. The theory that affirms that the central figure of the New Testament is non-historical, no more denies its reality than the affirmation of the non-historicity of the central figure of the Old Testament denies the reality of that. The central figure of the Old Testament is the God of the Old Testament. There is no one who will contend that the God of the Old Testament was an historical character. He was not a being who appeared within the range and limits of history. There is all the difference in the world between any historical character of the Old Testament, such as Abraham or David or Isaiah, and the God in whom these men believed. The conception or idea of God varies at different periods of the history. One of the charms of the study of the Old Testament is in tracing the stages through which the idea passed as the experience of the people widened. The God of the patriarchs is not the God of the prophets, and the God of the prophets is not the God of the priests of later Judaism. In the early ages he was El-Shaddai, God Almighty; to Moses he was known as Yahveh; to the psalmists he was the father who pitieth his children; and to the prophets he was the God of righteousness, who demanded righteousness from his people. There are in-

deed stories of miracle in which we are told that the natural and historical order was broken, and God appeared to men in visible form. Without entering upon the vexed question of miracles, there is no one who would affirm that the reality of the God of the Old Testament depends upon these stories. He is *in* the whole history, though above it controlling it, and while he never descends into history, never appears in bodily form, is in no sense a historical character, yet he it is who gives reality to the whole course of development. How real was Yahveh to the prophets and psalmists! We do not make the mistake of identifying the God of the Old Testament with God as he is in himself. We say that Yahveh was God as the Hebrew was able to conceive him. The real God reveals himself to men through their own thoughts of him, through their experience; their idea of God is the reaction or reflection of their experience. This is a universal principle. The world in which man lives in any age or land is never the actual things as they are, but his thought of these, the reaction of his experience upon these, the *Ding an sich*, as these are reflected in and through his experience. Just as it is a mistake to say that we do not know the things in themselves because we know them through phenomena, for the phenomena reveal them rather than conceal them, so it is a mistake to say that we do not know God because we do not know Him as he is in himself. All our knowledge is relative; hence the idea of God varies in different lands and ages. The Old Testament gives us, as I have said, the true birth succession of Israel's thought about God. Each stage of the development gives us a different aspect of God. We never say that there is no revelation of God in the Old Testament, because God did not incarnate himself in the course of its history. That is to say, the non-historicity of the God of the Old Testament does not militate against his reality. We never say that because he was not historical he was

mythical in the sense of unreal. If we mean that Yahveh was the name of some tribal deity, we are doubtless right enough, but that is an incorrect use of the word myth. Whatever name men give to God must be derived from somewhere; it cannot come from the sky. Barton in his *Semitic Studies* gives reasons for the belief that Yahveh was originally the name of a mother goddess, going back to the time when the family descended through the mother, and when, as a consequence, the deities were feminine. All this, however, does not justify us in calling Yahveh mythical, far less does it justify us in making him unreal. It is a most superficial notion that what is not historically true is not true at all. Cannot God reveal himself through the thoughts of men? Which is the more real, matter or spirit? Which would be the more enduring, a writing by the finger of God on the sands of Palestine, or an inbreathing into the living minds and hearts of men? Which is the more likely method of revelation, and which would bespeak the greater reality? There is, I am sure, only one answer to such questions.

Now the central figure of the New Testament is the logical successor of the central figure of the Old Testament. It is that universalized and Hellenized. The central figure of the New Testament is the God of the New Testament. Just as there is all the difference in the world between any historical character of the Old Testament and Yahveh, so there is all the difference in the world between the Jesus Christ of the New Testament and any historical character mentioned there, such as Paul, or John, or James, or Peter. The one outstanding feature of the New Testament is the worship of its central figure. Just as Yahveh in the Old Testament is an aspect or appearance of the one eternal God—the eternal God as understood by the Hebrew, seen through the experience of the Jewish people, the reflection from their experience of life—so it is with

the Jesus Christ of the New. Whenever one affirms the non-historicity of the central figure of the New Testament he is at once charged with affirming that he was a mere myth imagined by the early Christians. But nothing could be more unjust than this. The alternative is not history or myth, else all who affirm the non-historicity of Yahveh affirm with the same breath his mythical character. An immense deal of prejudice has been created or excited against the non-historicity theory by the publication of Professor Drews's *Die Christusmythe*. Probably because of that book, the man in the street, if not the man in the drawing-room as well, will persist in calling it the "mythical" theory. But all the same the term is essentially inapplicable. The alternative is better put, history or symbol. To say that the story of Jesus is non-historical is not to say that it is mythical; it is to say that it is symbolical. The myth is always unconscious and unreflective on the part of those who tell it; whereas the symbolism of the New Testament is perfectly conscious and deliberate. The late Prof. G. P. Fisher of Yale states the difference between myth and fable or parable with his usual exactness. "There is no consciousness on the part of those from whom the myth emanates that the product of their fancy and feeling is fictitious. Both fable and parable are the result of conscious invention. In both the symbolical character of the narrative is distinctly recognized. From the myth, on the contrary, the element of deliberation is utterly absent; there is no questioning of its reality, no criticism or inquiry on the point, but the most simple unreflective faith." Now a careful examination of the Gospels shows that the symbolism employed is of set purpose, indeed the deliberation is intensely conscious, hence it is far removed from myth and comes under fable or parable or allegory. Nothing, therefore, could so misrepresent the non-historicity theory of the New Testament as the phrase "the Christ Myth,"

and that, unfortunately, is the phrase by which it is most widely known. The real truth is that it affirms the essential divinity or deity of the central figure of the New Testament as against the critics of the liberal school who have expended ability and learning for over half a century in seeking to disprove this divinity which has been the doctrine of the church from the beginning, and to make out that both the church in all the ages and the writers of the New Testament were alike mistaken, that this divinity which has been attributed to him was merely the idealization or apotheosis of the early Christians, blundering attempts to account for the impression which Jesus, a great and good Master who was a man like themselves, had made upon them. The liberal theory is that Jesus was a man to begin with, which of course he must have been if he was historical—a wonderful man, but still a man. Some of them exhaust language in setting forth his greatness, but he was strictly within the limits and range of history. Every feature which has made him the divine Saviour of the church has been taken from him and he has been presented as “a man among men.” These features grew, it is affirmed, like an accretion about him, and it has been the function of liberal critics to peel this accretion off and so to get at the realistic human figure.

The effort of the liberal critics finds its culmination and completion in Professor Schmiedel's nine pillars—nine passages in the Synoptic Gospels used to prove the modern critical theory of a purely human Jesus. These nine passages Professor Schmiedel characterizes as “the foundation-pillars for a truly scientific life of Jesus.” “Were such passages wholly wanting,” he continues, “it would be hard to make head against the contention that the Gospels showed us everywhere only the picture of a saint painted on a background of gold; and we could, therefore, by no means ever know how Jesus had in reality appeared—nay,

perhaps, whether indeed he had lived at all." Here the whole animus or motive of the liberal critics comes out—the underlying idea of their whole contention—if Jesus was historical he was a man; no one of them would point to the supernatural features of the life as proof that the life was historical. In other words, if Jesus was historical he was a man in the same sense as Socrates was a man, and therefore the human traits are the proof of his historicity. They never weary of pointing out the absurdity of denying the historicity of Jesus on the ground that it would be absurd to deny the historicity of Socrates or Alexander or Napoleon. Professor Schmiedel admits that in a large part of the synoptic Gospels "Jesus appears as a divine being, whether in virtue of what he says or in virtue of what he does." But the point is that in these nine passages he does not appear as a being to be worshiped, but as a "man among men." There is no space here and now for the examination of these nine passages. It must suffice to say that it can be shown that not one of them bears out his contention. And the eminent professor makes two large assumptions when he premises that no worshiper of Jesus could have attributed to him human traits as these passages do (because the worshipers of the gods of paganism often attribute to their deities human traits) and that they are primitive and not late. These assumptions vitiate his conclusion. No one denies that Jesus is spoken of as a man in the Gospels; the crucial question is: which way of speaking of him is the primitive one? According to the theory of Professor Schmiedel, and of the liberal critics generally, Jesus was a man—more of a man, indeed, than ordinary men, but still a man—and the divine attributes with which he is clothed in the Gospels are later accretions, so that as he appears in the New Testament he is a divinized man.

Now if that had been the process of the development the New Testament would have shown it. By all the

canons of probability traces of this process would have appeared. In the early parts of the New Testament there would have been many proofs of the purely human character of Jesus; and then as time went on the divine traits would have been added. But the opposite is the actual process. First we have the divine being. As Pallas Athene is fabled to have come full fledged from the head of Zeus, so Jesus came from the first writers of the New Testament a full fledged divinity. The evidence of this is on the face of the New Testament. The process of development, therefore, was not that of a divinized man, but that of a humanized God. He was conceived of by the very first Christians as an aspect or person of the One God. Using the word "person" in its classical sense of a mask worn by the actor on the stage, he was a person of the one deity; the great Pauline verse in 2 Corinthians iv. 6 "For God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face (or aspect, or person) of Jesus Christ," is an instance of the way in which he was conceived in the earliest times. Who shall say that the "shining" was less real because it was "in our hearts," and not in outward form, in history? If so, the whole revelation of God in the Old Testament is nullified because that was all subjective, that is, in the minds and hearts of men, and not in outward form. The fact that the names "Jesus" and "Christ" were names of deities prior to the beginning of our era, no more militates against the reality of the revelation in the face of Jesus Christ, than the fact that Moses got the name "Yahveh" from a Kenite tribe dims the glory of the revelation through prophet or psalmist.

All rational study of the New Testament must, then, begin with the divinity of its central figure. The *fons et origo* of the Christian movement was not a human being,

but an aspect, or character, or person, of the one eternal God. Jesus is worshiped in the New Testament as God, and it is a most significant fact that the Christian church has followed the example of apostolic Christianity in this respect in all the ages of its history with very rare exceptions. What likelihood is there that the theory which has been held by the church without any critical inquiry, that the divine Jesus Christ of the New Testament was an historical person or individual, will continue to hold the credence of men? The church has been right in its contention that Jesus Christ, as the New Testament presents him, is a divine being; but it cannot rebut the arguments by which liberal Christianity has shown that the passages which have proved this divinity do not recite historical facts. The work which has been done by liberal Christianity, in showing the non-historicity of those parts of the New Testament which have been the proof-texts of the orthodox church, is a work which has been done for all time, and can never be undone. We may be sure that no so-called "facts" furnished by the Society of Psychical Research, to which some in their desperation are appealing, will in the end succeed in restoring those parts of the New Testament to the credence of men. What an uncertain, precarious foundation on which to rest a great religion like Christianity this would be were it possible! Not in this direction is help to be found, but in a frank acknowledgment of the facts of the situation, which are that the worship of Jesus is of the very essence of the religion of the New Testament, and that the human traits with which the writers clothe him are symbolic and not historic in their character.

The first thing that needs to be grasped is just what it was which formed the burden of apostolic preaching. What was the message proclaimed by Peter and Paul, by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, in its essence? The writings

of Paul are proof positive that it was not the fact that a great teacher had been born in Palestine; for these writings are not a recital of his teachings. There are no teachings of Jesus in the Epistles of Paul, no sermon on the mount, no parables, no Lord's prayer, no *Logia*. The essence of the apostolic preaching was the worship of the one God under the aspect or character or person of Jesus. It is quite manifest that Jesus was not the only name which was used to carry this great doctrine. There was the name "Christ" which with "Jesus" was the name of a divine or semi-divine being before the Christian era. These two were brought together as the name of one being by the movement which afterwards became historical Christianity; but neither the one nor the other denoted at first a historical person. The idea that "One was to come" was familiar in all the circles of the Jews scattered up and down the Greco-Roman world; and all that was needed for this transition to take place was that a story should arise that "the One had come." It is the luminous suggestion of Mr. Thomas Taylor in his *Origins of Christianity* that the occasion of this transition was the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70. Before that catastrophic event there were no Christians in the sense of believers in a historical Jesus; there were only Messianists, or Believers in "One to come." It is these Messianists who are meant by Tacitus in the famous passage in which he records that Nero put on the "Christians" the blame of setting fire to Rome. The great historian mistakes the Messianists of Nero's time for the Christians of his own day,—a very natural mistake for a high-born Roman to make. In the apocalyptic passages in the Gospels which predict the end of the world, or age, and which are curiously mixed up with the destruction of Jerusalem, we are to see the evidence of the existence of this earlier Messianic movement.

But the names "Jesus" and "Christ" were not the only

names that stood for the worship of the One God which we must never forget was the original content of the new religion. In the different names which were in vogue we may see an evidence of the fact that the movement in behalf of monotheism, the worship of the One God, was very wide spread. It is difficult to see on the supposition that the originating source was a historical individual, how there could have been these different names. There were "Son of Man," "Second Adam," "The Man from Heaven," "The Nazarene," "Great High Priest," "The Lamb," "Alpha and Omega," "Baradam," "Barnasa," etc., and these names, I repeat, are the evidence that there was a great cult or association with branches scattered all over the Mediterranean world which differed indeed in the method of presenting the great doctrine of the One God, but which were united in the doctrine itself. These differences in the names or aspects in which the doctrine was presented, let it be remembered, appear in the earliest parts of the New Testament, and are thus primitive, not a late growth; and therefore, could not have been applied first to one historical person. These names must have been symbols representing the new doctrine. It has long been seen that various ideas or phases of the Christ or Jesus are in the New Testament, and it has taxed the ingenuity of commentators to bring these into some kind of agreement. It has never been done, because there was no agreement to start with. The individual idiosyncrasies of the New Testament writers do not account for these variations, and there is no proof of one all-dominating personality. How could the representations of Paul, of John, of the apocalypticist, of Mark, be referred to one overruling person? So difficult have the critical commentators found this to be that some of them have given up the representation of John and of the apocalypticist altogether as telling us anything about Jesus. The whole thing becomes clear enough when it is under-

stood that they do not mean and were never intended to describe one person, but are the various aspects in which the doctrine of One God was conceived by different parties. There is only one thing in which all the various parts of the New Testament are united, and that is in asserting the divinity or deity of the aspect, or character, or person of the One God under whatever name. We can easily see why this must be so; because the essence of the doctrine proclaimed by the cult or community wherever found was "Fear God and give Him glory" (Rev. xiv. 7). This was the eternal Gospel for the inhabitants of the earth, and for every nation and tribe and language and people proclaimed by the angel in mid-heaven. Or to take it out of the language of the apocalyptist, the golden thread which runs through the whole New Testament is this doctrine of the One God, and in every case the names "Jesus," "Christ," "Saviour," etc., stand for this doctrine of One God.

In the fact that the cult or community which afterwards became the Christian church was originally a secret society, we have the reason why the symbolism of these names was used. The proof of this fact lies on the surface of the New Testament. I will cite only a few passages which might be indefinitely multiplied. Jesus is represented as teaching his disciples in a different way from that which he used with others. "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but unto them that are without it is not given." This is the reason why the teaching was in parables. It is usually assumed that the parable was used to make matters plain. That this was not the case is proved by the fact that the parable had to be explained to the disciples, and that its purpose for those who were without was that they should not understand it. "Therefore speak I unto them in parables; because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not,

neither do they understand." "Fear not, little flock," Jesus is made to say again, "for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom." "Many are called, but few chosen." "Cast not your pearls before swine, neither give that which is holy unto the dogs." "How is it that thou wilt show thyself unto us and not unto the world?" the disciples are made to ask the Master. For making the cult a secret society there were two reasons. Unwonted knowledge among the ancients was a very dangerous possession, and religious ideas other than those in vogue among the masses sought protection in obscurity. Wherever the human mind was active and spiritual there had arisen systems of exoteric and esoteric instruction, that is, of truth acknowledged and of truth concealed. And besides this general reason there were the special circumstances of the cult itself. Organized for the purpose of overthrowing the prevailing idolatry of the nations, and substituting the worship of the One God instead, it was exposed to the enmity and persecution of the nations. It was compelled thus to use symbols which were unintelligible to those outside but which were known to initiates, to the "little ones" or "little flock," to the "chosen." But while the primitive teaching of the cult or community was thus secret and esoteric, and that of necessity, the intention was to make it public as soon as that was possible. "Whatever ye have spoken in darkness shall be heard in the light; and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon the housetops." There are evidences of controversy among the early members of the communities: whether this open policy was wise. Some of the more cautious thought it was premature; others who were braver, perhaps, or more zealous, argued that the lamp was not intended to be put under a bushel or a bed, but on a stand that it might give light to all who were in the house. Paul was one of those who advocated the open method.

The mystery hid from ages and generations was now to be made manifest. The Gospel narratives are to be read as symbolic stories which "half revealed and half concealed" the hidden truth. One of the most patent of all symbolism is the casting out of demons or evil spirits. What a trouble it has been to commentators to reconcile the perfection of Jesus with such a crude superstition as demoniacal possession! How clear it all becomes when one understands that by the demons or evil spirits were symbolized the gods of heathenism, and by the casting out of them, the deliverance brought by the doctrine of One God under the aspect or person of Jesus. That this is the meaning of demoniacal possession and its cure ought to be manifest from the fact that all such stories of healing or cure took place in Galilee, and none of them in Judea. It is unbelievable that the northern province was full of these demoniacs, and that the southern one was free from them. It becomes clear when we remember that Galilee was regarded as the peculiar home of idolatry, accounted for by the way in which that province was settled by heathens in early times. Hence the casting out of the demons was said to have taken place there.

The method of teaching by symbol was a continuation or result of the idealizing tendency in the Hellenistic synagogues of Diaspora which interpreted the Old Testament allegorically. It was the conviction of these early Christians, who, however, were not yet called Christians, that Judaism had not brought the true knowledge of God. We call these men Gnostics, men who knew, men who had attained to a higher knowledge of God, who had, under the influence of Greek philosophy, spiritualized Judaism and were aiming at the reconstruction of a universal religion which would appeal to all minds. One of the most signal triumphs of scholarship within recent years is the proof that this Gnosticism antedated Christianity, that the latter

was the outgrowth of the former, instead of *vice versa* as has long been supposed. With these Gnostics Jesus became the symbol of a new divine knowledge of the One God, which they confidently believed would heal all the spiritual maladies of humanity. The New Testament will never be understood until it is clearly seen that the so-called historical Jesus with all the deeds attributed to him, with all the events that are said to have befallen him, his miracles, his death, his resurrection, his ascension, were symbols of the ideas of these Gnostics. The form of faith held by these men was on a higher level than that which very soon became the faith of the church, for very soon the unenlightened multitude made its voice heard as against these men who knew. One should not find fault with the course of history. It was, no doubt, natural that the world should not remain at the high level occupied by these Gnostics. Especially in view of the new race which was soon to overrun the fair fields of the old world, and form the population of the new, it was no doubt necessary that there should be a fall in spirituality. But this should not blind us to the fact that there *was* a fall, and that the historical interpretation of the Gospel stories which the church has given them, is on a distinctly lower level than the teaching of these Gnostics who were the first Christians. When we read that Jesus gave sight to the blind, that he cured the man with a withered hand, that he cast out devils, that he raised the dead Lazarus to life, we are to understand that the new divine knowledge attained by these men, who were, perhaps, the most spiritual men who ever lived, would give spiritual light and life to the crippled and dying pagan world. Instead of our Gospels being the product of fishermen, unlearned and ignorant, they were the work of deep thinkers who were perfectly conscious of the inner meaning of the parables and symbols they invented; they probably would have been astonished could they have foreseen

that their efforts to make known the truth would have been so greatly misinterpreted.

The gross literal interpretation of the Gospel stories, and of the Gospel story as a whole, did not come all at once; we can see it growing before our very eyes as spirituality declined. Ignatius lived in the first quarter of the second century, and in his Epistles we find him very much opposed to the spiritual interpretation of the Gospel, but he argues for the historical interpretation as one would who is putting forth something new, not as a conservative would speak who was confident that he represented the ancient view. The so-called Apostles' Creed, which defines Christianity as a series of historical facts, cannot be traced further back than the middle of the second century, even in its crudest form. Tertullian of North Africa and his older contemporary, Irenæus of southern Gaul, about the end of the second century, try to make out that the spiritual interpretation of the Gospel is a heresy of recent growth, but they do not succeed, though they did succeed in impressing their view—the historical interpretation—upon the mind of the church. The truth had to wait for recognition to a later day. The triumph of the Catholic church was synchronous with the triumph of the canon, and that again was synchronous with the triumph of literalism. Ever since that early day the interpretation of the New Testament according to the historical method has lain like an incubus upon the minds of men. Under its pressure the higher criticism of the New Testament, in its efforts to find something in the Gospel story which is historical, has denied the divinity or deity of its central figure, thus eviscerating the New Testament of all that makes it a Gospel message for humanity.

The restoration of the spiritual view of the New Testament, which, when completed, will restore divinity or deity to its central figure in the only way in which it can be

restored, has already begun. The critics have begun to recognize and acknowledge the symbolic character of the Fourth Gospel. As usual this is a compromise, that is to say, they wish to make out that the Evangelist does tell us of historical facts, but at the same time uses these historical facts as symbols of spiritual truth. Whether there were historical facts or not is immaterial. What is important is that they were used as symbols; therefore the spiritual truth is the supremely important thing. It has long been noticed that there are no parables in the Fourth Gospel, and that the miracles it contains are parables. Now it would be as foolish to affirm the historicity of the parable of the good Samaritan or of the prodigal son of Luke's Gospel as to affirm the historicity of the raising of Lazarus from the dead, or the restoration of sight to the man born blind, or the turning of the water into wine at the marriage at Cana of Galilee, or the feeding the five thousand with two fishes and five loaves, or any other miracle recorded in the Fourth Gospel. No one is shocked when it is affirmed that there never was a historical good Samaritan, that the character in Luke is a symbolic figure, just as the characters of the parable of the prodigal son are all symbolical and not historical. It is easy to see whence the author of the Fourth Gospel derived his miracle-parables. Take the raising of Lazarus from the dead. It immediately calls up the parable of Dives and Lazarus in the sixteenth chapter of Luke's Gospel. No one would be so foolhardy as to affirm the historicity of this parable. "The significant name" as Alford points out, Lazarus (Eleazarus = *Deus-Auxilium*) should have prevented the expositors from imagining this to be true history. The symbolism of it is very clear. Dives stands for the Jew who is rich in the law, the prophets, the promises and oracles of God. And Lazarus is the pagan who is dependent upon the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table. The rich man, as

Alford remarks, "is not accused of any flagrant crimes." The motive of the parable is not moral, but religious. The offence of the rich man, the Jew, was that he had not accepted the cult of Jesus, a fact which all history bears out. Luke gives a hint of one rising from the dead as a means of convincing the Jews that the new religion was a message from God, and affirms that they who had Moses and the prophets would not be convinced even by this. From this hint the Fourth Evangelist constructs his whole story, which is symbolic from beginning to end. It is quite manifest that he never intended to write history. The same remark may be made concerning all the other miracle-parables in the Fourth Gospel; and what is more important, the same is true of the central figure of the Gospel as a whole. That is to say, not only are the miracle-parables symbols of spiritual truth, but Jesus Christ, the hero of the Gospel, is a symbol of the doctrine of the one God, which was to bring life and salvation to the idolatrous pagan world. And that is to say further, Jesus Christ is an aspect or person of the one eternal God. To say that the Fourth Gospel is not historical is not to say that it is not true, for it is a very shallow conception that affirms truth only of what is historical. What John affirms of the Jesus Christ of his Gospel, that he is the life and light of men, that he is the bread of life, the door of salvation, the resurrection, and the life, the I am, is true of the one eternal God. In one word, the aspect or character or person of God which constituted Jesus the Christ, was the aspect or character or person of Saviour.

What is true of the Fourth Gospel is true also of the synoptics. "It must be recognized," says Pfleiderer, "that in respect of the recasting of the history under theological influences, the whole of our Gospels stand in principle on the same footing. The distinction between Mark, the other two synoptics, and John is only relative—a distinction of

degree corresponding to the different stages of theological reflection and the development of the ecclesiastical consciousness." Albert Schweitzer, who quotes this from Pfleiderer, exclaims (*Quest of the Historical Jesus*, page 312): "If only Bruno Bauer could have lived to see this triumph of his opinions!" Mark, the Second Gospel, has been accounted by the liberal critics the most realistic; but they have overlooked the dogmatic element which dominates Mark throughout. He is concerned with the doctrine that Jesus is the Christ, and while he gives his doctrine a historical form, there is no evidence either that he wrote history or that he intended to write it. The Second Evangelist is great on the power of Jesus over unclean spirits or demons, and these, we have seen, denote the gods of heathenism, and the power of Jesus, the power of the One God to cast them out. He speaks of Jesus having compassion upon the multitude, but it is not the compassion of one human being for other human beings which is meant, but the compassion of a deity for men. Mark conceives of Jesus as an Old Testament prophet conceived of Yahveh, that is, as a divine being. Much has been made of the attitude of Jesus towards little children as proving his human feeling; but a little examination shows that the little children mentioned were believers, which children in the ordinary sense could not be. They were the "babes" to whom God reveals the secrets which he conceals from the wise and prudent. These little children are nothing else but converts, proselytes or Gentiles, and the question which is discussed in the passages Matt. xviii. 2; Mark ix. 36, 37; Luke ix. 46, 48 is the one which was such a thorny one for the early church about the admission of these converts into the kingdom of heaven. When it is said that Jesus loved the rich young ruler, no human love is meant, because the rich young ruler is a symbol of faithful Israel, and not a young man at all. Throughout the synoptics

generally, and Mark in particular, Jesus is a wonder-working and oracle-speaking God, and not a human being. Whatever human traits are mentioned are symbolic, not historic.

Perhaps at no place does the non-historical character of the Gospel story come out more clearly than in the account of the arrest, the trial, the condemnation, and the crucifixion of Jesus. It is impossible to read the story of these so-called happenings as literal history. The evidence is on the surface so that he who runs may read. So plain is it that it is only a kind of hypnotism exercised by the glamour of history upon the mind of the average man dominated by the church that prevents him from seeing it. The whole story reads naturally as the successive scenes of a mystery play. In the first place the part played by Judas is quite an unnecessary one. It is implied that Jesus was not known and had to be pointed out; whereas the fact is according to the story itself Jesus had made a public entry into Jerusalem when the people had welcomed him by shouting "Hosanna" and by spreading branches of trees in his way. It is recorded that a little while before he had driven out the money changers from the temple, which surely would have made him sufficiently known to the police of the city and the authorities of the temple. And then the whole transaction is represented as taking place between Thursday night and Friday afternoon, which was an impossibility according to both Jewish and Roman law. A learned lawyer of Edinburgh, Mr. A. Taylor Innes, wrote a book a few years ago upon the *Trial of Jesus* in which he showed conclusively that the trial and condemnation were illegal from the point of view of both Jewish and Roman jurisprudence. The eminent author did not see—perhaps it was too early for him to see—that the reason why they are illegal is that they are unhistorical. The inference he draws is one of condem-

nation of the Jewish and Roman authorities which we are now able to see is wholly unwarranted. It was the only inference that could be drawn on the supposition that the matter is history. The facts as shown by competent students of Jewish literature are that at the time when the trial and execution are supposed to have taken place, none of the Jewish priests were judicial officers, or members of the Sanhedrin; the Sanhedrin itself had no criminal jurisdiction and did not sit in the only judgment hall where a death sentence could be pronounced; the provincial governors alone could condemn a man to death; the Roman procurator was not authorized to execute any judgment of a non-official court; a capital trial according to Jewish law-court procedure could not be consummated in one day, could not be held in the night, could not take place on Friday or on the eve of a festival day; the death punishment was inflicted for no blasphemy except that of pronouncing the tabu name of Yahveh, for which stoning was the penalty; crucifixion was not a Jewish mode of executing condemned criminals; and means were taken to make the execution of the victim as painless as possible by administering an anodyne to him. The inference drawn from these facts by infidel writers has been that the whole Gospel tale of the trial and execution of Jesus was a clumsy fiction elaborated by writers who were completely ignorant of the national constitution, social organization and prevailing customs of the Jewish people at the time when the alleged events were supposed to have taken place. Such an inference is unavoidable if we start with the supposition that the writers were writing history or were intending to write history. But this would prove not only that the writers were dishonest, but that they were foolish as well, for it is as plain as day that their story is not historical. But suppose that they never intended to write history, that the story is an allegory, a dramatized narrative with a

profound spiritual meaning, and that the interest of the writers like the interest of all mystics, was in spiritual truth alone and not in history at all, then at once a new face is put upon the matter. Then we see that we are at fault in not having spiritual imagination enough to take the writers' point of view. Why should they not take advantage of the common story of the miracle plays which we know were a familiar feature in the religious life of the time? Then we are not compelled to condemn the Jewish and Roman authorities unduly or at least unjustly, and we are enabled to credit the writers with a profoundly religious purpose. This theory lifts the veil that has so long covered the Gospels and discloses their true and beautiful meaning, the deeper sense intended by the writers themselves. It shows that the original sense is far grander, higher and more spiritual than has been supposed. It substitutes a satisfying and inspiring spiritual sense for a bewildering material one.

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## THE RELIGION OF TRAGEDY AND THE CHRIST-IDEAL.

TRAGEDY (which literally translated means "goat-song") has developed from a sacrificial performance in which a male-goat was offered to Dionysus. Arriving from abroad the god used to enter with his followers in festive processions. He was accompanied by Silenus, the lover of the cup, by fauns and bacchantes raving like maniacs in exuberance of life. The ass appeared in the procession, carrying a shrine or Silenus or the god himself. Wherever the procession went, there was great rejoicing, for Dionysus spread life, joy, liberty, rapture and drunkenness.

In the Dionysian festival the adventures of the god are imitated. Having undergone suffering and death he has been born again and now he comes as a liberator and saviour. He offers himself as the exhilarating drink and is the martyr of his divinity. He, the offspring of the vine, passes through his first life as the grape. He is cruelly tortured and mangled in the wine-press; his blood is shed, and he passes through a process of fermentation to rise from the tomb again as the intoxicating drink of the vine.

The myth tells us that he was the son of Zeus and Semele, but that before his birth Hera, the wife of Zeus, induced Semele to demand that her lover should show himself to her in all his divinity. Since, however, as also

in the case of the Jewish Yahveh, no one could see God and live (Ex. xxxiii. 20) Semele died at the sight of this theophany and Zeus transferred the unborn babe to his thigh where it grew to full babyhood and was then born a second time; hence the child was called *Dithyrambos*, i. e., "he of two doors," the twice born, and the irregular meter of poetry celebrating his birth is called after him the dithyrambic measure.

Intoxication is here not regarded as a loss of self-control, but as divine obsession. The god himself is assumed to speak out of the mouth of the one who is drunk, who is inspired. Liberated from the bondage of flesh, of sorrow, and of all evil, he enters into a state of ecstasy and enjoys the bliss of divinity, of liberty, of pure spirituality.

Connected with the worship of Dionysus were the so-called mysteries, dramatic performances representing the destiny of the god, his passion, his death, his resurrection, ending in his triumphal entry into the homes and hearts of the people.

Orphic and other mysteries are parallel formations, and it appears that all of them were imported from the East, although we may be sure that mysteries, or, generally speaking, half dramatic performances and dances of a symbolic nature, were common to all people all over the earth at a certain period of their development. They existed not only in ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Phenicia and Greece, but also in Tibet, in Africa and even among the North American Indians. Under the symbolism of certain acts the initiated persons were taught in the mysteries certain religious doctrines such as the eternal reappearance of life and the immortality of the soul.

The priesthood of the old established gods of Greece may originally have been hostile or perhaps indifferent to the new movement of Dionysian mysteries, but the new

ideas were too powerful and became too popular to be ignored. It appears that the Eumolpids, the ancient priestly family of Athens, deemed it wise to incorporate the new methods in their own system of the Demeter cult, the worship of the earth-mother, and celebrated in annual repetition the Eleusinian mysteries in which the descent of Persephone to Hades was symbolized in a dramatic performance. The daughter of the earth-goddess, the maiden representing vegetation, dies annually in the fall and comes to life again in spring. The acts of the drama deal with the rape of Persephone, the search for her by the disconsolate mother and her friends, the instalment of Persephone as queen in the realm of the dead and her annual return in spring with the bloom of flowers as well as the fruit of the fields. The course of nature symbolizes man's destiny. To set forth the continuity of life a torch was handed from hand to hand, and the ear of wheat, the seed of future life, was worn by the initiates as an emblem of immortality.

We need not doubt that the performance of the fate of Osiris in the Egyptian ritual was kin in spirit, expressing the same idea. Osiris lived on earth as a benefactor of mankind, a lawgiver, as the inventor of agriculture, of writing, of science, of laws and the social order as well as of civilization in general. Egyptian religion knows of his death and his descent into the underworld where he becomes the judge of the dead endowed with the power to give to those who have obeyed his commandments a life of bliss in the fields of Aalu, the Greek Elysium.

Orpheus, the Thracian singer, was another figure in the mystery religions. We know that he lost his beloved wife Eurydice and followed her into the nether world where with his sweet song he touched the heart of the stern Hades. Hermes, the leader of souls, accompanied the faithful lovers back to life, but Orpheus could not re-

strain himself and, contrary to the dictates of the law in the land of death, he turned to behold his bride, and she disappeared. The details of the mystery performance are lost to us; we only know that Orpheus sings to the lyre, that the whole creation, especially wild animals, come to listen to his enchanting strains and that he is killed and torn to pieces by his own worshipers, by the mænads who rove with him through the mountains.

All these mysteries, these dramatic presentations of the destinies of suffering gods who offer up their lives for the good of mankind, are tragedies, and comparative religion on the basis of anthropological research among savage races has discovered that they are a modified form of prior human sacrifices. It was the god's death that was enacted, and it was the god himself, his incarnation, his representative on earth, the high-priest of the tribe or the king himself, who was originally offered as the victim, as the *hostia*, and eaten. We live by eating the god of life, by nourishing ourselves with bread, the fruit of the fields, and by drinking the blood of the grape, and in the days of savagery it was deemed necessary to perform the act in all its cruel barbarity for the sake of perpetuating this divine munificence.

In the progress of civilization human sacrifices were abolished, and the sacred animal of the god was accepted as a fit substitute in the story of Abraham who offers a ram in the place of his son, Isaac. The symbol replaced the actual deed just as the hungry souls, originally fed with real food, had to be satisfied with the viands painted on the walls of their tombs (as instanced in the chambers of the dead of ancient Egypt); and while originally a master's slaves were killed to serve him in the other world, in a more cultured age a number of figurines (the *ushabtiu* of the Egyptians) were placed in his grave to serve the same purpose.

Is there any need of asking the question, why this idea of the suffering god, his death and resurrection, is so common all over the world and among so many nations? It is obvious that this doctrine symbolizes a great truth. It is undeniable that the maintenance of life and its renewal become possible only by constant sacrifice, and the heroes of mankind are martyrs whose struggles and whose passion are the condition of a victory over evil, of the attainment of prosperity, of life and of liberty. Such has been the religion of mankind, such is the fundamental idea in the Christian faith, and such will remain the religious ideal of the future.

The kinship between the old mystery religions and Christianity was recognized by the early Christians who pictured Christ as Orpheus in the Catacombs at Rome.

We need no longer wonder that Christianity spread over the world like a wildfire on the prairie after a drought. The nations were prepared for it. Indeed they had been believing in religions which had been born of the same spirit and were based upon the conception of life as a tragedy. The grotesque mythologies of the old gods were no longer acceptable to the more civilized age, while the story of the tragedy of Golgotha was more human, and therefore more humane, although the underlying truth was not different.

The formation of the Christian doctrines is by no means an accident. The life of Jesus (if he was, as we need not doubt, a real personality) was read in the spirit of these traditions, and the old pagan beliefs were superadded upon the story of the carpenter's son of Capernaum. Hence it is easy to point out the traces of myth and legend in the Gospels and there is no doubt that the saviour ideal existed before Jesus. It existed long before the origin of Christianity, not among the Jews alone, but among all the races of mankind; and this saviour ideal assumed a new form

after the breakdown of paganism in the new religion of Christianity.

In Christianity the belief in a saviour was reestablished in a new and purified faith. The saviours of the pagans were heroes, sons of Zeus or other gods, they were gods walking on earth, they were fighters with a club or sickle sword, but Jesus is a spiritual hero, the teacher, the healer, the benefactor of mankind, conqueror of death and saviour, the martyr who gives himself up in vicarious atonement, who dies and rises from the grave to give life eternal to all who believe in him.

In this sense Augustine is perfectly right when he claims that Christianity is not a new-fangled religion but existed from the beginning under other names. He goes as far as to declare that *pileatus* (i. e., the cap-wearer, Mithras) is but another name for Christ, and so are all the pagan saviours, Æsculapius and Dionysus, Orpheus, the ancient Baal of Tyre and Bel Marduk, Osiris and even the American Hiawatha—all are parallel formations of the Christ of Christianity.

It is wrong to speak (as does Schiller) of "the pleasure" we take in seeing tragic subjects on the stage. We ought not to use the word "pleasure," we ought rather to speak of the "satisfaction" which it affords to the spectators to witness a tragedy. It is not pleasure in the common sense of the word; it is the satisfaction of an intensely spiritual want, and this want is of a religious nature. Schiller means "satisfaction" and proves in his poetical compositions that he understood the problem in spite of the misnomer of his explanation.

Prof. Calvin Thomas, on another page of this number of *The Monist*, rightly calls attention to the fact that in a more primitive state of culture man not only took delight in the performance of tragedies on the stage, but rejoiced in witnessing the infliction of actual torture in the ritual of

sacrifices; and we must bear in mind that the goat is a mere substitute for a human Dionysus, as much as the bull, the ram, the boar and other sacrificial animals symbolize the gods whose emblems they are. The Indians were proud of the prowess displayed by the victims of the sun-dance; they claimed that the Great Spirit too looked down upon them with admiration and was pleased that his children could stand such torture without wincing.

All true art is of a religious nature; so above all is the drama, and the highest drama will always remain the tragedy. It will always represent the destiny of the man who walks on the heights of life, who becomes implicated in evil, struggles, suffers and is defeated, yet in spite of his defeat his ideal conquers. Struggle, death and resurrection or apotheosis are the essential elements of the tragedy, not in the literal but in the symbolical meaning of these words, in the sense that every man constantly and unavoidably experiences these phases in his spiritual growth.

Art represents life, and every piece of art reflects a world-conception, a philosophy, a religious conviction. Since struggle, death, and a renewal of life on a higher plane are the characteristic features of life, a truly thoughtful man will naturally find a satisfaction in witnessing the performance of a tragedy.

Suffering has been a part of religious ceremonies the world over, and it is only within historical times that civilized governments have suppressed rituals of this kind. Among savage races Miss Alice C. Fletcher was present at the last performance of the sun-dance ritual among the Indians, and her detailed report can be seen in the Smithsonian Reports.

From time immemorial the Khonds, a Dravidian race in the interior of India, in Bengal and Madras, have offered, often annually, in some districts every third year, human sacrifices to the earth goddess, called Zakaree-

Pennu, or Tari-Pennu, or Bera-Pennu, or Thadha-Pennu. The victim called *meriah* had to be purchased, unless he was born a *meriah*, by being the child of a former victim, or had in childhood been devoted to this sad fate by his father or guardian.

The details of the sacrifice differed in different districts, but everywhere the victim was cut to pieces, and the slices were mixed with the seed grain or buried in the soil of the different fields. There are quite a goodly number of various descriptions extant. We quote Mr. Russell's report on the districts under his control of the year 1837:<sup>1</sup>

"The ceremonies attending the barbarous rite [Khond human sacrifice] vary in different parts of the country. In the Māliahs of Goomsur, the sacrifice is offered annually to Thadha Pennu, under the effigy of a bird intended to represent a peacock, with the view of propitiating the deity to grant favorable seasons and crops. The ceremony is performed at the expense of, and in rotation, by certain *mootahs* [districts] composing a community, and connected together from local circumstances. Besides these periodical sacrifices, others are made by single *mootahs*, and even by individuals, to avert any threatening calamity from sickness, murrain, or other causes. Grown men are the most esteemed [as victims], because the most costly. Children are purchased and reared for years with the family of the person who ultimately devotes them to a cruel death, when circumstances are supposed to demand a sacrifice at his hands. They seem to be treated with kindness, and, if young, are kept under no constraint; but when old enough to be sensible of the fate that awaits them, they are placed in fetters, and guarded. Most of those who were rescued had been sold by their parents or nearest relations, a practice which, from all we could learn, is very common.

<sup>1</sup> Edgar Thurston's *Omens and Superstitions of Southern India*, pp. 199-201.

Persons of riper age are kidnapped by wretches who trade in human flesh. The victim must always be purchased. Criminals, or prisoners captured in war, are not considered fitting subjects. The price is paid indifferently in brass utensils, cattle, or coin. The *zanee* [or priest], who may be of any caste, officiates at the sacrifice, but he performs the *poojah* [offering of flowers, incense, etc.] to the idol through the medium of the *toomba*, who must be a Khond child under seven years of age. This child is fed and clothed at the public expense, eats with no other person, and is subjected to no act deemed impure. For a month prior to the sacrifice, there is much feasting and intoxication, and dancing round the *meriah*, who is adorned with garlands, etc., and, on the day before the performance of the barbarous rite, is stupefied with toddy, and made to sit, or, if necessary, is bound at the bottom of a post bearing the effigy above described. The assembled multitude then dance around to music, and, addressing the earth, say 'Oh! God, we offer the sacrifice to you. Give us good crops, seasons, and health.' After which they address the victim. 'We bought you with a price, and did not seize you. Now we sacrifice you according to custom, and no sin rests with us.' On the following day, the victim being again intoxicated, and anointed with oil, each individual present touches the anointed part, and wipes the oil on his own head. All then proceed in procession around the village and its boundaries, preceded by music, bearing the victim on a pole, to the top of which is attached a tuft of peacock's feathers. On returning to the post, which is always placed near the village deity called Zakaree Pennu, and represented by three stones; near which the brass effigy in the shape of a peacock is buried, they kill a pig in sacrifice, and, having allowed the blood to flow into a pit prepared for the purpose, the victim who, if it has been found possible, has been previously made senseless from

intoxication, is seized and thrown in the bloody mire amid the noise of instruments. The *zanee* then cuts a piece of flesh from the body, and buries it with ceremony near the effigy of the village idol, as an offering to the earth. All the rest afterwards go through the same form, and carry the bloody prize to their villages, where the same rites are performed, part being interred near the village idol, and little bits on the boundaries. The head and face remain untouched, and the bones, when bare, are buried with them in the pit. After this horrid ceremony has been completed, a buffalo calf is brought in front of the post, and, his forefeet having been cut off, is left there till the following day. Women, dressed in male attire, and armed as men, then drink, dance, and sing round the spot, the calf is killed and eaten, and the *zanee* is dismissed with a present of rice, and a hog or calf."

Col. Campbell<sup>2</sup> writes: "One of the most common ways of offering the sacrifice in Chinna Kimedi is to the effigy of an elephant (*hatti mundo* or elephant's head) rudely carved in wood, fixed on the top of a stout post, on which it is made to revolve. After the performance of the usual ceremonies, the intended victim is fastened to the proboscis of the elephant, and amidst the shouts and yells of the excited multitude of Khonds, is rapidly whirled round, when, at a given signal by the officiating *zanee* or priest, the crowd rush in, seize the *meriah*, and with their knives cut the flesh of the shrieking wretch so long as life remains. He is then cut down, the skeleton burnt, and the horrid orgies are over. In several villages I counted as many as fourteen effigies of elephants, which had been used in former sacrifices. These I caused to be overthrown by the baggage elephants attached to my camp in the presence of the assembled Khonds, to show them

<sup>2</sup> *Personal Narrative of Service among the Wild Tribes of Khondistan*, 1864.

that these venerated objects had no power against the living animal, and to remove all vestiges of their bloody superstition."

A hymn, sung during the passion of the victim, is preserved by Risley in *The People of India*, p. 62 (1908) which, reduced to a metric version, reads thus:

"As the tears stream from thine eyes,  
So may rain in August pour;  
As drips mucus from thy nose  
So may drizzles sometimes come;  
As thy blood is gushing forth,  
So may vegetation sprout;  
As thy gore falls down in drops,  
So the grains of rice may form."

Col. Campbell also describes a *meriah* sacrifice of the Khonds of Jeypore:

"It is always succeeded by the sacrifice of three human beings, two to the sun in the east and west of the village, and one in the center, with the usual barbarities of the *meriah*. A stout wooden post about six feet long is firmly fixed in the ground, at the foot of it a narrow grave is dug, and to the top of the post the victim is firmly fastened by the long hair of his head. Four assistants hold his outstretched arms and legs, the body being suspended horizontally over the grave, with the face toward the earth. The officiating *junna* or priest, standing on the right side, repeats the following invocation, at intervals hacking with his sacrificing knife the back part of the shrieking victim's neck. 'Oh! mighty Manicksoro, this is your festal day. To the Khonds the offering is *meriah*, to the kings *junna*. On account of this sacrifice, you have given to kings kingdoms, guns and swords. The sacrifice we now offer you must eat, and we pray that our battle-axes may be converted into swords, our bows and arrows into gunpowder and balls; and, if we have any quarrels with other tribes, give us the victory. Preserve us from the tyranny of kings and their officers.' Then addressing the victim, 'That

we may enjoy prosperity, we offer you as a sacrifice to our god Manicksoro, who will immediately eat you, so be not grieved at our slaying you. Your parents were aware, when we purchased you from them for sixty rupees, that we did so with intent to sacrifice you. There is, therefore, no sin on our heads, but on your parents. After you are dead, we shall perform your obsequies.' The victim is then decapitated, the body thrown into the grave, and the head left suspended from the post till devoured by wild beasts. The knife remains fastened to the post till the three sacrifices have been performed, when it is removed with much ceremony."

When the cruel custom was officially abolished by the British government in 1852, the Khonds demanded the privilege of sacrificing buffaloes, monkeys, goats or other animals as they had formerly sacrificed human victims. At the same time they insisted that they should be allowed to denounce in their prayers with impunity the government in general, and some of its servants in particular, as the guilty party for their delinquency in the performance of their religious duties which they considered both indispensable and sacred.

In spite of the seriousness with which the British government has stopped these barbaric rituals, the idea of the need and meritoriousness of human sacrifices still haunts the minds of the people, and there have been repeated occurrences which indicate that now and then sacrifices are still attempted or even actually take place, the vestiges of which are as much as possible concealed from the police.

We here quote the testimony of a case that was judged in the courts of the Bellary district in 1901. The man had offered his son as a sacrifice in the temple, but was apprehended by the police and imprisoned. The record of the Sessions Judge reads as follows:

"The prisoner has made two long statements to the magistrate, in each of which he explains why he killed the child. From these statements it appears that he had been worshipping at the temple of Kona Irappa for six or seven years, and that, on one or more occasions, the god appeared to him, and said: 'I am much pleased with your worship. There is wealth under me. To whom else should it be given but you?' The god asked the prisoner to sacrifice sheep and buffaloes, and also said: 'Give your son's head. You know that a head should be given to the god who confers a boon. I shall raise up your son, and give you the wealth which is hidden under me.' At that time, the prisoner said to the god: 'I have only one son. How can I give him?' The god replied: 'A son will be born. Do not fear me. I shall revive the son, and give you wealth.' Within one year the deceased boy was born. This increased the prisoner's faith in the god, and it is apparent from his own statement that he has for some time past been contemplating human sacrifice. He was advised not to sacrifice the son, and for a time was satisfied with sacrificing a buffalo and goats, but, as a result, did not succeed in getting the wealth that he was anxious to secure. The prisoner says he dug up some portion of the temple, but the temple people did not let him dig further. The boy was killed on a Sunday, because the prisoner says that the god informed him that the human sacrifice should be on the child's birthday, which was a Sunday. The prisoner mentions in his statement how he took the child to the temple on the Sunday morning, and cut him with a sword. Having done so, he proceeded to worship, saying: 'I offered a head to the bestower of boons. Give boons, resuscitate my son, and show me wealth.' While the prisoner was worshipping the god, and waiting for the god to revive his son, the *reddi* (headman) and the police came to the temple and interrupted the worship. The prisoner

believes that thereby the god was prevented from reviving the son. . . . The facts seem to be clear. The man's mind is sound in every respect but as regards this religious delusion. On that point it is unsound."

It would be difficult for a judge of India to regard a man who sacrifices his own son in any other light than as religiously insane, but we ought to bear in mind the parallel case of Abraham's intended sacrifice of Isaac as recorded in the Bible, Genesis xxii.

In reading the accounts of the stories of human sacrifices which extend down to our present day, the significance of Christianity will be clearly seen in having once for all done away with the idea of human sacrifice, but we will point out that the abolition of human sacrifice has not been accomplished by a public declaration of the uselessness of such sacrifices, but by recognizing as it were the justice of the underlying idea, and by claiming that in Christianity this indispensable need of mankind in the interest of salvation through vicarious atonement has been fulfilled in the sacrificial death of Jesus on the cross, and we must remember that every mass represents symbolically the sacrificial offering of the host.

Death on the cross was originally an offering to the sun, and it is noteworthy that in the language of the Septuagint, the Greek version of the Old Testament, the word "to crucify" is translated *exeliázein*, which means "exposing to the sun." A sacrifice to the sun is either performed by burning the victim, "making it pass through the fire," which act is commonly called in Greek *holocaust*, i. e., a burning up of the whole; or it is done by crucifixion, i. e., by allowing the sun to suck out, as it were, the life of the victim. These sacrifices prevailed most among the Semites from whom the Romans adopted them, and it was a common belief that they were considered as most efficacious. Judging from ancient tradition, God could not

refuse to grant fulfilment of a prayer if the the victim was a son of the supplicant.

In this sense we must read the passage in 2 Kings iii. 26-27, in which the king of Moab when hard pressed by the Israelites burned his eldest son, who was to have reigned in his stead, for a burnt offering upon the wall in full sight of the besieging enemy. After the sacrifice of the king's own son the Israelites abandoned the siege, despairing of taking the city.

According to the interpretation of two Roman Catholic archeologists<sup>3</sup> we must read a remarkable description of a sacrificial crucifixion in the history of Carthage in the same light as the story of the king of Moab who sacrificed his own son as a holocaust. The Roman historian Justinus tells us in his epitome of the Philippic histories of Trogus Pompeius that Maleus, a Carthaginian general, suffered a defeat and was exiled by the authorities of Carthage. He had been victorious and had sent the tenth of the booty home by his son Carthalo, who was thence despatched to offer it as a gift to the Tyrian Hercules at Tyre in Phenicia, the metropolis of Carthage. Indignant about the treatment Maleus had received at the hands of his compatriots, the Carthaginian general did not go into exile but returned home with the whole army to take revenge. While he was besieging the city, his son Carthalo returned from Tyre adorned with purple and priestly insignia. Having first attended to his religious duties in the temple, Carthalo met his father who bitterly reproached him for his lack of filial piety and had him crucified in his priestly robe on a high cross in sight of the besieged city. A few days afterwards he succeeded in conquering Carthage and took revenge on the authorities by having ten senators slain and himself reinstated. The triumph of the

<sup>3</sup>Von der Alm in *Theologische Briefe*, III, p. 138, and following him Dr. J. Stockbauer in *Kunstgeschichte des Kreuzes*, p. 3.

cruel father did not last long. Since he was suspected of striving for royal power the enemies of Maleus recovered their influence. They accused him of slaying his son and fighting against his country, whereupon he was condemned and executed.

Here we have another conspicuous instance of a human sacrifice, and if the interpretation of Von der Alm and Stockbauer may be trusted, we must assume that one who sacrifices his own son as an offering on the cross expects to attain the fulfilment of his wish from Baal.

There is no need of multiplying instances of a belief in the efficacy of a sacrifice of one's own son. They can be found in folklore all over the earth, and facts of a kindred nature have been gathered by Professor Frazer in his famous book *The Golden Bough*. We have the cruel rites of human sacrifices in ancient Mexico and in addition the wide spread custom of theophagy, the ceremonial eating of the god.

The most essential feature of life is the truth that the maintenance of life is a constant struggle and its end is death. The fittest survive, and the fittest are those who gain advantages through the love and sacrifice of their parents and fellow beings. We live through sacrifice, and through continued sacrifice the human race rises higher and higher. In this sense life is and will forever remain a tragedy. The climax of the struggle need not lead to actual death, but it must always involve suffering and tribulation; the main point is that tragedy means a victory through sacrifice.

In the light of this fact we can understand how Aristotle could see in a tragedy the most perfect expression of art, and also how religion from its most primitive stage up to the highest summit of its development should be a more and more refined presentation of a tragedy.

The truth that life is a tragedy is a common occurrence in experience, and progress is made through sacrifice. This has been true for all times and is true to-day, but in former days when life was governed more by superstitious notions the tragic events were more dramatic, and this can be seen in countries which are not yet so far advanced as we are wont to see in modern European and American cities.

As an instance which fully expresses the meaning of this truth I will quote here an incident of modern Hindu life: It is well known that girls are considered a burden in India because the religious traditions of orthodox Hinduism demand that girls should be married at a definite age, and it has become an established custom that the bridegroom must be bought. This custom has been taken advantage of by ambitious youths who thus gained a means of acquiring a higher education. The educated youth having a chance of earning a better living is in high demand, and parents are compelled by religious usage to dispose of their daughters. The bridegrooms frequently stipulate not only the payment for their education but also further sustenance in the first years of married life to continue to complete their studies. This nuisance has contributed to the impoverishment of many families who in their religious fervor wished to comply with the requirements of their orthodox faith. It was for this reason that the infanticide of girl babies was practised in India, and it happened of late that a girl by the name of Snehalata ("the creeper of affection") was to be married to a bridegroom for whom the parents-in-law had to pay a price of 1800 rupees, and 1200 rupees worth of jewels. These expenses were too hard on the family, and in order to free her parents from the crushing debt involved by her marriage the girl decided to sacrifice herself for the benefit of the family. She burned herself to death and the touching letter which she left behind reads as follows (see *Open Court*, July 1914):

"Father, I have heard that many noble-hearted and educated young men volunteered for philanthropic work for the relief of the sufferers from the Burdwan floods. God bless their kindly hearts, so full of compassion for their suffering fellow-beings. I have also heard that many young men have taken a vow not to buy *bideshi* (foreign) articles. Only the other day I heard how bands of noble-minded youths had gone from door to door to raise funds for the relief of some people in far away South Africa. But is there no one among them to feel for their own people?

"Last night I dreamt a dream, father, which made me take my vow. To the enthralling strains of a music unheard before, and amid a blaze of light as never was on land or sea, I saw the Divine Mother Durga, with benignant smile, beckoning me to the abode of the blest, up above, and then I thought of you father, of the ever sorrow-laden face of my beloved mother and of the dear little ones who have done so much to brighten our home. And then I resolved to save you all and made a sign to the Divine Mother that I would not delay obeying her merciful call.

"After I am gone, father, I know you will shed tears over my ashes. I shall be gone—but the house will be saved. Since then I have been pondering on the best way of ending my worldly pilgrimage—fire, water, or poison. I have preferred the first, and may the conflagration I shall kindle set the whole country on fire!"

The event has stirred India and the movement started through the excitement has produced among other good results the foundation of a society of Indian youths who take the vow not to accept any "bridegroom price" on account of their marriage. Here is a glaring instance of a sacrifice done for a purpose, a sacrifice which is sure to

bring good results, and little Snehalata is worthy to be mentioned among the heroes and martyrs of mankind.<sup>4</sup>

The Christ-conception existed before Christ and has had its influence on the dogmatic interpretation of the life of Jesus. Whether or not Jesus was a historical person is a question of passing interest, for the superpersonal figure of the Christ ideal is the founder of Christianity, not St. Paul nor Jesus the Nazarene; and it is certainly not a mere accident that we do not speak of Jesuanity but of Christianity.

In comment on the theory of the non-historicity of Jesus, so doughtily advanced by Prof. William Benjamin Smith of Tulane University, and again championed in the present number of *The Monist* by Mr. K. C. Anderson (who, however, strange to say, makes no reference to him) we wish to say that we can not be convinced of the negative aspect of their views, the non-existence of Jesus, although we fully accept the positive claim that Christ, not Jesus, is the formative factor of Christianity.

In connection with a discussion of the Christ problem, a few comments will be in order on Mr. Kampmeier's article "Are We Just to Jesus?" which is published in the current number of *The Monist*, and we must say in justice to the author and in explanation of the motive that instigated him to treat this subject, that the article is practically a criticism of my own view upheld in editorials. In a personal letter to Mr. Kampmeier, I descanted on the proposition that for any essential questions, and also for practical purposes, it was quite indifferent whether or not Jesus had lived or of what character he may have been.

Christianity originated through syncretism. The ideal of Christ existed before Jesus, and it is the ideal of Christ and not Jesus that has become the founder of Christianity.

<sup>4</sup>Incidentally I wish to call attention to the story of *The Chief's Daughter*, describing the last sacrifice of the Niagara Indians, and treating the subject in this spirit (Open Court Publishing Co., 1901).

Ideals (i. e., superpersonalities) need not be historical persons. They are heroes or gods and their efficiency is greater than historical persons. It is probable that Dr. William Benjamin Smith means in his proposition that Jesus is a god, and only a god, not a man, the same as we mean by a superpersonality.

The main portion of my letter to Mr. Kampmeier criticized by him in his article contains the following expositions:

First of all I recognize plainly that the Gospel stories of Jesus contain much material which is not of a historical origin. We find in them traces of sun myths; incidents of the lives of previous saviours have been superadded upon Jesus; ideas of a Christ which were prevalent at the time, have been introduced as historical facts; finally sayings attributed to former saviours or Buddhas are ascribed to Jesus, and so we find innumerable references to parallel formations in other religions. All these items have been used as evidence to prove the non-historicity of Jesus. What they really prove is that an ideal was prevalent among the nations which we may call the ideal of a Christ, a Messiah, a Buddha, a Mithras, a Jaina, a god-man, a divine incarnation, etc. I have no doubt that books existed which contained the sayings of a divine teacher, and they were derived most likely from Indian sources, containing many Buddhistic ideas. Such must have been the book used in the synoptics, called "Q" by Wellhausen.

The idea that Christ was not historical seems to suggest itself, but there are remnants left which do not agree with this Christ-ideal, and stand even in contradiction to the traditional notion of the Greek Christ-ideal as it prevailed among the Gentile Christians. These little remnants of an Aramaic personality indicate that there is an element in the Gospels which has little to do with the Christ-ideal, and

seems to be the underlying and historical root upon which all the rest has been grafted.

In the synoptic Gospels Jesus is a healer. Apparently he made a living by healing. He is a fanatic in his way, and certainly not the gentle Jesus of the Unitarians, the liberals among the higher critics, or the historicists. He could curse a fig-tree simply because it did not bear fruit when he wanted a fig, and that when the time of figs was not yet. The Jesus of Mark let loose a legion of demons in Gadara where they hurled a herd of swine into the sea. He could curse his adversaries, the scribes and Pharisees, in a sweeping and wholesale condemnation. Even granting that most of the scribes and Pharisees were hypocrites, we need not doubt that there were among them many pious people; but they were as much his enemies as the physicians are the enemies of mind-cure healers and Christian scientists to-day. He, the traveling healer, interfered with their profession of supervising the hygienic conditions of the people and their business of pronouncing on the health of lepers, etc.

Moreover this historical Jesus must have been a Jew of the narrowest kind, for he called the Gentiles dogs,—an expression in Matthew xv. 26, smoothed down, probably by a Gentile copyist's hand, to "lap dogs" or "little dogs,"<sup>5</sup> a pet name, not "dogs."<sup>6</sup> He also declared in Matthew v. 18 that "Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass" from the Mosaic law.<sup>7</sup>

The passage which mentions the brothers and sisters of Jesus<sup>8</sup> can only by very artificial means be interpreted as

<sup>5</sup> κυνῶντες.

<sup>6</sup> κύνες. Compare Matt. vii. 6, where "dogs" can only refer to the Gentiles.

<sup>7</sup> That must have been the original meaning of this well-known contradictory passage. The second clause "till all be fulfilled" is apparently a later addition. The Mosaic law had been abolished because (as St. Paul argued) it had been fulfilled.

<sup>8</sup> Mark iii. 31-35.

having a symbolic meaning. Here we have scriptural evidence of his family, and we have reason to believe that he did not live in concord with his mother and his brothers and sisters, for he refused to see them.

There are further indications of a concrete background not in accord with Gentile tradition, and I will mention a few of them. The existence of Nazareth seems doubtful. There is a confusion between Nazaree, the member of a sect, and Nazarean, meaning the man from Nazareth. The early Christians and St. Paul are called Nazarenes, although they were not born in Nazareth. The argument that Nazareth as a town does not make its appearance before the fourth century is well known, and it is more than probable that the home of Jesus was Capernaum. At any rate Capernaum was called "his city."

The apostle Paul never met Jesus, but he knew his brother James and other disciples, especially Simon, called Cephas or Peter. Why should the expression "brother" be symbolical as Dr. Smith claims? There is no probability that the quarrels between Peter and Paul should be later inventions of a symbolical nature, for we must bear in mind that the pact between Peter and Paul to divide the world between them makes the story of Peter's journey to Rome and his becoming the first bishop of Rome, if historical, a palpable breach of faith.

The life of Jesus was apparently passed in the province of Galilee, and if we ignore the story of his visit to the temple in his childhood, he seems to have come to Jerusalem only once when he was seized and crucified.

All his sayings give not the slightest indication that he busied himself with the political problem of his people. He thinks of their immediate ailments and diseases. The passage concerning Cæsar's imprint on the coins does not make the impression of being a historical incident. It was probably a later invention to make Christianity acceptable

to the Roman government, for the meaning of the incident seems to characterize the later situation.

It stands to reason that when Jesus came to Jerusalem he offended on both sides, the priests or orthodox Jews who never cared much for Galileans, and the Romans who naturally would see in him a dangerous rebel.

According to tradition in Mark Jesus was very impulsive, and possibly a fanatic Nazarene sectarian. If the Nazarenes were actually the same sect as the Essenes, he must have been opposed to bloody sacrifices and this would explain his wrath when entering the temple. Did his words perhaps imply an objection to the slaughter of animals when he said: "Is it not written, My house shall be called the house of prayer? but ye have made it a den of thieves?"

The original<sup>9</sup> here means "a den of robbers or pirates or buccaneers," viz., men who kill to rob. Luther translates *Mördergrube*. If Luther's version is correct the story acquires a definite meaning and the narrative of the purging of the temple may be based upon an actual occurrence, which would naturally make many enemies, not only among the venders of doves themselves, and the money changers and the orthodox Jews, but also among all those common people who were in business contact with the traders at the temple gate.

The stories of the crucifixion are apparently modified through the principle not to cast any blame on the Roman authorities. There was a time when Christianity endeavored to ingratiate itself with Rome. Paul prides himself on being a Roman citizen and finally Roman Christianity against the faiths of the Armenians and Copts became its orthodox form. Yet it is clear that Jesus was not crucified by the Jews upon whom the opprobrium of the deed is thrown, but by the Romans, and so Pilate is represented as a weak man who became a mere instrument in the hands

<sup>9</sup> σπήλαιον ληστῶν.

of the highpriests. Yet we ought to take note that Pilate had no right to sit in judgment in Jerusalem. Jerusalem stood under the jurisdiction of Herod, except perhaps, as probably was the case at the time of feast, when martial law was pronounced.

The prophecy that people standing by would live to see Jesus come in the heavens with all his glory is an irrefutable proof that the passage is old and genuine.<sup>10</sup> It must have been written in the first century, and has not been removed as unfulfilled. It is another indication that the Gospels contain at least a nucleus of genuine old traditions.

Thus I base my views of the historicity of Jesus mainly on those passages which would not have been written if Jesus had been a mere ideal figure constructed for the sake of symbolization or as an incorporation of an old sun myth, or a new formation of a divinity of some kind or a belief in a saviour-god, or a Yahveh cult, or a kind of Judaized Buddhism. The original documents must have been based on genuine records of a real man, although the essentially Christian elements (viz., those narratives which are typical of saviour stories) as well as the sayings of a religious sage, the parables, the Lord's prayer, the beatitudes, the Logia in the "Q" document, etc., may have been superadded in the course of the development of the New Testament scriptures.

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While I believe that Christianity has been called rightly after Christ and not after Jesus, Mr. Kampmeier recognizes Jesus as the founder of Christianity and thinks that the church would not have originated without the man Jesus. But the New Testament itself furnishes the evidence that it was St. Paul who identified the two. We read in the Acts (xviii. 24) that there was a teacher called

<sup>10</sup> The same argument has been used by Schopenhauer and is likewise considered irrefutable by Garbe. See his article in the present number.

Apollos who "taught diligently the things of the Lord," which is the typical expression for the Christ, the religious ideal of the God-man whom the Jews called Messiah and the Gentiles the Saviour.<sup>11</sup> Apollos was perfectly familiar with the Christ-ideal, but he had never heard of Jesus, and the Gospel which Paul preached consisted in this, that this Christ had become flesh in Jesus, and Paul succeeded in having Jesus recognized as the Christ. In this sense and in this alone Paul may be regarded as the founder of Christianity.

Why Jesus was better than any other figure to be identified with the highest religious ideal of the age need not be discussed here. We must assume that the humanity of Jesus and his martyr's death were more sympathetic to the down-trodden multitudes of the Roman empire than the more philosophical figure of Apollonius of Tyana and the mythological personality of a Mithras. But we claim that some other figure might have taken the place of Jesus, in which case the narratives of a saviour, of an ideal teacher, of a healer, of a conqueror of death, etc., would have crystallized about this other person in the same way as in the development of Christianity they have crystallized around Jesus.

This view is naturally regarded by men like Mr. Kampmeier as an underestimation of Jesus, and so he has felt called upon to explain his position and give his answer to the question "Are we just to Jesus?" His opinion represents an important phase in the conception of the Christ-ideal most prevalent among the Unitarians and other liberal Christians, and so we feel that in order to complete the discussion of the Christ-ideal his view should not be overlooked.

While we believe that the Christ-ideal, the superper-

<sup>11</sup> The term *σωτήρ* is Greek, not Jewish; the very word does not exist in Hebrew.

sonality of a saviour and not the human personality of Jesus, has made Christianity and has always remained its backbone, we see no necessity of denying the historicity of Jesus. Occam's razor, as Prof. W. B. Smith argues, can no more cut it off than M. Pérès's ingenious proposition of the Apollo incarnation of Napoleon will render Buonaparte unhistorical or as the poem of the Alexander myth will change Alexander the Great into a mere solar hero. The amalgamation of myth and history is too common to see in it anything improbable or even impossible.

I wish to add one suggestion which may be helpful for the interpretation of the facts of our religious development. Superpersonalities, such as ideals, gods and religious aspirations; heroes, such as Heracles in ancient Greece; also the figures of great men (not what they were in life but what became of them after death) such as Bismarck, Washington, Napoleon, etc., are not nonentities, but important factors in the life of mankind. The thought of Heracles was not a mere fable to the Greek youth but a potent influence which moulded his life, and so the Christ-conception of to-day is and has been since the beginning of the Christian era, a living power in the Christian churches. We must learn to appreciate the superpersonalities of secular life as well as of the gods of pagan religions by recognizing the paramount influence which such ideals exert in the life of the people.<sup>12</sup> This is true of Christ and also of the analogous pagan notions, although we now find difficulty in appreciating their significance. Only if we compare pagan sentiments to the sentiments which Christians entertain for Christian beliefs, shall we catch glimpses of the truth.

We see a lesson in the struggle for the historicity or non-historicity of Jesus, which is this. The liberal party

<sup>12</sup> Concerning the nature of "superpersonalities" see the writer's little book *Personality With Special Reference to Superpersonalities and the Interpersonal Character of Ideas*, Chicago, 1911.

of theology has succeeded in breaking down the claims of the old orthodoxy, but the liberals have gone too far. In attacking the letter of dogma and tradition they have denied the spirit. As a rule they do not understand the meaning of the religion whose beliefs they attack. So it is natural that they see in Jesus a mere man; they deny his divinity. All their hope is therefore set in the human Jesus. Jesus has been stripped of all supernatural qualities, he remains to them a mere man. He is good, indeed very good. He is a paragon of virtue, a veritable model of Sunday-school morality, and this is expressed by calling him "the gentle Jesus" or honoring him with similar names. He is not a God, not a superpersonality, but an ideal man, and he is assumed to be the founder of the church. The orthodox position is rejected as irrational, impossible and superstitious. To these liberals it is sufficient to prove the Christ figure to be mythological.

Now we will unreservedly grant that Christ is a mythological figure; and all that the Mediterranean people ascribed to a saviour—the virgin birth, the power to perform miracles, a blameless character, the fate of martyrdom, of suffering and dying for others, the resurrection from the tomb and an apotheosis in one form or another, all the wisdom of the ages—was attributed to him as a matter of course. Such is the logic of a religious mind. This is the way in which a believer argues. It is founded in the constitution of a man's being that a saviour must have sacrificed himself for the good of mankind, therefore Christ's death was an act of vicarious atonement.

Here is an instance of how the scriptures grew by accretion: A Christian hears that when Socrates died he forgave his enemies. A pagan may have argued, "You see Socrates was nobler than Christ." But the Christian thinks: "Christ was the ideal man, therefore he can not have been outdone by Socrates; he too must have forgiven

his enemies." The passage in Luke xxiii. 34 does not occur in the oldest manuscripts but was inserted comparatively late by a copyist who was somehow familiar with Plato's *Crito* and had adopted this typically human argument. Once inserted, the passage remained a most highly appreciated verse in the gospel story, though no critical student of the New Testament will venture to regard it as historical.

We read of Zarathustra and of Bodhisattva that they were tempted by the Evil Spirit before they started on their careers. Great moral teachers must first have proved that they knew the nature of evil and that they could overcome the tempter. Therefore Jesus must have been tempted.

We need not increase instances to explain how ideals grow and how they naturally develop by incorporating what is kin to them and assimilating what by slight changes can be adapted. And ideals are predetermined in the constitution of being like Platonic ideals, like the types of the several atoms, like the chemical compounds, predetermined in their nature, and also like plants and animals and rational beings. We are sure that the atoms of gold are the same on earth as in the sun and in the stars of distant worlds. So we can be sure that the same law will develop similar organisms in the most distant planets, and the moral leaders of a group of rational creatures will teach the same ethics of universal good-will as all the abstract thinkers will invent the same geometry however different may be their roads of approach or methods of demonstration or schemes of explanation. So the ideal of a Christ is not only predetermined by the history of the people where the story of a saviour grows, but is also founded, at least in general outlines, in the conditions of the social life of rational beings. Thus a Christ can rightly

say: "Before Abraham was I am." In fact the ideal man, as an ideal, existed in the beginning of the world and it was with God. It is as eternal as God and is the divine factor which determines the development of life toward the realization of the Christ ideal.

We see that the orthodox view contains a truth which no higher criticism can kill. The construction of an ideal man, such as the gentle Jesus of liberal theology will scarcely be verified by historical investigation, and in our opinion it is quite indifferent for us to-day what Jesus thought and did and whether he was as gentle as described in Unitarian tractates or whether he was as zealous and stern as the Jesus according to Mark who expels demons, commands the storm and allows a herd of two thousand swine to drown, forbids his disciples to approach the Gentiles and the Samaritans, consigns Dives to hell, requires the rich youth to sell all he has and give to the poor, curses the fig-tree, scourges the money changers from the temple gates, expels other poor venders peddling pigeons etc. If we want to render the Gospel story useful for us to-day, we must reinterpret it in the spirit of to-day and must explain the incidents of the life of Jesus in the light of the Christ-ideal which we have to-day.

One thing seems assured. The Christ-ideal of the church is not the Jewish Messianic ideal. It is the ideal of a healer like Æsculapius, who cures the blind and makes the lame walk again; of a teacher of ethics such as taught in the school of neo-Platonism; of a preacher such as could be found among the Stoics. Moreover this ideal was a god-man. As Hercules found comfort in the idea that he was the son of Zeus, so Jesus addressed God as his father.

Such is the Jesus of the latest Gospel according to St. John which though it may have incorporated older elements is the least historical and ranges highest in significance. Had it not been written Christianity might not

have overcome its rival religions, Gnosticism, Manicheism, Mithraism or even the belief in Apollonius of Tyana. The main factor, however, which gave strength to Christianity lies in its recognition of life as suffering, and the conquest of evil by sacrifice.

On a superficial inspection life seems a joyful display of energy, a kind of frolic entered into for the fun of it. Such is naturally the opinion of childhood and youth, but mature manhood with its struggles and cares will soon enough teach us the earnestness of life. The time will come to every one who reaches maturity of thought, when he will understand that life is a tragedy, and this lies in the very nature of thought.

Every heroism procuring reform or progress means a sacrifice of the present for the future, of the generation of to-day for the generation to come, of the life-blood of the parents for the welfare of their children, yea of the present hour for the years to come.

This is true generally, but it is specially true of the heroes of mankind who bear the brunt of the battle for progress, and so it is but natural that the quintessence of all the religions that can claim any depth of conception deal with the problem of evil and teach us to face and to overcome the tragic element in life. The North American Indian wanted to show to the Great Spirit what suffering his sons could endure and so underwent the horrible tortures of the sun dance. The Syrian Adonis, the lord, or Tamuz, personified vegetation, and his devotees witnessed his tragic death in religious mysteries. Similar ideas pervade almost all the pagan religions, and the gist of Christianity is this same world-old tale of the god who offers himself up for the best of mankind, who dies on the cross that those who believe in him may gain life everlasting.

These considerations explain Christianity as the re-

ligion of mankind and also the similarity of Christianity to the pre-Christian Gentile religions.<sup>13</sup>

Mankind wants and indeed needs a religion that sets forth the truth of tragedy, of our struggle with the power of evil, and of triumph over evil through sacrifice. If we understand the history of religion aright and if we study the data of comparative religion with sympathy—or, if that be grudged to pagans, merely with justice—we shall be able to trace the common basis of all faiths in the crucial truth that all life is a tragedy, and this remains true whether or not there are historical connections between the pre-Christian and Christian institutions, such as Lenten ceremonies and Easter festivals.

The recognition of this idea will remove many misgivings in the circles of those theologians whom Christ addresses with the words "Ye of little faith" and we are glad to notice that some scholars begin to understand the significance of this conception. We quote from Dr. Hugo Radau's *Sumerian Hymns and Prayers to God Dumu-zi or Babylonian Lenten Songs*,<sup>14</sup> (Preface, pp. vii-viii):

"Strange indeed and most remarkable are the parallels between the Sumerian and Christian Lenten and Easter festivals:

"Dumuzi goes to the 'north' or 'netherworld,' i. e., he 'dies,' in order to conquer the 'enemy from the north,' the cold, winter, darkness. Christ dies in order to conquer Satan, the 'prince of darkness.'

"Dumuzi while in the netherworld is 'bewailed' by his 'Bride' Ishtar, especially during the month February-March (*Ululu*); but this is exactly the season of the Chris-

<sup>13</sup> This idea is outlined in a little book entitled *The Pleroma* (Open Court Publishing Co., 1909) which is a historical account of the pre-Christian struggle for religious supremacy, and how it resulted in Christianity as the fulfilment—the *pleroma*—of the needs of the times.

<sup>14</sup> Published as Vol. XXX, Part I, of *The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, Munich 1913, to be obtained through Rudolf Merkel, Erlangen, Germany.

tian Lent, during which the church, the 'Bride of the Lamb,' mourns over the death of her 'bridegroom,' Christ.

"The month *Ululu* is followed immediately by the 'month of the festival of Dumuzi' which begins with the vernal equinox and which celebrates, among other things, Dumuzi's marriage with 'Mother Earth,' the resurrection of nature and the beginning of new life. The Christian lenten season is terminated by the Easter festival, celebrating at the time of the vernal equinox the resurrection of Christ and the beginning of a new, spiritual life (*soo-poietheis de to pneumati*, 1 Peter iii. 18) of Christ and of his church, thus demonstrating, corroborating and proving the truthfulness and correctness of the Sumerian resurrection festival, for 'if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither hath Christ been raised' or again 'if the dead are not raised, neither hath Christ been raised' (1 Cor. xv, 12ff).

"The Christian lenten and resurrection festivals are in this wise by no means merely a 'rehash' of Babylonian ideas. This would be misunderstanding the divine will as carried out in history. No, not a 'rehash,' but the very culmination and 'fulfilment' of the wisdom of ages past are the Christian lenten and resurrection festivals. The 'truth' which the Sumerians dimly recognized while still groping in the dark receives by the death and resurrection of Christ its true light, explanation, seal, approval and spiritual significance. Christ and the Christian religion not only *is*, but *must* and, I am sure, *will* be recognized, more and more, to be what we are told it is: the *pleroma*.

"In thus admitting, on the one hand, the exact parallels between the Sumerian and the Christian lent and resurrection, and on the other recognizing in the Christian festivals the *pleroma* of their predecessors among the Sumerians, we will not stand in any danger of losing our faith—on the contrary, the Christian religion will become for us

a living reality, the last link in the long chain of divine revelations uniting us with the past and into a common brotherhood of man, believing the same thing and hoping for the same thing: *our own resurrection*.

"Let us, therefore, be true to ourselves and recognize the divine element even in the Sumerian religion, at the same time let us not forget that grand and sublime though the Sumerian religion may be, it is but a faint shadow of the light that shines in Christ. This 'declaration of faith' I am constrained to make publicly here in response to several communications and criticisms from certain quarters requesting me to state frankly and honestly my position and *personal belief* with regard to the Sumerian religion in its relation to that of the Christians."

Here is our conclusion: The tragedy of Golgotha is the most characteristic and the most essential trait of Christianity, and still to-day we recognize the truth that every enhancement of life, every progress, the widening of our horizon in politics, in social life, in the discovery of truth, even in industrial enterprises, yea the mere maintenance of life and its continuance in the future generation, the rearing of children and their education can be accomplished only through sacrifices. Life is a constant struggle: we fight and bear the brunt of the battle, we are perhaps wounded; we break down under the burden of toil and if the cause for which we fight be victorious, others, not we, will see the day of triumph; we pass away but mankind marches on. Such is the nature of the tragedy, such is the meaning of Christianity and such is the destiny of mankind.

EDITOR.

### ARE WE JUST TO JESUS?

THERE seems to be a tendency, as I recently found out through a correspondence with the editor of *The Monist*, among those who, for good historical reasons, can not accept the complete denial of the historicity of Jesus, to undervalue the character of Jesus and his importance for the origin of Christianity. Though the writer sees in Jesus only a human character and therefore not a perfect ideal man, he thinks for this very reason that we ought to judge the character of Jesus and his importance for the origin of Christianity as justly as possible. We must take into full consideration the times, surroundings and education which brought him forth, and also see whether there was not something after all in his character which made it possible that a world-religion could be attached to his personality.

There are several points in the character and work of Jesus which are not sympathetic to many a modern man and therefore have often been open to attack.

According to the Gospels Jesus was a great exorcist and healer of disease, driving out the demons in the name of God. To any one who is acquainted with the general views of antiquity on the nature of disease and with the prevailing custom among both Jews and Gentiles of healing sickness by exorcism and other means which appear to us as superstitious, the practice of Jesus is not strange at all.

Jesus does not stand alone in this respect. Other noted prophets, religious and moral teachers of antiquity, such as Epimenides, Empedocles and Apollonius of Tyana, were said to have been at the same time great healers and miracle workers. It is well known that even a Vespasian could be prevailed upon to undertake cures at Alexandria in the name of Jupiter Serapis in exactly the same way as Jesus. Jesus did not claim a monopoly as exorcist and healer among his people. He readily conceded that the disciples of his opponents, the Pharisees, also exorcised demons (Matt. xii. 27).

Of course the Gospels make Jesus the preeminently great exorcist and healer. This can be readily understood, for when primitive Christianity was pursuing its victorious way, it naturally represented its founder as the man to whom God had especially given the greatest power to overcome disease and its origin, the evil demons, just as Moses was represented as more powerful than the Egyptian conjurers. We have a striking example of this in the earliest Gospel, Mark. Here Jesus plays a greater rôle as an exorcist and wonderworker than as a religious teacher. The object of this Gospel is to awaken belief in the divine mission of Jesus by representing his great and mighty deeds. That there is much exaggeration here, as also in the other Gospels, every one will now concede. But even the Gospels are compelled to admit that the power of Jesus is not absolute where faith is lacking, showing how great a part auto-suggestion played in his work as exorcist and healer.

That Jesus was a healer should not lower him in our estimation. Even the attacks against Christianity in the first centuries by such men as Celsus and others were not directed against Jesus as healer and miracle-worker. They only disputed that his miracles were any different from those the old gods performed, and the Christian apologists

had no better way to answer this claim than by attributing to the devil the healing practised in the name of the old gods, just as the Pharisees had attributed the healings of Jesus to Beelzebub.

As long as Jesus practised the office of exorcist from pure sympathy for his fellow men (and this impression we get without doubt from the Gospels) and not for self-glory and gain, there is no reason to condemn him. The living he gained by this practice must have been very scant, for he is once reported as saying that the foxes and birds were better off than himself. Considering that man is as anxious about his health to-day as in the days of antiquity, and that the hope of securing health still plays as large a part as any other feature in the attempted construction of a religion of the future, we must be lenient when we realize that this point was predominant in the rise of a new religion in the early days of Christianity and was met by methods that were in accord with the knowledge of the times.

Another point often brought forward against the character of Jesus is his Jewish narrowness. The passage in the story of the healing of the Syro-Phenician woman's daughter is frequently cited as an illustration (Mark vii. 27): "It is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it unto the dogs." It is generally known that because the dog was considered a ceremonially unclean animal among the Jews, they often applied this term to the Gentiles to designate them as profane and unholy because they did not follow the ritualistic laws of the Jews. Whether the passage Matt. iii. 6: "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine," also refers to Gentiles, or is only a figurative expression referring to profane natures generally, is doubtful, since Paul, who surely cannot be accused of Jewish narrowness after his conversion, uses the term "dogs" in a figurative sense

even of "evil-workers," the Jewish-Christian teachers who demanded circumcision of the Gentile Christians (Phil. iii. 2). Reference is further made to the expressions (Matt. v. 17-18), "I am not come to destroy the law. . . , but to fulfil," and "one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law etc."

It must be conceded that Jesus was thoroughly Jewish. Nothing else could be expected from his purely Jewish-Palestinian education. It must also be conceded that his mission was intended for his own people, for he said: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and when he sent out his disciples to preach, he told them not to go "into the way of the Gentiles" or "into any city of the Samaritans."

Still we must be careful not to make Jesus narrower than he was. The same Gospel (Matthew) which has taken over the story of the Syro-Phenician woman from Mark, though it has a more Judaistic tinge than any other Gospel, relates also the story of the Roman centurion who asks Jesus to heal his servant and to whom Jesus replies that he had not found so much faith among his own people, adding that many would come from the east and west and sit down with the patriarchs in the coming kingdom while "the children of the kingdom" would be cast out (Matt. viii. 11). These words compared with others of Jesus, that Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah would receive a more lenient final judgment, and that the repentant Ninevites and the queen of the south would rise up in judgment against his own generation, show that Jesus was inconsistently less narrow than he is assumed to have been.

Such sayings of Jesus might be construed as arising merely from dissatisfaction at his own ill success, but we must remember that they are entirely in accord with the spirit of the best Hebrew prophets who very often drew comparisons between their people and other nations favor-

able to the latter. In fact the Jewish religion, in spite of its exclusiveness, was not so narrow as we generally conceive it. Though it considered itself of a higher quality than surrounding religions, it believed its mission to be that of spreading the true knowledge of God with the firm expectation that all nations would finally accept its main truths.

That the mission of Jesus was limited to his people alone was extremely natural, and it was wise, moreover, to limit his work to a smaller sphere thus making it more effective. He evidently thought, as did the Baptist, that there was more fear for his own people at the coming of the kingdom than for others, because "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required" (Luke xii. 48).

Another arraignment often repeated against Jesus is that he intentionally destroyed other people's property, as in the case of the herd of swine of the Gadarenes, and when he cursed a fig-tree because it did not bear fruit at a time when figs could not be expected, as Mark has it (xi. 13). That Jesus intentionally destroyed the herd of swine there is not the least hint in the narrative, nor that he even expected the unlucky result, even if he believed that demons could enter animals. We of course can not believe this, nor that the demons were foolish enough, as David Strauss said, to destroy their new abode again immediately. The story is as grotesque as that of the Jewish exorcist who drove out demons in the name of Solomon before Vespasian by holding a certain root to the nose of the patient, and proved the expulsion of the demon by making him upset a basin of water placed there for that purpose (Josephus, *Ant.*, VIII, 2, 5).

Concerning the story of the accursed fig-tree it is not to be conceived that Jesus was so simple as to expect figs from a tree when figs were not due. The story is incom-

prehensible, and many think that it may have started from the parable of the barren fig-tree as Luke relates it. In regard to many things which the Gospels have reported of Jesus in their zeal and admiration of him and to show his divinity and extraordinary powers, Jesus could well have said: "God protect me from my friends, against my enemies I will shield myself."

Another point. We may readily concede that Jesus had a very impetuous nature, a trait which seems to have characterized the Galileans generally according to Josephus and certain hints in the Gospels. That he cleansed the temple (the Fourth Gospel has magnified the story by giving Jesus a whip of cords) and that he did not treat the spiritual leaders of his people with gloves, as the invectives against them when he came to Jerusalem clearly show, are probably no inventions. Very probably his first visit to Jerusalem had the same effect upon him as the visit of Luther to Rome.

There are other instances that go to show that the temple needed cleansing, though the way Jesus proceeded may not have been the wisest one. We are told in the Talmud that Simon, the son of the Gamaliel mentioned in Acts, was obliged later to effect some reforms regarding money-changing in the temple (*Ker.*, I, 7; *Sanh.*, 90b). We also have other proofs from his own times and from impartial Jewish sources that Jesus was not the first one who said harsh things against the spiritual leaders of his people, though surely not all of them.

The tract *Aboth* (Sayings of the Fathers of the Synagogue) declares that "there are seven sorts of hypocrites among the Pharisees," and describes each of them. Of one sort of Pharisees who ask, "What more is my duty?" the tract raises the question, "Why is this hypocrisy?" and goes on to state that the inquirer is boasting that he has done every good thing possible, and challenges any

one to tell him what more there is to be done and he will do it. Of another we are informed that "he walks on tiptoe in order to show his meekness and thereby to attract attention." Another is described as "One who is walking with his eyes shut in order not to look upon women, and so strikes his head against a wall and bleeds." Another "allows himself to be circumcised, not to please God but for his own benefit," which reminds us of the words in the invective (Matt. xxiii. 15): "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves."

There is no question but the strong criticism of legalism and minute observance of the oral law which hedged in the written law was well deserved. Not to go into details in this matter as they are mentioned in the Gospels, we only refer to the summarizing words of Jesus, that all that minute observance set aside "the weightier matters of the law," "judgment, mercy, and faith."

Perhaps the character of the priestly class, which assisted in the final downfall of Jesus, was also open to criticism. The Talmud speaks of the "bazaars of Annas" (Derenbourg, *Hist. de la Palestine*), which would imply that this high-priest knew how to combine a sacred station with business. Of one of his sons of the same name, who also became high-priest, Josephus says that "he was a great hoarder of money" and that under his administration even some of the lower priests died for want of food." (*Ant.*, XX, 9, 2).

Impetuosity bursting with righteous indignation over abuses and hurling "woes" against their perpetrators, though it may often exceed proper limits, is not always the sign of a medium but of a very high character. In the history of human progress such characters have often served the very desirable purpose of a violent thunder-

storm to clear the air. The damage which a storm may cause here and there is not to be compared to the general relief and good it brings.

On the other hand every student of human history and daily life knows that stormy characters can be men of the tenderest and gentlest emotions. This was surely the case with Jesus. His sympathy with the fallen, the morally and socially unfortunate, without descending to sentimentality; his open eye for the powerful temptations to sin in every position, whether high or low, rich or poor (he expresses his love for the rich young man); his purpose to save his fellowmen in all classes, not in the sense of a divine redeemer, but in a genuinely and truly human spirit; these are traits in the character of Jesus which will always appeal to any one who has a deeper insight in human nature, and they are traits which I think will never be erased from his character.

Of course there will always be those, as I know from personal experience, who will scoff at the parable of the prodigal son, and there will always be "such Philistines as Ed. von Hartmann, by whom Jesus is looked upon dubiously on account of his company with publicans and sinners and fallen women. Jesus did not know the idea of what was proper and becoming" (Weinel). It is this trait of Jesus combining on the one hand his strong condemnation of sin, on the other the acknowledgment of the fearful power of temptation—followed when yielded to by the burden of guilt—and his sympathetic attempt to bring the erring and repentant sinner into the right relation with God, his fellow-man and himself again, that has contributed so greatly to transfer upon Jesus later the idea of a saviour as in the case of Buddha.

If with this high mission to save the sinner by arousing in him a conviction of guilt coupled with the announcement of a forgiving and merciful God toward the truly repen-

tant, Jesus combined a stern adherence to his purpose, not letting himself be turned aside even by his nearest relations, his own family—we must not condemn this attitude but rather praise him for it. If we do not condemn other men for placing the demands of a higher mission above those of family ties and friendships, we ought not condemn Jesus for the same thing. In the end the alienation from his family when Jesus started out on his work, turned into complete reconciliation, for we find the brothers of Jesus, and especially James, acting a leading part in the formation of the first Christian community. We see here the influence of an overpowering personality.

It was the *daimon* in the sense in which Socrates uses this word,—the *daimon* of that higher power impelling him in his work, which also led Jesus. If the influences directing the inner life and consciousness of Jesus had an oriental aspect, an ecstatic and visionary character, this must not repel us. To the modern man of course the ecstatic experiences of Jesus at the time of his baptism and at other times seem strange. These awakened in him the consciousness of being the instrument of a divine mission, and confirmed him so thoroughly in this persuasion that the charge of blasphemy could be brought against him at his trial before the sanhedrin. Still they gave Jesus strength and awakened that implicit faith in his mission among his followers which even his final tragedy could not obliterate.

I will say here incidentally that the baptism of John is surely historical, especially since it has been always a stumbling block to the dogma of the sinlessness of Jesus. John's preaching of the nearness of God's kingdom, the announcement of one coming to baptize with the Holy Spirit those willing to bear good fruit, and with fire those who were merely chaff, must have made a deep impression on Jesus. For he was certainly of a deeply religious and

introspective character no less than Paul, and this combined with the knowledge of such prophecies as Joel ii. 28, speaking of the outpouring of the Spirit in the last days, and of Mal. iv. 4, speaking of the coming of Elijah to prepare the way before the last period, must have brought him to the decision to consecrate his whole person to saving his people, after having been convinced like Paul (compare Gal. i, 15) that God had by his grace chosen him for that purpose.

Since we have often judged leniently in history of the consciousness and elation of many a genius in art, music, literature and other activities, when they considered themselves selected instruments of higher ideas, of a divine mission, though this conviction has often revealed itself in a strange and often repellent form, we ought also to use the same attitude towards Jesus, who surely must be classed with the religious geniuses who gave religion a further impetus to progress.

After all, the consciousness of Jesus that he served a divine mission did not manifest itself in such a very strange way, if we except the form expressed in the speculative Fourth Gospel, which is only a later reflection of the personality of Jesus. And perhaps even the Synoptics have confused certain reflections of the primitive Christian community with the original form in which Jesus expressed himself (compare Matt. xi. 25-30).

Moreover, Jesus did not make use of his ecstatic experiences and Messianic pretensions, if he had the latter, for his own interest and glory. He sought to serve, not to reign; to save not to destroy; he did not arouse his people to a bloody revolt against the Romans. His entry in Jerusalem on an ass was probably an actual fact, not only a legend based on Zech. ix. 9, as Strauss assumed, for we have a parallel in Mohammedan history of Salman, the governor of Medinah, "who at the time of the dis-

sensions of the califs, rode upon an ass in order to show his advocacy of peace according to the account of Ibn Kutaibahs" (*Jewish Encyclopedia*, art. "Jesus").

It seems certain that Jesus sought rather the spiritual and moral regeneration of his people, leaving their deliverance from the heavy yoke of the Romans until the coming of God's kingdom, soon to be expected. Nevertheless, the enthusiastic acclamations of his Galilean followers at his entry; the suspicious eye of the Roman administration; the criticism of the spiritual leaders of the people; the perhaps not wholly unpatriotic attitude of the hierarchy to keep the nation quiet, even if self-interested motives on their part may have run along with this; the disillusionment of many—perhaps even among his followers—because Jesus did not entertain political aspirations, all these accidents combined brought him to the cross. Had he headed an insurrection he would perhaps have shared the same fate, but his name would have probably gone down into profane history together with a Judas the Galilean, Theudas and others, whereas instead it went down at first only as that of a beloved and adored master and rabbi among a quiet Jewish sect of religious brotherhood. When this brotherhood gradually expanded, outgrowing its Jewish shell and coming into conflict with the Roman state religion, it then became known also in political history.

Even the stories of the resurrection of Jesus and his appearances after his death, started first by three Galilean women, had entirely a Jewish garb, if we consider the extravagant stories of the Talmud about beloved and adored rabbis, upon whom *Shechina* (the presence of God) was believed to rest, and whose bodies were thought not to be liable to corruption in accordance with the notions of other Semitic peoples who believe even to-day that their saints continue to live after death. The *Jewish Encyclopedia* is probably right in stating that the legendary lives

of Jewish saints like Onias and others in the Talmud must be compared before a true estimate of Jesus can be formed.

That Jesus was not only a healer and exorcist, but just as much a religious and moral teacher, there is no doubt. I do not see any necessity to assume that there were existing books containing the sayings of a saviour or master and probably derived from Indian or Buddhistic sources which were attributed to Jesus. This may be admitted to some extent as in the case of the late Fourth Gospel where vii. 38 is evidently of Buddhist origin, but we must guard against assuming a loan in every parallel thought. The religious and moral spirit of Hebrew thought was not so unoriginal as not to be able to furnish parallelisms to sayings of other great religions. The saying of Buddha cited by Mr. B. K. Roy (*Open Court*, Jan. 1914, p. 59) for instance:

"One may conquer a thousand men in battle,  
But he who conquers himself is the greatest victor,"

is paralleled by Prov. xvi. 32: "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city." There is no need to assume a connection between these sayings, although Proverbs in its present form very probably dates from the Alexandrian period. The above-mentioned Jewish *Aboth* refers to this saying of Proverbs with regard to the question, "Who is a true hero?" and Jesus says: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."

The Jewish religion could very well bring forth independently a religious and moral teacher like Jesus. So many of his sayings of the highest spiritual and moral order can be paralleled by similar sayings in the Jewish fathers, that Jewish scholars point to them and say: "Did Jesus teach anything new?" Is there then any necessity to refer them to some foreign book of the sayings of a

saviour or ideal man? Jesus as a moral and religious teacher is entirely explainable on the basis of that spirit of the prophets of the Old Testament and of those Jewish teachers since the close of the canon who always dwelt more on the inner spirit of the law than on its letter or the traditions of the elders which were attached to the law and drove out all life from religion. Such men were Antigonus of Socho and Hillel of the pre-Christian century, of the first of whom the saying is recorded: "Be not slaves who serve a master for the sake of compensation, be like such servants as labor for their master without reward; and let the fear of heaven be upon you." Compare a similar saying of Jesus.

"Jesus spoke with the authority of the Haggada<sup>2</sup> as opposed to the legalism of the Halachists" (*Jewish Encyclopedia*). It is this fact, that Jesus was a moral and religious teacher representing the flower of the best spirit of Hebrew religion coupled "with his anti-Essenic and anti-Pharisaic attitude toward the fallen, opposing the barrier between the better classes of society and the *Am-harez*"<sup>3</sup> (*Jewish Encyclopedia*), coupled further with the expectation of the approaching end and the coming of the kingdom of God, that gave Jesus his importance in the origin of Christianity.

In this connection we will compare the prayer of Jesus (Matt. xii. 25) with the prayer of a rabbi in the Talmud (*Berach.* 28. 2) when leaving the school of learning. Jesus prayed: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes." The rabbi's words run thus: "I thank thee my God, that thou

<sup>2</sup> *Haggada* (from Hebr. *hagad*, to say,) is the free interpretation of scripture for homiletical purposes as opposed to the authoritative *Halacha*, the Jewish oral law supposed to be of divine origin like the written law. It made much use of tale, parable and allegory.

<sup>3</sup> *Amharez*, the rabbinical term for the *plebs*.

hast given me my portion among those who sit in the house of learning and not those who sit at the corners of the street. I rise in the morning and they rise in the morning; I rise to occupy myself with things concerning the law, they rise to occupy themselves with things which are useless. I work and they work. I work and receive a reward, they work and receive no reward. I run and they run. I run to everlasting life, they run to the pit of destruction."

Especially the "heavy laden" must have hailed the preaching of divine mercy as a great evangel—those who were oppressed outwardly by hard toil, or inwardly by the feeling of being far below the demanded ideal, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," for this feeling has always been the most depressing burden with deeper minds.

A similar effect is noticeable in the doctrine of "boundless mercy" of the Buddhist Hongwanji or Shinshu sects in Japan. This preaching of Jesus must have drawn many hearts to him and must have formed a brotherhood around his name even after his death. His death especially glorified him, and his followers must have early believed that the *Shechina* had dwelt upon him. They must have hailed him as a special divine messenger, "a man approved of God," as Peter calls him Acts ii. 21.

The divinization of Jesus had already begun when Paul, a man of deep introspection and filled with the consciousness of the insufficiency of all moral aspiration to reach the ideal, as expressed in Rom. vii. 14-24, heard of the crucified Nazarene. This honest Pharisee, a Hellenistic Jew, inclined to a broader conception and versed in the rabbinical terminology concerning the Messiah as "the heavenly, the last Adam," was overwhelmed by the faithfulness of the first followers of Jesus to their master, and so this Jesus rose higher and higher in his estimation, and finally became the metaphysical Christ who has come upon

earth to save all mankind. The personality of Jesus must at least have made such an impression upon Paul that he felt justified in seeing in him an incarnation of the heavenly Christ. "He must at least have become persuaded that Jesus was not an unworthy person. If Paul speaks of Jesus as one without sin, which of course is rather more a dogmatic proposition,<sup>4</sup> he could only apply this to him if he had the impression that Jesus died innocently and was not crucified rightly as a blasphemer and wicked person" (Weiss).

That Paul knew nothing of Jesus is a very strong assertion. Is it possible that a man who stayed fifteen days with Peter and James after his conversion, and also met them in other ways, who also knew other Jews that belonged to the first Christian community before he himself joined them, such as Barnabas, Andronicus and Junias (compare Rom. xvi. 7) should not have known anything of Jesus? That he rarely cites sayings of Jesus is no proof that he did not know of any. He probably presupposed a knowledge of them with his readers, and moreover the nature of his dogmatic and polemic writings did not offer much opportunity to refer to them. That he knew of sayings of Jesus and knew of him as a teacher, we have a proof, as Weiss rightly says, in 1 Cor. vii. 25, where concerning a certain question he says he has "no commandment of the Lord" (compare also verses 10 and 12).

After all, in order to be just to Jesus, even if we do not assume him to be the sinless God-man of orthodoxy or the ideal man of liberal theology, we must admit that he must at least have been of a very high religious and moral character, measured by the times in which he lived, or else Christianity could not have gathered around him as the nucleus of a new religion. The words of the noted

<sup>4</sup> In the Talmud friends console a rabbi over the death of his son, because he died sinless, having spent his time in sacred study.

philosopher and Sanskritist Deussen in his latest book *The Philosophy of the Bible*<sup>\*</sup>: "Only a fool can doubt the historicity of Jesus," are certainly too strong, but he is surely right that "in Jesus the Jews killed one of their best men." Of course he grants that it was only a small minority who did this and under peculiar circumstances.

Modern Jewish scholars seem to me sometimes to be more impartial and just to Jesus than Gentiles. They also claim Jesus as one of the best men of their nation, and I think they can very well understand how the death of Jesus could have been looked upon as an atoning death, even among his earliest followers, on the basis of such a purely Jewish idea that the death of a righteous man is of great value.

Christianity might possibly have developed without Jesus with all its dogmas and the same ethics as it has now. Still it is peculiar that this did not take place on the basis of such mythical personalities as Mithras, Attis and Adonis, but on the basis of a historical person like Jesus; and for this reason I think his character and importance in the origin of Christianity must not be under-estimated.

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<sup>\*</sup> See an excerpt from Deussen's book on another page of this issue.

## THE CRITICAL TRILEMMA.

THE great triangle of judgment concerning the Christ or, more strictly, the Jesus presents these mutually incompatible theses:

1. Jesus was Man and God,
2. Jesus was Man and not God,
3. Jesus was God and not Man.

The first is orthodox, the traditional view.<sup>1</sup> It calls for no discussion, it is not discussible; for it is the denial and renunciation of thought. No meaning can be attached to the compound God-Man. One may discourse about it forever, but can really form no idea and convey no idea that is intelligible or debatable. This thesis then belongs to the realm of faith, not of reason.

The second view is accepted with practical unanimity by the critical intelligence the world over. It makes no difference what kind of a man or how great a man one may take Jesus to have been, whether a miserable degenerate (with Binet-Sanglé), or a strange combination of contradictions (with Karl Weidel), or the synthesis of every conceivable excellence in the highest degree (with Vorwerk),—man is man and nothing more.

<sup>1</sup> Any one eager to enrich the language with sonorous vocables might find occasion in devising appropriate names for these three views. The first might be called dualistic or androtheistic; the second, liberal, historicist, or andromonistic; the third, radical, symbolistic, or theomonistic. The term allegorical does not seem so good as symbolistic, and the adjective *mythic(al)* would be both misplaced and misleading. *Theomonistic* may be somewhat pedantic and outlandish, but it strikes nearest the bull's eye, for the most distinctive mark of the protochristian movement was its *militant monotheism*.

This view has met with such general acceptance among the "liberals" solely as a reaction from the orthodox dogma of Chalcedon, which they recognized as meaningless and impossible, and in supposed default of any choice, and not at all because of its inherent rationality or plausibility. The liberal critics rashly assumed that there was only one logical alternative, that the Jesus was surely either God-Man or mere man; on rejecting the first they felt forced to accept the second. Hence for a century the problem has been, How shall we understand and explain the New Testament and primitive Christianity on the hypothesis that Jesus was mere man? Immeasurable learning, indefatigable industry, inexhaustible patience, the keenest insight, the most piercing acumen, the most vivid imagination, the subtlest analysis, the boldest synthesis—all have been enlisted unceasingly and in every Christian country and in lavish extravagance in the persistent attempt to rationalize and make comprehensible the great facts of the New Testament and Protochristianity on the hypothesis of the pure-humanity of Jesus.

This splendid and heroic enterprise, though employing all the enginery of the human mind in its completest equipment, has issued in failure total, absolute, undeniable, and irremediable. Not one single feature of Protochristianity has been explained. No light whatever has been thrown upon the miracles, none upon the doctrines, none upon the early life. Neither has any *progress* been made towards any solution. The darkness is just as deep as ever, the diversities and contradictions among the critics become ever sharper and more numerous; there is not one that can satisfy himself much less any other, nor is there anywhere offered any outlook for improvement. The deepest researches of such as Reitzenstein, Norden, Charles, Reinach, Loisy, and Frazer in no way come to the support of

the liberal positions but at the very least necessitate complete re-formation of the lines of defence.

In the foregoing the language may sound a trifle strong, but it is not a whit too strong. It does not exaggerate the facts in the case. The bankruptcy of liberal criticism is as utter as such bankruptcy can be. It is not then too much to say that the situation as viewed from the second standpoint is hopeless. It must be repeated that when highly cultured and intelligent men tell us glibly and confidently that Jesus was merely a remarkable man, they do so simply and solely on the principle of the Excluded Middle, reasoning thus: He was either God-Man or pure man; but God-Man is impossible; therefore he was pure man. Convinced by such logic, they make no serious attempt to comprehend the New Testament and Proto-christianity on their hypothesis, but merely feel confident that some way or other these phenomena *must* be comprehensible. Whereas, if they would make earnest effort to grasp the situation, they would soon discover that they were in a blind alley, that it was just as impossible to understand the historical and literary facts in terms of the pure-human Jesus as to understand the Jesus as at once both human and divine.

Such being the state of case, we are driven to inquire whether there be not another possibility, and instantly we discern a long neglected alternative: *Jesus was God.*

The full meaning of this statement is not easy to realize, still less easy to express in a narrow compass. It is not meant that Jesus was the metaphysical or cosmical God of Plato or Aristotle, of Zeno or Epicurus, still less the God of dogma, of Athanasius or Augustine or Thomas, or of Rome or London to-day. Nor again a mythical or astral or nature God, such as flourished in the many-named faiths of the circum-Mediterranean region. What is meant

is that Jesus was a certain person or aspect of deity, the aspect that recommended itself particularly to the religious mind of the Jewish Dispersion. Jesus was the Jehovah of the Hellenistic consciousness, of the Jewish consciousness as it was modified and profoundly modified by constant contact with the more or less nearly allied Greek consciousness in matters of religion. We might almost say that Jesus was Jehovah Hellenized. Of course, any such compact formula must sacrifice verity to brevity. In fact, this Hellenization could not run quite the same course in any two minds. The individual reaction necessarily varied from man to man. So Jesus could not mean quite the same for any two. The shades of conception varied like the colors of the spectrum, insensibly from one extreme to another. Yet there were certain resemblances and distinctions broad and clear enough to mark off certain groups with more or less clearness. An aspect or person of God was truly God and yet did not exhaust the idea of God; it was very God, and yet not all God.<sup>2</sup> Nothing like logical or metaphysical accuracy or consistency is to be expected in the deep musings of these Protochristians; on the contrary, we must expect to find all manner of contradictions, often patent, more often latent; we must expect to find them lying quietly side by side in our scriptures. Nor must we hope to find the divine and the human sundered completely in these early notions, any more than the material and the spiritual in early Greek philosophy.

It is not strange then that from the fusion of Jewish theologic-religious and Greek mythologic-philosophic thought there should have issued a compound or rather

<sup>2</sup>We have a similar case in the Bolzano-Dedekind-Cantor doctrine of infinity, where a part equals the whole, that is, may be set in one-one relation with the whole. Thus, of the infinite assemblage of integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,....  $2n$ .... we may pick out the *even* integers, 2, 4, 6, 8,....  $2n$ .... which form only a *part* of the original assemblage. Yet on taking out the factor 2 from these even integers we obtain the original assemblage 1, 2, 3, 4,.... $n$ ....,  $2n$ .... The part is equivalent or one-one related to the whole.

compounds, many-colored<sup>3</sup> and many-shaped, a new deity or aspect of deity that itself presented varied aspects. Here the Greek, there the Jewish, tinge would be deepest, yonder they would vie in hue. For some the great concept of the Son of Man, present in Daniel, dominant in Enoch, would be most fascinating; they would frame their phrases in accord therewith. Others might be more attracted by the suffering Servant of Yahveh, and would delineate an experience along the lines laid down in Isaiah lii. liii. They might easily extend the analogy to include the Alexandrian Wisdom and devise a career in which countless Old Testament phrases would be mirrored, saying, "(All) this was done that the scripture might be fulfilled," as in Matt. xxi. 4, where it is plain that the incident is a pure invention, to fulfil the scripture prophecy. Some again might sail on still loftier wing: they might dream of a second Adam, of a Man from heaven, of a new order of spiritual being ushered in by the new deity. Still others might remember the Stoic or the Philonic Logos and might conceive of him as Son of God, as an emanation from the inmost bosom of God conceived as the Father, an idea far older than either Philo or the Porch. Yet others might seize upon the genuine Jewish notion of the Messiah, the Christ, and sublime it into the concept of the vicegerent of God, the envoy extraordinary, the ambassador plenipotentiary of the court of heaven unto all the nations of the earth. Indeed, there seems to be no limit to the divagations of religious and theosophic fancy when once set free to roam at will in such airy realms. To any one who properly estimates the mythopoetic faculty and its enormous importance in the history of civilization, none of the foregoing need seem remarkable, but in any case it was certainly all actual, for exactly those ideas and countless

<sup>3</sup> πολυχρῶντος, Eph. iii. 10.

others more or less similar are indubitably present in the New Testament and other early Christian literature.

But in all of this diapason there is one ground-tone that sounds out clearer than any other. It is the great note of *salvation*. Above all else the new deity is the *Saviour*. For this the pure Greek<sup>4</sup> is used in the New Testament only 24 times: 8 times it is "God (the) Saviour" or "Saviour God"; twice it is "Our God and Saviour Jesus Christ (or Christ Jesus)"; 4 times (in 2 Peter ) it is "Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ"; twice it is "Saviour of the world" (John iv. 42; 1 John iv. 14); thrice (Titus i. 4; iii. 6; 2 Tim. i. 10) it is "our Saviour"; five times it is "Saviour." It belongs to the later strata of composition (Johannines, Pastorals, 2 Peter, Jude), elsewhere only in Luke i. 47; ii. 11; Acts v. 31; xiii. 23; Eph. v. 23; Phil. iii. 20. A favorite with the Gnostics, it lost caste with the orthodox, who substituted "Lord." But instead of this pure Greek, that smacked maybe too much of paganism, the New Testament puts Jesus and preferably The Jesus. This was *understood* to mean *Saviour*, as is clear from Matt. i. 21, "And thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that *shall save*<sup>5</sup> his people from their sins." Justin Martyr and Epiphanius both interpret the name as Saviour; that their etymology was not quite correct makes no difference, the question is not what the name really meant (Yah-help) a thousand years B. C., but what it was *thought* to mean in the first century A. D. (or B. C.), and that was Saviour.

The salvation was from sin or sins. The chief sin, which dragged all others in its train, was idolatry. The chief mission of the "Saviour of the world" was to save it from idolatry, from false worship of false gods. Such was almost necessarily the central idea of a new mono-

<sup>4</sup> σωτήρ.

<sup>5</sup> σώσει.

theism in the midst of polytheism. This great controlling idea is expressed beautifully under a host of symbols in the Gospels. The world to be saved, mainly Gentiles, but partly Jewish or half-Jewish, is represented as a human being suffering from some form of disease or affliction, as sick or halt or blind or leprous or even dead, and to this wretch the Saviour-God, the Jesus, brings healing. A still more favorite image depicts the polytheistic world as a man possessed of demons (the gods of heathendom), or more pathetically as a fallen woman (an unchaste woman being the regular Old Testament term for an idolatrous people); the Saviour-God, the Jesus, expels the demons, forgives the sins of the woman, who worships him (i. e., who is converted to monotheism, to the Jesus-cult).

Beyond this framework of ideas the earliest Gospel (in all probability) did not extend. The scene is laid in Galilee of the Gentiles, to represent the rising on benighted heathendom of the great light, of the proclamation of salvation, of the Saviour-God, the Jesus, that is, the preaching of "the monotheistic Jesus-cult" (Deissmann), of the worship of the One God under the aspect of Saviour (from sin, i. e., from idolatry). But at an early date there was made a most important addition: Some imported from their own abandoned heathen cult the notion of a "dying God," of a god that saved his people by dying for them, a notion derived originally from nature-worship or from the sacrifice of the king to preserve the vigor of kingship, but held very tenaciously by many even after conversion from polytheism, even as our Germanic ancestors still clung to their heathen notions long after conversion to Christianity. What more natural than to engraft this pagan notion on the primitive Gospel, which was especially easy to do, since the suffering Servant of Yahveh is represented (Is. liii.

12), as "pouring out his soul (Septuagint, 'was delivered') unto death."

The especial form that this representation should take may have been given by an expression in Heb. vi. 6,<sup>8</sup> where it reads like a quotation, "crucifying to themselves the Son of God and putting him to an open shame." The phrase is used of such as at first accept the doctrine of the Christ<sup>7</sup> but fail to go on with it, falling by the wayside and bringing the doctrine into contempt and disrepute: the word *crucifying*<sup>8</sup> seems nearly equivalent to *pillorying*. That the word is used figuratively seems indicated by the phrase "putting to open shame."<sup>9</sup> The only conceivable way in which this could be done was by rejecting the doctrine of the Son of God, and since actual crucifixion is out of the question, and since the two participles seem quite parallel, we must assume that their meanings are nearly the same. Even though there be no adducible case of *crucify*<sup>10</sup> used in the sense of *pillory*, yet we know that the cross was the punishment of slaves and miscreants, that it was considered peculiarly ignominious, so that it could hardly escape becoming a symbol of shame and disgrace (Heb. xii. 2). Such a sense seems demanded by the context in this passage. If now such be the case, then we may easily see how from this germ may have sprung up the whole story of the crucifixion. The Jews of Jerusalem, who rejected the doctrine of the Jesus and may even have tried to repress it, are most vividly and dramatically represented as arresting, trying, condemning the Son of God, the Jesus, and then calling on the Roman government to carry

\* Hereby it is not at all excluded, what is emphasized in *Ecce Deus*, that the famous impalement of the righteous one (in Plato's Republic, II, 361D) may have suggested the idea of the crucifixion of Jesus; but the part of the Jews and of Jerusalem must have been derived from elsewhere.

<sup>7</sup> τὸν . . . τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον, Heb. vi. 1.

<sup>8</sup> ἀνασταυροῦντας.

<sup>9</sup> παραδειγματίζοντας, making him a public example.

<sup>10</sup> ἀνασταυροῦν.

out their verdict, which they themselves could not legally do.

Now it is well known that the whole account swarms with improbabilities. Such a hasty proceeding at such a time appears credible only when all things are possible. This matter has been set forth so repeatedly and conclusively that it would seem needless to dwell on it here. There is in the whole story not a single feature of likelihood. Even Brandt, who does not question the traditional view, in his learned *Evangelische Geschichte* is compelled to reject the major portion as palpable fiction, and the remaining fraction he retains for the most insufficient of reasons, because not in itself unbelievable nor showing any obvious tendency. If indeed the central fact of the crucifixion were itself independently well assured (as Brandt would naturally assume in 1893, but by no means now), then such reasons might be admitted, in the absence of counter-reasons. But since now the focal figure of Jesus can not be proved to be historical (as conceded by representative historicists themselves), the hypothesis of the historicity becomes needless, being no longer necessary. We must in accord with Occam's law of parsimony explain as many as possible of the details of the Last Days in some such way as Brandt (among others) has so successfully employed on the majority; nor does it appear that there is any single feature that *may* not thus be explained.

All the more confidently do we go at this work, since it is now coming into clearer and clearer evidence and is admitted by such authorities as Harnack that the "Sayings," the Q-source, the oldest form yet known of the Gospel, did *not* contain any such account as we now read of the Judean ministry or the presence of Jesus in Jerusalem, but was confined to Galilee. It calls for the utmost zeal and for almost superhuman ingenuity to reconcile such a fact with the historical authenticity of the Passion

week and its central feature, the crucifixion. On the other hand, we have now a thoroughly satisfactory explanation in terms of motives, methods, and materials, all of which are known independently to be not only real but also favorites with the men of that time and place.

It is a very strong confirmation of this interpretation of the Passion-week, particularly the crucifixion, as a symbolic-dramatic homily on the Jewish rejection of the Jesus cult, that it is the motifs of shame, of ignominy, of mockery, and of Jewish unbelief and contempt that are plainly conspicuous, and by no means any motifs drawn from Jesus himself, whether his power, his love, or his suffering. These latter contribute little or nought to the representation, whereas even the old festival of the Sacæa at Babylon is made to contribute to the picture of the shame and ignominy to which the king is subjected. It has been argued that the details of the soldiers' mockery (about which the disciples could have known nothing, but which are narrated in the same spirit as all the rest) must be historical, because so closely resembling the Sacæan! Whereas it is obvious that the latter merely furnish the model for the fictive imagination of the Evangelist. Similar relations abound in history.

To the foregoing it remains only to add that the supremely important incident of the resurrection is now admitted in all critical quarters to be unhistorical. The liberal rejects decisively the notion that his mere man Jesus rose up from the dead or was in any way resuscitated. The liberal concerns himself not for an instant with the question, How did Christ rise from the dead? (which he denies *in toto*), and vexes himself solely with the purely psychological question, How did the disciples *come to believe* that Jesus rose from the dead? This question alone has for liberals any rationality. They seek solely to explain the amazing mistake of the disciples, from Magde-

lena and Peter down to Saul of Tarsus. In this quest of an explanation for such an era-making delusion they have squandered the most splendid abilities, all absolutely to no purpose whatever, except to make more and more indisputably evident that all such efforts are idle and that no such explanation is possible. At this point the victory of the orthodox over the liberal critic is complete and certain. It is folly in any one to reject the physical miracle of resurrection as incredible and then to accept the psychical miracle of the universal belief in that resurrection as convincingly attested; for the belief is just as incomprehensible as the thing believed. To convince oneself of the hopelessness of the task of making the belief in the resurrection intelligible, it suffices to read carefully the theories of the greatest masters, the biographers of Jesus, such as Keim and Volkmar, Holtzmann and Pfleiderer, Renan and Reville, and even Loisy and Holsten. The keener the critic's intellect, the absurder his theory.

On the other hand, the radical criticism offers a solution in perfect harmony with all the ascertained facts in the case and of a piece with the general body of symbolic interpretation that is demanded for understanding the Gospel, as well as in accord with modes of speech current in evangelic circles. This solution is set forth in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, in the essay entitled "Anastasis." Though not yet accessible in English, it cannot be reproduced here even in substance, it must suffice to indicate the barest outline: The doctrine of the resurrection was not at first stated in the word *Anastasis*, but almost certainly (as in Acts) in some such form as "God hath raised up Jesus." It is unlikely that the primitive preacher meant "resuscitated" or "revived" by the term "raised up." Other words were at hand, which he would have used more naturally. On the contrary, the term "raised up" in both of its Greek

forms<sup>11</sup> as well as in its Hebrew equivalent (*qûm*)<sup>12</sup> was regularly used to denote—not resuscitation, far from it, but—establishment, appointment, installation; in fact, *anastasis* is literally *up-setting* and it is commonly used exactly in this sense of overthrow,<sup>13</sup> but also in the exactly opposite sense of *setting-up*, establishing (as in Luke ii. 34), erecting (as of walls, trophies, images, etc.). It is only in this latter sense that the verb is used in the New Testament, and though the raising-up *might* be “from the dead,” yet this latter phrase is not needed and is sometimes positively excluded. If we would discover what the first preachers would have meant and what the first hearers would have understood by the words “God hath raised up Jesus,” we can not do better than to turn to the Old Testament and particularly to the Septuagint translation. Here we find that ‘UR<sup>14</sup> is used four times of “raising up” a man, as “the righteous” (Is. xli. 2), “him from the north” (Is. xli. 25), “him in righteousness” (Is. xlv. 13), rendered by *egeirō* thrice, by *exegeirō* once; that *qûm* is used most frequently in the same sense and is rendered by *anistēmi*, more seldom *egeirō*, thus: “God will raise up a prophet” (Deut. xviii. 15, 18); “Yahveh raised up judges” (Judg. ii. 16, 18); “Yahveh raised up a Saviour” (Judg. iii. 9, 15); “Yahveh will raise up a king” (1 Kings xiv. 14, Jer. xxx. 9); “I will raise David a righteous branch” (Messiah) (Jer. xxiii. 5); “I will raise up for them a plant” (Ez. xxxiv. 29); “I will raise up a shepherd” (Zech. xi. 16), and especially “The man raised up for Messiah of God of Jacob” (2 Sam. xxiii. 1, Sept. “whom the Lord raised up for Christ of God of Jacob”). Here be it noted the very words of the Christian dogma are used. In Acts

<sup>11</sup> ἀνέστησεν and ἤγειρεν.

<sup>12</sup> קום

<sup>13</sup> So in Herod. I, 177, 178 ἀνίσταται and ἀναστράται mean “subjected,” “overthrown.”

<sup>14</sup> עורר

ii. 24 Peter says "whom God raised up,"<sup>15</sup> a clear echo of the Septuagint, "whom the Lord raised up."<sup>16</sup> Now let us ask the "unbiased man," to whom the historicists are so fond of appealing, when Peter first quoted the words used of the establishment of "David Son of Jesse," is it likely that he used them with the same or with a wholly different meaning? And even if the latter, is it likely that his *hearers understood* them in the familiar or in a wholly unfamiliar sense? Consider also that in Acts ii. 30 we *must* refer this *raising-up* to the establishment on the throne of David. For it is declared, "therefore (David) being a prophet and knowing that with an oath God had sworn to him from the fruit of his loins to seat (one) on his throne, foreseeing spake of the *anastasis* of the Christ." If by *anastasis* here be meant the establishment of the Christ (on the throne of David), then all is in order, Peter is speaking rationally and is intelligible to his auditors; but if resurrection be meant, then the logic fails and becomes hard or impossible for the hearer to understand. What sense in saying that David, knowing God had promised to establish a lineal successor on his throne, foreseeing (the fulfilment) spake of the resurrection of the Christ? The following clause tries to explain this by misquoting Ps. xvi. 10. The Psalm says naught about flesh or corruption, even the Septuagint says not "flesh" but "thy holy one," as does the Hebrew. Such a misquotation seems plainly an after-thought of the Christian compiler, and no part of the earliest propaganda. Peter would have been called to order had he begun his preaching by such gross miscitation. In Acts xiii. 35 a similar misconstruction is attributed to Paul, but since the redaction of Acts falls near the close of the first century, there is no reason to hold Paul responsible; it is far more likely that it is the work of a reviser or compiler, nor is there any ground to

<sup>15</sup> ὃν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέστησεν.

<sup>16</sup> ὃν ἀνέστησεν κύριος.

affirm with Kautzsch that this "Scripture proof" (at least in this form) "formed part of the oldest Gospel preaching" (*Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments*, II, 123).

The next verse (Acts ii. 32) states merely, "This Jesus hath God raised up," and verse 36, "Surely then let all the house of Israel know that God hath made him both Lord and Christ." The following words, "this Jesus, whom ye crucified," are unnecessary and sound very like an interpolation. That the interpolator has been busy here is known and admitted. Even Von Soden brackets the six words *to kata sarka anastēsein ton Christon* (verse 30). The splendid verse 33, "By the right hand therefore of God raised up on high etc.," can not refer to any resuscitation, but must refer to the installation of Jesus as pro-Jehovah. Turning now to the similar discourse in Acts iii, we find our contentions greatly strengthened. In verse 22 the prediction of Moses is quoted, that "a prophet shall our Lord God raise up<sup>17</sup> for you," and in verse 26 the *fulfilment* is found in the fact that "unto you first God, having raised up his Servant,<sup>18</sup> has sent him to bless you etc." Common sense would demand that *raise up* means as nearly as possible the same in both verses; and it seems very hard to endure such a rendering as "God having resuscitated his Servant has sent him"; whereas the notion of the establishment of Jesus satisfies all requirements—the sending of Jesus is then obviously the proclamation of his cult.

It is true that verses 13<sup>b</sup>-15 refer plainly to the crucifixion, but these verses may fairly be taken to represent a later revision of the oration, indeed they *must* be so taken, if the whole situation is to be made intelligible: that Peter should have preached and convinced thousands that a man lame from birth had been made whole by the name of Jesus who had been crucified six weeks before as a malefactor, is incredible. Jesus appears before us as a God,

<sup>17</sup> ἀναστήσει.

<sup>18</sup> ἀναστήσας τὸν παῖδα.

the viceroy of God most High, and the story of the Passion is just as much a later addition here as it is (by admission of such a staunch historicist as Harnack) in the Gospels.

On passing to Stephen's speech we find new confirmation. In Acts vii. 37 the same prediction of the *raising up* is cited, where there is certainly no hint of resuscitation. Coming now to the great speech ascribed to St. Paul at Pisidian Antioch (Acts xiii. 17-41) we find in verse 22 that God "raised up<sup>19</sup> David as King," in verse 23 we read that God "raised up<sup>19</sup> for Israel a Saviour Jesus, John having forepreached before face of his entrance etc." Here there is surely no reference to resuscitation but only to the introduction of the Jesus.<sup>20</sup> It is true that many very old MSS. read "led"<sup>21</sup> instead of "raised up,"<sup>22</sup> and this reading is preferred by the editors; but it is enough for our purposes that many old and high authorities read "raised up" as given above. In verses 32, 33 it is again stated that God had fulfilled the promise to the fathers by "raising up<sup>23</sup> Jesus," where the sense of establishment is necessary, and of resuscitation impossible; for it is the Ps. ii. 7 that is quoted as fulfilled, "Thou art my Son, I this day have begotten thee," where the reference is certainly to installation. True there follows straightway (verse 34) an attempted proof that "he raised him from the dead," but this seems to be an after-thought, and may surely be understood easily as the work of the reviser.

This reviser here uses *anestēsen* because he is trying to explain the *anastēsas* of verse 33; everywhere else he uses the term which means "rouse up" rather than "raise

<sup>19</sup> ἤγειρεν.

<sup>20</sup> Verses 27-31 refer to the Passion, but are clearly marked as a later insertion: verse 26 connects naturally not with verse 27 but with verse 32, with which verse 31 does not connect naturally. Leave out these verses, and see how much more smoothly it reads. That the interpolator has been busy here is *certain*, for in verse 29 some excellent ancient manuscripts contain an important addition of ten words.

<sup>21</sup> ἤγαγεν.

<sup>22</sup> ἤγειρεν.

<sup>23</sup> ἀναστήσας.

up,"<sup>24</sup> as in Acts iii. 15; v. 30; x. 40; xiii. 30, 37; xxvi. 8. This use was very natural, for though "rouse up" may be used of inauguration and is so used in the Septuagint (as we have seen) and also in Acts xiii. 22, 23, yet its idea lies closer to "resuscitation" than does that of "raise up." In the Epistles it is everywhere *egeirō*, never *anistēmi*, though the middle form, "rise up"<sup>25</sup> is used oftentimes in allusion to the dead (Eph. v. 14; 1 Thess. iv, 14, 16).

In Ephesians it is the spiritually dead, in Thessalonians the writer seems to refer (verse 14) to a dogma rather than to an historical fact. In Heb. vii. 11, 15 the reference is certainly not to resuscitation but to the rising-up or appointment of the great "High Priest after the order of Melchizedec," i. e., to the inauguration of the new deity or his cult.

It seems clear then that the phrase "raised up Jesus" originally referred to the historic installation of the new God, Jesus, or what is nearly the same, to the introduction of his cult, and the word *anistēmi* was preferred, in its regular Septuagint sense. Gradually, as the doctrine of the "dying God" pleased more and more the Gentile converts, as the Passion week intruded into the primitive Gospel, the application of the phrase was diverted to the resuscitation of the Crucified, and the verb "raise up"<sup>26</sup> was either explained to mean resuscitate or was displaced by "rouse up,"<sup>27</sup> which more naturally suggested revival. A strong witness to this process is found in Matt. xxvii. 53 (admittedly a very late passage), where the term *egerais* is used, instead of the regular word *anastasis*, to denote resurrection. In *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (pp. 228-232) it is shown that the phrase "from the dead"<sup>28</sup> seems to have come in gradually, in many places by interpolation.

Such appears to have been the original sense of the phrase "raised up Jesus," and such its gradual, though

<sup>24</sup> ἐγείρω.

<sup>25</sup> ἀνίσταμαι.

<sup>26</sup> ἀνίστημι.

<sup>27</sup> ἐγείρω.

<sup>28</sup> ἐκ νεκρῶν.

very early, transformation of meaning. Somewhat similar changes abound in the histories of cults and religions, where they shine clear to the eye of the modern student, though less evidenced than the one in hand. Surely no one can maintain that such a process is impossible, certainly no one has tried to show any improbability in the foregoing conception. Pfeiderer did indeed pronounce it "perverse" (*verkehrt*), but without the display of reasons. Critics have in general avoided it, though some have admitted in print that the essay on *Anastasis* was particularly hard to refute, and an illustrious Biblicist has (in a private letter) declared it the strongest of all contentions in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, and on its face impregnable. In the presence of the admitted failure of all other attempts to understand the faith and dogma of the resurrection, this one would seem to call for consideration. The single obvious objection would appear to be that it presupposes extensive revision and modification of the primitive forms of the New Testament writings, or at least of the original doctrines and documents that have been worked up in our present canonical scriptures; but he who is unwilling to proceed on this hypothesis may as well abandon once for all the problem of New Testament interpretation; for outside of it there is no hope whatever of understanding even the most obvious facts.

It may now be in place to give in conclusion a general though partial conspectus of the critical situation. The necessity of some other theory of Christian origins than the prevailing historicist theory, is shown in the following:

1. This latter theory is not now and never was plausible in itself; it is not guaranteed by any precedent or succedent in history; the supposed situation is extremely unlike any other presented in human experience, and the course of events is without any parallel in the annals of men; it is in fact quite unique, an incomparable exception.

2. The attempt to interpret Jesus as a mere man is only a first and natural reaction from the impossible conception of the God-Man and has little else to recommend it than that its only recognized alternative is unthinkable. As soon as the third possibility, Jesus was God (under a particular aspect or person), is distinctly recognized, the liberal view is at once stripped of all its fictitious necessity and even probability.

3. The complete failure of all attempts to discover an historical Jesus is clearly and convincingly set forth (in Schweitzer's "Quest of the Historical Jesus") by a very high authority in the very center of the liberal camp. One may agree or disagree with Schweitzer at a multitude of points, but it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the broad general fact that no progress has been made towards clearing up primitive Christianity regarded as an emanation from a personal focus, Jesus. Indeed, the most venerated oracles of criticism are coming to recognize this quest as hopeless. Loisy, while still cherishing the simulacrum of an historical Jesus, admits definitely that "it is not to the Gospel of Jesus, it is to the Christian mystery that the Greco-Roman world was converted." Similarly Söderblom in his new edition of Tiele's *Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte*. Not strange then that Kennedy complains that it is now held that "the mystery of Paul's conversion is his conversion to the mysteries." Unmistakably the humanity of Jesus is fast losing all significance for primitive Christianity, even in the hands of its staunchest defenders; it is becoming, in Ransom's fine phrase (in his review of *Ecce Deus*) "an utterly ineffectual source of Christian influence." While such critics fight furiously for the husk, they let the kernel disappear forever.

4. The historicist view fails wholly to yield us any intelligible or even admirable, much less lovable or adorable, character of Jesus. This fact is brought most clearly to

light in such a penetrating and sympathetic study as Weidel's on the *Persönlichkeit Jesu*. Weidel finds himself compelled to throw overboard all current conceptions of Jesus's character, yea, to reverse them at nearly every point. He is *forced* to think of Jesus as essentially choleric, wrathful, harsh, and even unjust in judgment; almost every trace of warmer and tenderer humanity vanishes, and there remains a character not unlike Fichte's in its moral fanaticism, only greatly exaggerated and narrow, and, what is even more significant, shot through and through every way with violent contradictions. These indeed Weidel not only exhibits but tries to reconcile, though with pitiful success. His painstaking and conscientious study leaves us with an incomprehensible medley of contraries instead of a character, and the appeal to Goethe as a parallel is merely bewildering. Weidel himself confesses the extreme difficulty of the situation, but thinks it *must* be overcome unless the peculiarities of the Gospel can be explained as mainly literary phenomena. Herein he is greatly right. The impressiveness of the Gospel portrait is essentially a matter of vivid rhetoric, and finds its explanation in the collective and contagious enthusiasm of a circle formed of many smaller circles of militant monotheists. This rare literary flavor may well be derived in a large measure from one or more specially gifted members whose names we know as little as we know the names of the authors of the 23d, the 90th, the 139th Psalm, or of a hundred others who have studded the firmament of religious literature with unquenchable constellations. The radical view does not deny nor depreciate the large contributions of personality and personalities to the protochristian movement, on the contrary it recognizes them in the amplest measure; but no one of these personalities was the God Jesus of primitive Christianity: they were all servants of the Heavenly Master.

5. The historicist view fails utterly to present any comprehensible picture of the activity of the Jesus, of his agency as it existed in the minds of the earliest New Testament writers. This fact comes clearly to light in such "a sufficient answer to its recent critics" as Bacon's *Christianity Old and New*. This master of exegesis recognizes three different types of "characterization of Jesus" as found in the New Testament: Paul's, Mark's, Q's. Each of these he perceives is "conventionalized": Paul's after the concept of the "Servant of God" (in the later Isaiah); Mark's "wholly different conception" "contains scarcely a trace of the Isaian conception," never predicates humility, forbearance, long-suffering, exhibits "heroism, virility, and power," "a superhuman authority," "already at the right hand of God," "more of defiance than humility"; the Q-conception (that of the "Sayings") presents Jesus as "the Servant of God who is the incarnation of his redeeming spirit of wisdom," following the "conventional ideal" of "the Alexandrian Wisdom literature." In particular, Bacon recognizes the famous "Come unto me etc." (Matt. xi. 25-30) as a "Hymn of Wisdom," referring to Norden's "Agnostos Theos" (1913). It was distinctly declared to be such in *Ecce Deus*, pp. 165-166.

It goes without saying that three such "wholly different" conceptions, conventionalized, discrepant, and without any support in any well attested words or deeds, can afford no firm historic basis for any understanding of the Jesus. Bacon in fact admits that "little indeed should we know of Jesus as he was, but for the Gospel of Mark," and yet Mark presents him (as already set forth in *Ecce Deus*) without any attractive qualities, in truth without human characteristics,—to quote Bacon— as "the Christ the Son of God," as an "authority," "in heroic proportions," whose "mighty works" are in "the foreground," "whose 'words of grace' . . . have almost disappeared."

Bacon confesses (p. 158), "the contrast between this conception and that of Paul could hardly be stronger within the limits of fidelity to historic fact." The closing phrase is evidently thrown in merely *pro domo*. According to Bacon's own statement it is superfluously manifest that these three conceptions (and he might have added a fourth, the Johannine) have no perceptible relation to historic fact, they are pure products of idealizing fancy, determined in form and contents by the temperaments of the writers and the *milieu* in which they were engendered.

As Wrede has most clearly shown, especially in treating Mark, and as Bacon knows excellently well, there is displayed nowhere in the Gospels any sense of "the limits of historic fact." It is plain in nearly every paragraph that the writers are trying to express ideas, and that they are using the incidents merely as a means of such expression, and hence the incidents are entirely plastic in their hands. This is generally admitted in critical circles concerning three-fourths, or even nine-tenths, or still more, of the total; of the small residue, where the *tendence*, the formative action of dogmatic interest, is not so clearly discernible, it is only our ignorance (of the original circumstances of the case) that is responsible. In no case has any alleged biographic datum been shown even probably to be really such; the "Pillars of Schmiedel" sleep in the dust. It is queer reasoning that, when the great bulk (which we do understand) is admittedly tendential and unhistorical, therefore the small remainder (which we do not yet understand) is naive and biographical! Such thinking goes directly against the chief methodological maxim, the Law of Parsimony, the Razor of Occam.

6. The historicist view fails to explain the transference of the propaganda from Galilee to Judea and the disappearance of Galilee from the subsequent history of the movement. This consideration has been set forth in *Ecce*

*Deus* (pp. 170-175) and appears to be decisive. No reply seems to have been attempted.

7. The historicist view fails to account for the world-mission of the new religion. Harnack admits that it did not start from any historic Jesus, whose precept and practice (he thinks) were all against it. But this world-mission was the very heart of Protochristianity; to concede that it did not issue from any historic Jesus is to concede that he was not the source of primitive Christianity.

8. The historicist theory can not explain the sudden wide-spread outburst of the propaganda, its apparently multifocal origin. This consideration has been enforced in *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (pp. 23-31), and though it has deeply impressed German reviewers, no attempt has been made to answer it—the trivial cavil of Weinel was most easily annulled.

9. The historicist theory fails to explain the relation of Paul to (any historic) Jesus, nor can it make Paul himself or the Pauline preaching intelligible. The latest and most ingenious essays on "Paul and Jesus" satisfy only their authors, while more and more the explanation of Paulinism is sought in the mystery-religions with which it has so many apparent points of contact.

10. The historicist construction wrecks utterly on the fact that it postulates an amazing personality in Jesus, a personality of astounding energy, ardor, enthusiasm, magnetism, and of the most restless activity, a personality that dominated all within its circle during life and still more after death—yet left not the slightest ripple in the course of events, is never mentioned in contemporaneous history, nor in any accounts independent of the early Christian! What is still more confounding, this impressive human personality disappears entirely and instantly from the earliest Christian preaching, which knows nothing of Jesus save as an over-earthly being, as a God. The references

to Jesus are of course frequent enough, but they are dogmatic and do not tell us certainly one single thing about his humanity, not one word that he uttered, not one deed that he did. This argument has been urged in *Ecce Deus* (pp. 18-25), it has deeply impressed such critics as Meyboom (*Theol. Tijdsch.*, 1912, p. 44), and it calls urgently for answer,—but none has been attempted.

11. The historicist hypothesis fails to explain the New Testament, more especially the symbolic element in the Gospels. That there is such an element, that it is extensive and important, and that it urgently demands honest, serious, and thorough-going consideration—all this is entirely beyond question. So much is indeed admitted by German authorities, such as Dibelius and Brückner. The obvious symbolisms discussed in *Ecce Deus* may be much increased in number. Sooner or later, criticism must make its peace with these momentous facts, and that will be the end of historicism.

12. The historicist theory can not explain extra-canonical old Christian literature; in particular, it can not explain the apologist, nor the *Teaching*, nor the *Shepherd* (of Hermas), especially the ominous silence of these latter as to any historical Jesus, their apparent utter ignorance of the whole New Testament story. The apologists have been treated (of course, not exhaustively) in *Ecce Deus*; the *Teaching* and the *Shepherd* are the subjects of elaborate essays ready for print. The argument from old Christian literature is conclusive; no attempt has been made to answer.

From the foregoing summary many most important considerations have been omitted, as too subtle or linguistic, or defying condensed statement. It remains to add that the symbolistic or radical theory is strong wherever its opponent is weak, that it has explained thus far every well-ascertained fact in the whole case, that in the happy

simile of the review of *Ecce Deus* in the *Christian Commonwealth* of London, "it fits in the New Testament as a key fits in the wards of its lock." It will doubtless receive enlargement and modification at the hands of such as Norden, Reitzenstein, Wendland, Hertlein, and other philologists, but its elements of truth are too obvious even for prejudice permanently to ignore. At no point thus far has it been successfully assailed (see "Leben Jesu, Kritik," *Theol. Jahresb.*, 1912-1913, pp. 239-252).

Meantime such scholars as Conybeare and his fellows may amuse themselves with "merciless criticisms" of the astro-mythologic interpretations of Robertson, Fuhrmann, Niemojewski, Jensen, Morosow, and with other irrelevancies. If some of these interpretations should maintain themselves, it would be highly interesting and even instructive; if one and all they should collapse like bubbles, no harm would be done, the radical symbolistic theory would not be in the least affected; for it depends upon such astro-mythology only as the tree depends upon the vine, or the wall upon the ivy.

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## ON THE NATURE OF ACQUAINTANCE.

### III.

#### ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE.

**I**N our first part, we took a preliminary survey of the objects experienced. In the second part, we considered the theory that experience is merely a certain interrelation of these objects, involving no particular existent in addition to what is experienced. Having found this theory unsatisfactory, we have now to seek out the additional constituent of experience, and to consider the nature of its relation to the objects experienced.

Before embarking upon our analysis, let us again take stock of those relevant facts which are least open to doubt. From the diversity of philosophical theories on the subject, it is evident that the true analysis, whatever it may be, cannot itself be among the facts that are evident at once, but must be reached, like a scientific hypothesis, as the theoretic residue left by the comparison of data. Here, as in philosophy generally, it is not the few logically simplest facts that form our data, but a large mass of complex every-day facts, of which the analysis offers fresh difficulties and doubts at every step. For this reason, if we wish to start with what is undeniable, we have to use words, at first, which, though familiar, stand in need of a dissection and definition only possible at a later stage.

The most obvious fact, in our present inquiry, is that, whatever may be the definition of "experience," some ob-

jects undoubtedly fall within my present experience, and of these objects some at least did not fall within my experience at earlier times which I can still remember. What is only slightly less obvious is that remembered objects sometimes—at least in the case of the immediate past—are still experienced, so that the objects experienced are not necessarily contemporaneous with the experiencing. It is obvious also that we can think of abstract facts, such as those of logic and mathematics; but in this case some argument is needed to discover what we experience when we think of them. If it were not for the fact that neutral monism has been believed, I should have said it was obvious that we can experience our own experiencing, and that this is different from experiencing the object of our experiencing; and in spite of neutral monism, I think a place must be found for what appears as an experience of our experiencing, since it is hard to see how otherwise we should have arrived at the notion that we have experiences.

At an earlier stage, we decided that our present experience can be known not to be all-embracing. It is sometimes maintained that this cannot be known, on the ground that if a thing lies outside our experience we cannot know that there is such a thing. At the risk of repetition, it may be worth while to repeat the reasons (belonging to logic rather than to theory of knowledge) which show that this argument is fallacious. An object may be *described* by means of terms which lie within our experience, and the proposition that there is an object answering to this description is then one composed wholly of experienced constituents. It is therefore possible to know the truth of this proposition without passing outside experience. If it appears on examination that no *experienced* object answers to this description, the conclusion follows that there are objects not experienced. For example, we may know Jones and paternity and the fact that every man has a father.

Then we know there is "the father of Jones," although we may never have experienced him. To consider this case more fully would demand a discussion of knowledge by description. For the present, it is only necessary to remove a possible objection to the view, which I shall henceforth assume, that what is experienced at any moment is known not to be the sum total of the things in the world. At the same time, it is important to remember that I can never give an actual instance of a thing not now within my experience, for everything that I can mention otherwise than by a description must lie within my present experience. This is involved in the very nature of experience, and is one of the most important of the obvious facts about it.

Experiencing is only one, though perhaps the most characteristic and comprehensive, of the things that happen in the mental world. Judging, feeling, desiring, willing, though they presuppose experiencing, are themselves different from it; they may be themselves experienced, and they doubtless require that we should experience the objects with which they are concerned, but they do not themselves consist *merely* in experiencing objects.

It is important to be clear as to the extent to which the experience of one mind may overlap that of another. Neutral monists have done a service to philosophy in pointing out that the same object may be experienced by two minds. This certainly applies, as a matter of fact, to all experiencing of universals and abstracts; it applies also, though I think only as a theoretic possibility, to the things of sense. But there remain a large number of things which only one mind can experience. First and foremost, an experiencing, as opposed to the mere object experienced, seems, empirically, not as a matter of *a priori* necessity, to be only capable of being experienced by one person. I can know by immediate experience what I am seeing at this moment; but

another person, though it is theoretically possible for him to see the same object, cannot, as a matter of empirical fact, know by immediate experience that I am seeing it. Exactly the same is true of other mental facts, such as judging, feeling, desiring, willing. All these can only be experienced by one person.

Thus when an object O is experienced by two different persons A and B, the experiencing of O by A is one fact, and the experiencing of O by B is another. The experiencing of O by A may be experienced by A, and the experiencing of O by B may be experienced by B, but neither can experience the other's experiencing. A can experience his experiencing of O without logically requiring any other experience; hence the fact that he experiences O cannot consist in a relation to other objects of experience, as neutral monism supposes. From these characteristics of experience, it seems an unavoidable inference that A's experiencing of O is different from O, and is in fact a complex, of which A himself, or some simpler entity bound up with A, is a constituent as well as O. Hence experiencing must be a relation, in which one term is the object experienced, while the other term is that which experiences. We might continue to call this relation "experience," but we have employed the word "experience" hitherto because it is a non-committal word, which seemed not to prejudge the issue of our analysis. Now, since we have decided that experience is constituted by a relation, it will be better to employ a less neutral word; we shall employ synonymously the two words "acquaintance" and "awareness," generally the former. Thus when A experiences an object O, we shall say that A is acquainted with O.

We will define a "subject" as any entity which is acquainted with something, *i. e.*, "subjects" are the domain of the relation "acquaintance." Conversely, any entity with which something is acquainted will be called an "object,"

i. e., "objects" are the converse domain of the relation "acquaintance." An entity with which nothing is acquainted will not be called an object. A fact will be called "mental" if it contains either acquaintance or some relation presupposing acquaintance as a component. Thus any instance of acquaintance is mental, since it is a complex in which a subject and an object are united by the relation of acquaintance. The object by itself need not be mental. We will call a fact "physical" when some particular, but no relation presupposing acquaintance, is a constituent of it. The reason for defining mental *facts* rather than mental *entities* is that we reach subjects only by description, and cannot know whether they are among objects or not.

It is to be observed that we do not identify a mind with a subject. A mind is something which persists through a certain period of time, but it must not be assumed that the subject persists. So far as our arguments have hitherto carried us, they give no evidence as to whether the subject of one experience is the same as the subject of another experience or not. For the present, nothing is to be assumed as to the identity of the subjects of different experiences belonging to the same person.

The strongest objection which can be urged against the above analysis of experience into a dual relation of subject and object is derived from the elusiveness of the subject in introspection. We can easily become aware of our own experiences, but we seem never to become aware of the subject itself. This argument tends, of course, to support neutral monism. It is a serious argument, and deserves careful consideration. We may attempt to meet it in either of two ways, namely by maintaining that we do have acquaintance with the subject, or by maintaining that there is no reason why, even if the theory is true, we should have acquaintance with the subject.

Let us consider first the theory that we have acquaint-

ance with the subject.<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that the question is bound up with that of the meaning of the word "I." This is a question in which confusions are very hard to avoid, but very fatal if they are not avoided. In the first place, the meaning of the word "I" must not be confused with the meaning of "the ego." "The ego" has a meaning which is a universal: it does not mean one person more than another, but rather that general characteristic, whatever it is, which makes each one of us call himself "I." But "I" itself is not a universal: on each occasion of its use, there is only one person who is I, though this person differs according to the speaker. It is more nearly correct to describe "I" as an ambiguous proper name than to describe it as a universal. But when used, "I" is not in the least ambiguous: it means the person using it, and no one else. In order, however, to obtain a clear statement of our problem, it is necessary to pare away from "I" a great deal that is usually included—not only the body, but also the past and future in so far as they may possibly not belong to the subject of the present experience. It is obvious that all these are obtained by an extension from the present subject, and that the essential problem is concerned with our consciousness of the present subject. Let it therefore be assumed, in this discussion, that "I" means the subject of the experience which I am now having (the vicious circle here is important to observe), and that we have to ask ourselves whether "I" in this sense is something with which we are acquainted.

On this question, it must be confessed that introspection does not give a favorable answer. Hume's inability to perceive himself was not peculiar, and I think most unprejudiced observers would agree with him. Even if by

<sup>1</sup> In a former discussion of this point, I maintained tentatively that we have such acquaintance. Cf. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," *Arist. Soc. Proc.*, 1910-11, esp. pp. 110, 127.

great exertion some rare person could catch a glimpse of himself, this would not suffice; for "I" is a term which we all know how to use, and which must therefore have some easily accessible meaning. It follows that the word "I," as commonly employed, must stand for a description; it cannot be a true proper name in the logical sense, since true proper names can only be conferred on objects with which we are acquainted.

We are thus forced to investigate the second answer suggested above, and to ask ourselves whether our theory of acquaintance in any way implies a direct consciousness of the bare subject. If it does, it would seem that it must be false; but I think we can show that it does not. Our theory maintains that the datum when we are aware of experiencing an object O is the fact "something is acquainted with O." The subject appears here, not in its individual capacity, but as an "apparent variable"; thus such a fact may be a datum in spite of incapacity for acquaintance with the subject.

If it is true, as it seems to be, that subjects are not given in acquaintance, it follows that nothing can be known as to their intrinsic nature. We cannot know, for example, that they differ from matter, nor yet that they do not differ. They are known merely as referents for the relation of acquaintance, and for those other psychical relations—judging, desiring, etc.—which imply acquaintance. It follows that psychical data—at any rate those that are cognitive—consist not of particulars, but of certain *facts* (i. e., of *what certain propositions assert*), and of *relations*, namely acquaintance and certain others which presuppose acquaintance. We may distinguish sensation from perception by saying that the former gives *particulars* while the latter gives *facts*; in this case, introspection consists wholly of perceptions, not of sensations.

The definition of what is "mental" as what involves subjects is inadmissible, in view of the fact that we do not know what subjects are. We may define a mental fact as one involving acquaintance or one of those other relations—judging, desiring, etc.—which presuppose acquaintance. It *may* be that subjects are constituents of other facts of the kind we should call physical, and therefore a fact which involves a subject may not be always a mental fact.

When two objects O and O' are given as parts of one experience, we perceive the fact "something is acquainted with both O and O'." Thus two instances of acquaintance can be given as having a common subject, even when the subject is not given. It is in this way, I think, that "I" comes to be popularly intelligible. When we have recognized that an experience is constituted by the relation of acquaintance, we may define "I" as the subject of the present experience, and we can see that, so defined, it denotes the same entity as is denoted by our former more popular definition. But in neither form does it require us to assume that we are ever acquainted with the bare subject of an acquaintance.

One very interesting and important point, however, remains to be investigated in the above definition of "I," and that is, what is meant by the "present" experience. If "I" is to be defined as we have suggested, it seems evident that the "present" experience must be known by acquaintance. There are here several points to be brought out. First, it is necessary to consider the connection (if any) between psychological presence and the present time. Secondly, it is necessary to consider what is psychologically involved in our acquaintance with the present experience. Thirdly, it is necessary to consider the logical difficulty of the vicious circle in which any definition of the present experience appears to be entangled.

1. Whatever I experience is, in one sense, "present" to me at the time when I experience it, but in the temporal sense it need not be present—for example, if it is something remembered, or something abstract which is not in time at all. The sense in which everything experienced is "present" may be disregarded, the rather, as we already have three words—experience, acquaintance, and awareness—to describe what is meant by this sense. There is, however, another sense in which objects given in *sensation* are "present." As we shall find later, there is reason to suppose that there are several species of the general relation "acquaintance," and it would seem that one of these species is "presence" in the sense in which objects are present in sensation and perception but not in memory. The relation of "presence" in this sense is, I think, one of the ultimate constituents out of which our knowledge of time is built, and the "present" time may be defined as the time of those things which have to me the relation of "presence." But remembering what has been said about "I," we see that, when we speak of things which have the relation of presence to "me," we mean things which have the relation of presence to the subject of the present experience. Thus "the present experience" is a more fundamental notion than "the present time": the latter can be defined in terms of the former, but not *vice versa*.

2. What is psychologically involved in our acquaintance with the present experience? The least that is possible is obviously that there should be an experience of an object O, and another experience of experiencing O. This second experience must involve presence in the sense in which objects of sensation and perception are present and objects of memory are not present. Let us call this sense P. Then it is necessary that a subject should have the relation P to an object which is itself an experience, which we may

symbolize by  $S - A - O$ . Thus we require an experience which might be symbolized by

$$S' - P - (S - A - O).*$$

When such an experience occurs, we may say that we have an instance of "self-consciousness," or "experience of a present experience." It is to be observed that there is no good reason why the two subjects  $S$  and  $S'$  should be numerically the same: the one "self" or "mind" which embraces both may be a construction, and need not, so far as the logical necessities of our problem are concerned, involve any identity of the two subjects. Thus "present experiences" are those experiences that have the relation of presence to the subject using the phrase.

3. But there remains a logical difficulty, of which the solution is both interesting and important. In order to know a present experience, it is not necessary that I should perceive the fact

$$S' - P - (S - A - O),$$

and it must be possible to pick out an experience as present without having perception of this fact. If it were necessary to perceive this fact, it is fairly evident that we should be embarked upon an endless regress. It is in fact obvious that "the present experience," or "the present object," or some phrase fulfilling a similar purpose, must be capable of being used as a proper name; all manner of objects are present on different occasions to different subjects, and we have already seen that the subject concerned in presence to "me" must be defined by means of presence.

The main consideration is undoubtedly to be derived from remembering what "presence" actually is. When an object is in my present experience, then I am acquainted

\* or rather,  $S' - P - [(S) . (S - A - O)]$ .

with it; it is not necessary for me to reflect upon my experience, or to observe that the object has the property of belonging to my experience, in order to be acquainted with it, but, on the contrary, the object itself is known to me without the need of any reflection on my part as to its properties or relations. This point may perhaps be made clearer by an illustrative hypothesis. Suppose I were occupied, like Adam, in bestowing names upon various objects. The objects upon which I should bestow names would all be objects with which I was acquainted, but it would not be necessary for me to reflect that I was acquainted with them, or to realize that they all shared a certain relation to myself. What distinguishes the objects to which I can give names from other things is the fact that these objects are within my experience, that I am acquainted with them, but it is only subsequent reflection that proves that they all have this distinguishing characteristic; during the process of naming they appear merely as this, that, and the other.

Further consideration of the word "this" will help to make the point clear. The word "this" is always a proper name, in the sense that it applies directly to just one object, and does not in any way *describe* the object to which it applies. But on different occasions it applies to different objects. For the purposes of our present problem, we may say that "this" is the name of the object attended to at the moment by the person using the word. The relation of attention, here introduced, is of course different from that of acquaintance, and one point in which it differs is that a subject can only attend to one object, or at least a very small number, at a time. (This may of course be disputed, but for our purposes it may be assumed.) Thus we may speak of "*the* object of attention of a given subject at a given moment." The object so described is the object which that subject at that moment will call "this." But it

would be an error to suppose that "this" means "the object to which I am now attending." "This" is a proper name applied to the object to which I am now attending. If it be asked how I come to select this object, the answer is that, by hypothesis, I am selecting it, since it is the object of my attention. "This" is not waiting to be defined by the property of being given, but is given; first it is actually given, and then reflection shows that it is "that which is given."

We may now retrace our steps in the opposite order. At any moment of my conscious life, there is one object (or at most some very small number of objects) to which I am attending. All knowledge of particulars radiates out from this object. This object is not intrinsically distinguishable from other objects—it just happens (owing to causes which do not concern us) that I am attending to it. Since I am attending to it, I can name it; I may give it any name I choose, but when inventiveness gives out, I am apt to name it "this." By the help of reflection and special experiences, it becomes evident that there is such a relation as "attention," and that there is always a subject attending to the object called "this." The subject attending to "this" is called "I," and the time of the things which have to "I" the relation of presence is called the present time. "This" is the point from which the whole process starts, and "this" itself is not defined, but simply given. The confusions and difficulties arise from regarding "this" as *defined by the fact of being given*, rather than simply as given.

The objection to our theory of acquaintance which was derived from the absence of acquaintance with the subject is thus capable of being answered, while admitting that the objectors are in the right in maintaining that we are not acquainted with the subject. Having answered the objection, we can now retort on neutral monism with the

demand that it should produce an account of "this" and "I" and "now." I do not mean merely that it should produce an account of particularity and selfhood and moments of time; all this it might accomplish without in any way touching the problem. What I demand is an account of that principle of selection which, to a given person at a given moment, makes one object, one subject and one time intimate and near and immediate, as no other object or subject or time can be to that subject at that time, though the same intimacy and nearness and immediacy will belong to these others in relation to other subjects and other times. In a world where there were no specifically mental facts, is it not plain that there would be a complete impartiality, an evenly diffused light, not the central illumination fading away into outer darkness, which is characteristic of objects in relation to a mind? It may be that some answer can be found to these queries without admitting specifically mental facts; but to me it seems obvious that such "emphatic particulars" as "this" and "I" and "now" would be impossible without the selectiveness of mind. I conclude, therefore, that the consideration of emphatic particulars affords a new refutation, and the most conclusive one, of neutral monism.

Before leaving the analysis of experience, we must take account of a widely held theory according to which our acquaintance with objects involves not only subject and object, but also what is called "content." The distinction between content and object is set forth very explicitly by Meinong, for instance in his article "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung."<sup>2</sup> The following quotations from this article may serve to make the theory plain.

"That it is essential to everything psychical to have an

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, Vol. XXI, 1899, pp. 182ff.

object, will presumably be admitted without reserve at least in regard to that psychical material which will here exclusively concern us. For no one doubts that one cannot have a presentation<sup>3</sup> without having a presentation of *something*, and also that one cannot judge without judging about *something*. People will probably also concede just as willingly that there is no presentation or judgment without content; but for not a few this readiness comes from the assumption that content and object are pretty much the same thing. I also long believed that the two expressions could be used indifferently, and that therefore one of them could be dispensed with. To-day I regard this as a mistake" (p. 185). He proceeds at once to give his grounds. The chief ground, he says, is that we may have a presentation or judgment whose object is non-existent, whether because it is self-contradictory, like the round square, or because, like the golden mountain, there happens to be no such thing, or because, like the difference between red and green, it is not the kind of thing which can exist, although it may "subsist," or because, though now presented, its existence belongs to the past or the future. He concludes: "Thus the presentation exists: but who, except in the interests of a theoretical preconception, will be willing to assume that the presentation exists, but not its content?" (p. 186). Thus the first difference between object and content is that the object may be something non-existent, but the content must exist when the presentation exists. A second difference is that the object may be not psychical, whereas the content must be psychical. The object may be blue or warm or heavy, but the content cannot have attributes of this kind (pp. 187-8). All presentations, however different their objects, have in common, he says, just what makes them presentations,

<sup>3</sup>I think the relation of subject and object in presentation may be identified with the relation which I call "acquaintance."

namely "das Vorstellen oder den Vorstellungsact"; but two presentations of different objects cannot be completely similar to each other, and therefore the difference in the objects must point to some difference in the presentations. Now that in which two presentations may differ in spite of the identity of the "act" is what is to be called the "content." This exists now and is psychical, even when the object does not exist, or is past or future, or is not psychical (p. 188).

Before deciding whether in fact there are "contents" as well as objects of presentations, let us examine Meinong's arguments in the above. The instances of non-existent objects quoted by Meinong are largely disposed of by the theory of incomplete symbols—the round square and the golden mountain, at any rate, are not objects. (I do *not* mean that they are objects which do not exist). The other instances are less intractable. The difference between red and green, for example, has the kind of subsistence appropriate to objects of this kind; and future things are not presented, although they may be known by description. Nevertheless, it remains the case that we can have a presentation of an abstract (which has no position in time), or of a remembered object which exists no longer. The case of memory suffices to illustrate Meinong's difficulty in the supposition that a presentation can exist when its content does not exist. We should say that we remember now, and in popular language we should say that we are in a different "state of mind" when we remember from that in which we should be if we were not remembering. Meinong's "content" is in fact what would commonly be called a "state of mind." Thus the question is: Are there "states of mind," as opposed to objects cognized in various ways? We are told that it is impossible the presentation should exist now, if its content does not exist now. But if presentation consists wholly and solely,

as we have contended, in a relation of subject and object, then a memory-presentation is a complex of which one constituent is present while the other is past. It is not clear that such a complex has any definite position in the time-series: the fact that the remembering subject is in the present is no sufficient reason for regarding the whole complex as present. And similar remarks apply to the case of presentations whose objects are not in time at all. Thus the question "who will be willing to assume that the presentation exists but not its content?" loses its force: the word "exist" is very ambiguous, but if it means "being at some part of the time-series," then it is not at all clear that the presentation does exist; and if it means any other legitimate meaning, it is not clear that the object does not exist.

The arguments that the content but not the object must be psychical, and that the object but not the content may have such attributes as blue or warm or heavy, may be passed by, since they do not afford any independent ground for believing that there are such things as contents.

The argument which has probably done most to produce a belief in "contents" as opposed to objects is the last of those adduced by Meinong, namely that there must be some difference between a presentation of one object and a presentation of another, and this difference is not to be found in the "act" of presentation. At first sight, it seems obvious that my mind is in different "states" when I am thinking of one thing and when I am thinking of another. But in fact the difference of object supplies all the difference required. There seems to be, in the hypothesis of "states" of mind, an operation (generally unconscious) of the "internal" theory of relations: it is thought that some intrinsic difference in the subject must correspond to the difference in the objects to which it has the relation of presentation. I have argued this question at length else-

where, and shall therefore now assume the "external" theory of relations, according to which difference of relations affords no evidence for difference of intrinsic predicates. It follows that, from the fact that the complex "my awareness of A" is different from the complex "my awareness of B," it does not follow that when I am aware of A I have some intrinsic quality which I do not have when I am aware of B but not of A. There is therefore no reason for assuming a difference in the subject corresponding to the difference between two presented objects.

It remains to inquire whether there are any other reasons for assuming "contents." I think perhaps belief in them has been encouraged by a careless use of such words as "image" and "idea." It may be thought that, when a given physical object is seen from many different points of view, the physical object itself is the object of many presentations, and that the different images are the different contents. Meinong himself is far from any such confusion, but language tends to encourage it. In fact, of course, the one physical object which is supposed to be seen from different points of view is a theoretical construction, and is not the object of any presentation. The objects of the various presentations concerned are the immediate visual data from the different points of view. The change in the visual data, combined with the belief that the physical object is unchanged, tends to generate the belief that the visual data are "subjective modifications," and thus to obscure their character as objects. I shall not enlarge on this subject now, as I have dealt with it at length in an article in *Scientia* for July 1914.

It may be urged that different people can know the same object, but cannot have the same presentation, and that this points to something other than the object as a constituent of a presentation. As against neutral monism, the argument is valid if its premise is granted; but in our

theory, the difference between the subjects suffices to distinguish the two presentations, and therefore no problem arises.

The chief argument *against* contents is the difficulty of discovering them introspectively. It may be said that this difficulty—which is admitted—applies equally to the subject in our theory of acquaintance. This is true; but our theory is based on inference from the nature of experience, not on any supposed introspective perception of the subject. If the arguments by which Meinong supports his belief in contents had appeared to us valid, we should have admitted contents; but in the absence of valid arguments introspective evidence alone could lead us to admit contents. Since such evidence is lacking, we may therefore conclude that there is no reason to admit contents.

The belief in "contents" as subjective modifications is often held in a more extreme form than that advocated by Meinong. It is thought that whatever can be immediately known must be "in the mind," and that it can only be by inference that we arrive at a knowledge of anything external to ourselves. This view may be combated in many ways. It would be well to know, first of all, what is meant by "my mind," and what really is being debated when it is asked whether this or that is "in my mind." We might next point out that abstract facts and universals may be known to many people, and that therefore, if they are "in my mind," the same thing may be in two minds at once. But I think the main source of subjective theories has always been the supposed illusions of sense. The sun, as it appears in astronomical theory, is not immediately given: what is immediately given is a certain visible bright patch, which according to physics depends upon the intervening medium and our sense-organs. Hence if we suppose that the astronomer's sun is the object when we "see the sun," then what is actually given has to be degraded to the level

of something subjective. But in fact, the physical object which the astronomer deals with is an inference, and the bright patch that we see, in spite of its variability, is only thought to be illusory as the result of fallacious arguments.

To sum up: The obvious characteristics of experience seem to show that experiencing is a two-term relation; we call the relation *acquaintance*, and we give the name *subject* to anything which has acquaintance with objects. The subject itself appears to be not acquainted with itself; but this does not prevent our theory from explaining the meaning of the word "I" by the help of the meaning of the word "this," which is the proper name of the object of attention. In this respect, especially, we found our theory superior to neutral monism, which seems unable to explain the selectiveness of experience. Finally we considered and rejected the opinion that experience involves mental modifications called "contents," having a diversity which reproduces that of objects—an opinion which appeared to rest upon the internal theory of relations; and along with this opinion we rejected—though partly by arguments which await amplification on another occasion—the doctrine that all immediate knowledge is confined to knowledge of ourselves.

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## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

### GENTILE ELEMENTS IN CHRISTIANITY.

Inasmuch as Christianity in its beginnings was dependent on the Jewish religion it contains various doctrines and views which Judaism had previously adopted from other religions. But even without the mediation of Judaism other cycles of thought have exerted an influence on the original form of Christianity. Modern research in the history of religion has bestowed such zealous care on the determination of these foreign elements, that now there is no serious difference of opinion except with regard to the scope of the foreign elements. Our most eminent theologians, men like Harnack<sup>1</sup> and Gunkel,<sup>2</sup> call Christianity in plain words a syncretistic religion.

The dogmas derived from Parsism come decidedly first of all under consideration. We know that the Jews have borrowed from Parsism the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, of the resurrection and judgment after death, of heaven and hell, of the angels, and principally also of Satan, and that these originally Zarathustrian doctrines have found their way from Judaism into Christianity. If we ask about the period in which these entirely revolutionary religious views have penetrated into Judaism, the most obvious reply would be that the borrowing took place during the exile in Babylonia (which had been a Persian province since 538). But these assumptions which are so probable on a *priori*

<sup>1</sup> *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, 2d ed., I, p. 261f. On pages 262-263 we read: "Since the middle of the third century Christianity is to be regarded as a syncretistic religion in the widest sense.... It was syncretistic from the very beginning on Gentile-Christian ground. It did not appear as a mere gospel but decked out with all that the Jewish religion had appropriated throughout its long history, accepting at once whatever might still be lacking. But now, about the middle of the third century, the new religion was ready for the first time as the syncretistic religion *par excellence*...."

<sup>2</sup> *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*. Göttingen, 1903, p. 95.

grounds do not find support in the Old Testament. Belief in immortality and the resurrection is first established there at so late a date that we are compelled to give up the idea that Parsism exerted any appreciable influence on the Jewish religion during the exile. The belief in resurrection does not appear<sup>3</sup> until in the book of Daniel (165 B. C.), and then seems to be very generally diffused in the New Testament. But otherwise there is nowhere any mention of immortality, even in the post-exilic writings of the Old Testament—with one exception which, however, testifies exactly *against* a belief in immortality. The preacher Solomon is acquainted with the belief in it but is very doubtful whether it is justified (Eccl. iii. 20-21): "All go unto one place; all are of the dust and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" The Psalms, of which by far the greater part is post-exilic, know nothing of immortality, although it would have fitted so well into their line of thought. Accordingly therefore everything is in favor of the idea that these views first reached the Jews in the Grecian period—though not from Grecian quarters—but then quickly became popular with them.

Consequently I agree in this point with Van den Bergh van Eysinga who, following Erik Stave, does not regard the influence of Parsism on Judaism as a consequence of direct contact between Jews and Persians in the time of the Achaemenids, but explains it from the general spirit of the time which had prevailed since the days of Alexander.<sup>4</sup> From this standpoint we can also easily understand at once that the Parsi doctrines have not found entrance into later Judaism in their original pure form but in a mixture with foreign elements, especially the Babylonian. On this subject H. Zimmern says:<sup>5</sup> "Far more important than the Babylonian material, because exhibiting more striking parallels to the New Testament Christology, appear on the other hand, for instance, certain mythologemas of Parsism connected especially with the figure of Mithra. This naturally follows as completely established also from a purely chronological point of view. Nevertheless later Judaism in Babylonia came into particularly close contact with

<sup>3</sup> H. Gunkel, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen*, Göttingen, 1909, 2d ed., p. 111. In a much later time Parsi elements have entered directly into Christian writings. Ernst Kuhn has published an interesting treatise in the *Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth* (Stuttgart, 1893, p. 217f) on the Christian garb in which the Zoroastrian prophecy of the future saviour has been dressed.

<sup>5</sup> *Zum Streit um die "Christusmythe"*, Berlin, 1910, p. 6; cf. also pp. 22, 50.

the Persian religion which lasted for centuries. Therefore we can easily account for the presence of Persian elements to a considerable extent, for instance, in the Messianic ideas of later Judaism. And yet, as has already been justly emphasized in various quarters, it was not the pure Iranian form of the Persian religion which exerted an influence on Judaism in Babylonia, but rather a form of Parsism within Babylonia in which many elements had found admittance from the older Babylonian religion already established there and which accordingly represents a mingling of Babylonian and Persian religious material."<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless we must not estimate too highly these Babylonian admixtures of Parsism. What originally Babylonian ideas have finally found a place in Christianity are much more insignificant than is assumed by the noted advocates of Babylonism with Jensen at their head. Even the discreet and temperate Zimmern<sup>7</sup> seems to me still to overestimate the force of his parallels which to some extent cannot be compared with the parallel tales of Buddhism and the Gospels. Aside from details in Revelations which are based upon undeniably Babylonian ideas,<sup>8</sup> and from the demonology "which plays a great part in the time of Jesus as we learn from the Synoptists, and which strongly resembles that of ancient Babylonia,"<sup>9</sup> there remain, on careful consideration, hardly any other traces of the ancient Babylonian religion projected from the Judaic into the Christian religion than a few adornments of the Messianic picture and the day of rest at the end of the week of seven days.

Next in importance to the Parsi influences on Christianity stands the Hellenistic influence which is shown—especially, as is well known, in the Gospel of John and even more in the writings of St. Paul—in the introduction of the Logos as divine reason, in the identification of Christ with the Logos, in the doctrine of Christ's preexistence based upon it, and in sundry allegorical interpretations.

There are probably still other foreign influences on primitive Christianity which belong to those above mentioned, even though they can not be demonstrated with equal certainty—above all the frequently assumed influences of ancient Oriental forms of faith,

<sup>6</sup>Gunkel also expresses himself to this effect. See *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 30, 36, 76. Mithra is identified with Shamash.

<sup>7</sup>In Eb. Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, 3d ed., Part II, pp. 345f as well as in the pamphlet just cited.

<sup>8</sup>Gunkel, *op. cit.*, pp. 3f, 42f.

<sup>9</sup>Gunkel, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

having for the object of their veneration a dying and reviving God, on the narrative of the death and resurrection of Christ. Largarde<sup>10</sup> says: "The death of Jesus transposes these ancient sages into a higher key from flat to sharp," and explains the belief in the resurrection of the Saviour as an unconscious transference of these ancient myths upon the beloved Master. Such deities appearing in the mythologies of neighboring lands, all of which probably represent nature dying in the winter and reviving in spring, are the Babylonian Tamuz, the Phenician Adonis, the Egyptian Osiris, the Phrygian Attis and the Greek (originally Thracic-Phrygian) Dionysus.

Among the primitive ideas universally diffused throughout the earth which have taken effect in the presentation of the life of Christ in the Gospels, we must count with equal probability the ideas of the necessity of a human sacrifice for the salvation of all and of the magic power of baptism with water and the notion of partaking of the god.

Nevertheless the conviction that all these foreign elements are recognizable in the New Testament and that there is no more history in our Gospels than perhaps—to select a convenient example for me—in the ancient Buddhist Pāli sources, does not admit of any doubt with regard to the historicity of the person of Christ. Though our Gospels may bear in part a legendary character, yet the powerful personality of Christ shines out from them in sharp outlines and complete distinctness with a doctrine and diction of its own. And although the most radical direction of modern Jesus research does not concede it, there is at least one argument which weighs more heavily than all the reasons put together in recent times for the historicity of Jesus, and which supplies a positively irrefutable proof for the historical Christ and for an authentic tradition from his own times which was utilized by the evangelists. I here set forth this reason in the words of Arthur Schopenhauer,<sup>11</sup> which are now mentioned but rarely and deserve to be called to mind:

"That our Gospels are based on the whole upon some sort of an original, or at least a fragment, from the time and environment of Jesus himself, I would conclude exactly from that prophecy which has proved such a stumbling-block, foretelling that the end of the

<sup>10</sup> *Deutsche Schriften*, 231.

<sup>11</sup> In the treatise "On Religion," *Sämtliche Werke*, Reclam ed., V, pp. 403-404.

world and the glorious return of the Lord in the clouds was still to take place during the lifetime of some who were present when the promise was given (Matt. x. 23; xvi, 28; Mark ix. 1; Luke ix. 27).<sup>12</sup> That these very promises remained unfulfilled is an excessively annoying circumstance which has not only made trouble in later times but caused embarrassments to Paul and Peter, as is discussed extensively by Reimarus in his very readable book *Vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger* (sections 42-44). Now if the Gospels had been written about a hundred years later without actual contemporary documents, good care would have been taken not to introduce prophecies of this kind which it was very clear at that time had conspicuously not been fulfilled. Nor would those passages have been introduced in the Gospels from which Reimarus with keen insight has constructed what he calls the first system of the disciples, and according to which Jesus to them was only a secular liberator of the Jews, if the writers of the Gospels had not worked on the basis of contemporary documents which contained such passages."

In mentioning the foreign religions which have furnished ingredients to Christianity, I have not yet mentioned India. I have set myself the task to investigate and present in an entire volume<sup>13</sup> the connections between India and Christianity in their historical and religious relations. I shall there have occasion to treat the much discussed question of Buddhist influences on the New Testament and hope to bring it nearer to a satisfactory solution, after having considered the interesting material for years without prepossession for either side. That generally speaking Buddhism is the only Indian religion that can come into consideration, and that Brahmanism has not exerted any influence on Christianity requires no proof; for Krishnaism which would be the only other possibility has sought and found no extension outside of the world of India.

The question of influences on the New Testament has an entirely different meaning in Buddhism than with respect to those religions which have had an effect on the origin of Christian dogmas. With respect to Buddhism the problem concerns entirely only

<sup>12</sup> It will not do to declare these passages ungenueine because we should ask in vain who could have had any interest in interpolating them. Cf. B. Weiss, *Die Religion des Neuen Testaments*, p. 309: "It is quite futile to try to do away by exegetical or critical violence with the fact that Jesus promised that he would return to his own generation."

<sup>13</sup> *Indien und das Christentum*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1914. An English translation is in preparation under the title *Christianity and the Religions of India*, and the present article is adapted from its Introduction.

the coloring of the life of Christ in the Gospels. On Christian doctrine itself Buddhism can not have exerted any considerable influence for the reason that as a religion it stands in sharpest contrast to Christianity in its preconceptions and dogmas. I need not enter into this any farther because it has been done often enough by those who are qualified<sup>14</sup>—and still oftener by those who are not qualified. Whoever will take the trouble to look through the *Orientalische Bibliographie*<sup>15</sup> will find dozens of books, essays and lectures on this subject.

That in spite of the above-mentioned relations the problem of Buddhist influence on the New Testament has long aroused a greater and more general interest than the question of other foreign influences on primitive Christianity, is mainly due to the striking similarity which many narratives and sayings in the earliest Buddhist and Christian sources exhibit in spite of the fundamental difference between the two great world religions.

Here we can barely touch upon those similarities between Buddhism and Christianity in which the possibility of historical connection is excluded and so confirms a parallel independent development.<sup>16</sup> By this statement we do not intend to say that they are in themselves any less worthy of interest. Coincidences of this kind press in great number upon the attention of any one who will make comparisons. First of all we think of the analogous relation in which Buddhism and Christianity stand to the national religions of their home lands, to Brahmanism and Judaism, from which they have developed and which they have successfully resisted in order then to enter upon their world-subduing triumphal course—Christianity to the west and Buddhism to the east, so that now the silent ocean separates the realms of their expansion. Both re-

<sup>14</sup> I would emphasize the following treatises as particularly valuable: Nisikānta Chattopādhyāya, "Buddhismus und Christentum," two essays in *Indische Essays*, Zurich, 1883, pp. 85f; A. Bertholet, *Buddhismus und Christentum*, 2d ed., Tübingen, 1909; L. von Schröder, "Buddhismus und Christentum, was sie gemein haben und was sie unterscheidet," in *Reden und Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 85f, and the terse antitheses of E. Windisch in *Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 217, 218. L. von Schröder, who places Christianity high above Buddhism, shows at the end of his above-mentioned essay that he is not blind to some advantages of Buddhism, but points out that with its undeniable gentleness and toleration towards other faiths it furnishes a mortifying model, and is distinguished by the fact that self-righteousness and religious pride are less common faults among its adherents than among Christians.

<sup>15</sup> Revised and edited by Lucian Scherman.

<sup>16</sup> K. E. Neumann, *Die innere Verwandtschaft buddhistischer und christlicher Lehren*, Leipzig, 1891, shoots far above the mark. Cf. Leblois, "Christianisme et Bouddhisme" in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, XXIII, p. 351.

ligions assumed their missionary tendency and universal character very soon after their birth and show remarkable similarities also with respect to the development of doctrine and its establishment in great councils. Even the external form of the original doctrine corresponds in so far as the founders of both religions have preferably used popular comparisons and parables besides vigorous maxims. Windisch<sup>17</sup> has called attention to similarities in the literary form of the earliest Buddhist and Christian tradition. But all this is of less importance than the circumstance that both Buddhism and Christianity preach withdrawal from the world and its pleasures, with a pessimistic aspect in their judgment of the activities of the world; that they both are religions of salvation although they understand salvation in a very different sense, Buddhism as liberation from suffering and from the necessity of continued life, and Christianity as the liberation from sin and its consequences; and that almost the same demands in the moral realm are made by both religions, namely meekness, kindness, patience, mercy, forgiveness of wrong, yea, self-sacrifice and love of one's enemies. In all this neither of the two religions has copied the other. Everything has arisen independently.

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## DEUSSEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE.

### EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION.

Professor Deussen's new book, *Die Philosophie der Bibel*, is a highly instructive, interesting and most comprehensive statement of the modern situation of Bible study. Properly speaking it is not a philosophy of the Bible, but Professor Deussen's own philosophy with reference to that collection of books which reverently we call "the Bible." The book is really a confession of faith and reflects the religious attitude of progressive mankind at the present date.

Professor Deussen has studied in Schulpforta. He has been trained in literary criticism and has incidentally learned to apply the scientific method also to the scriptures. While a university student at Bonn, he lost the rest of his dogmatic faith, but he regained the spirit of it in his philosophical studies, of which the most important documents to him were Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. The former saved him

<sup>17</sup> *Buddhas Geburt*, 218, 219.

from the crude materialism of the materialistic world-conception, while the latter showed him how to base his faith not upon dogmatic views, but upon the fundamental facts of man's inner life, the cornerstone of which is conscience. In other words, we must rely not upon the historical figure of Christ, but upon the ideal of Christ, upon the Christ within us. This Christ within us constitutes the same source upon which all religious revelation must draw. Even Jesus and Paul relied in their life work on nothing else.

This view was by no means disturbed in Paul Deussen through a study of Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea." On the contrary, Schopenhauer's pessimism pointed out to him the significance of renunciation, a conception which was deepened by his study of the ancient religions of India. In this line, it is well known, our author gradually developed into the foremost authority, not only of the Sanskrit language but also of Sanskrit literature, above all in the study of the Vedanta. We have only to refer to the fact that Paul Deussen has written the clearest, the most comprehensive and most authoritative book on the subject under the title *The System of the Vedanta*, an English translation of which has recently been published by the Open Court Publishing Company.

Paul Deussen's philosophical views have been deposited in his "General History of Philosophy," but for people interested in Christianity he has now written the special book on "The Philosophy of the Bible" because it treats a subject that is of great practical importance for every man of western culture. We can not characterize his book better than in his own words, and so we here reproduce in translation the greater part of his foreword.

Upon the whole we fully indorse Professor Deussen's ideas, especially his historico-critical methods upon which his results are based, but there are several points of smaller importance where we beg to state a difference of opinion.

A basic difference, which however is of little consequence for the present purpose, is this, that in the contrast between the Brahman and Buddhist views Professor Deussen takes the former, the Vedanta conception of the *atman*, which means that the self, or man's soul, is a being in itself, while we deem the Buddhist conception of the non-existence of a special independent *atman* to be in full agreement with the most matured scientific psychology of to-day. Yet we grant to all the adherents of the belief in an *atman* that a unification of ideas constitutes a real factor of utmost importance, so that we really concede that soul-life in its practical

application acts as if there were an independent self, an additional superimposed unit, a systematic direction of the whole. The co-operation of parts creates something absolutely new, as every one will know who holds a watch in his hands in which by a mishap something has become twisted so that it will not go. But when it is in good order and all its parts interact, it is as if a soul had been put into it; and it is this soul, this *atman*, this unity of the parts which is the most important part of the watch. Nevertheless we entirely agree with the Buddhist philosophers that this highly important unity is not any special concrete being, but is simply that non-material cooperation, that harmony which prevails among the parts.

This difference is fundamental and makes us reject dualism in every form. We recognize the paramount significance of spirit, we do not deny the contrast between matter and mind, and we insist on ethics as rising above hedonism and involving altruistic aspirations and self-sacrifice; but all this, all higher life, the germ of life, man's mind and even his conscience rises from nature in a continuous ascent, and we boldly claim that there is nought of it that is not explainable on purely scientific ground.

In addition to this fundamental difference between Professor Deussen's and our own views, we will mention a few trifling details that occur in the present article. Professor Deussen voices the common view that Christianity has grown out from the life of the people of Israel. We believe that Christianity has developed from the religious life of the Mediterranean pagans. Christianity is the belief in a God-man, in the Saviour, who being the son of God himself has been incarnated, walks on earth, helps mankind by good deeds, by instruction, by healing the sick, helping the poor and doing miracles, but his enemies intrigue against him and succeed in putting him to death. Thereupon, he rises from the grave and will come back to judge the quick and the dead. This same story is the tale of all the pagan gods. Thor the Teutonic god walked on earth unknown. Osiris having been killed by his enemies becomes the judge of the dead in the underworld. He is revived again in his son Hor, the child. The same story of the dying and resurrected god is told of Adonis in Syria, of Marduk in Babylon and of many other divinities of the ancient pagans. This belief had been cut out from the national faith in ancient Israel by rationalists who refused to accept the strange methods, perhaps justly, to be branded as superstitious. The faith of the ancient

Israelites was not different from the religion of the surrounding Gentiles, but after the great temple reform, recorded in 1 Kings xviii., the leading party struck out the hope of immortality, and the idea of a humanized God. The very idea of a son of God became blasphemous to them, as it was later on to Mohammed. Christianity in our opinion would have originated under all circumstances in the same or a similar way even if Judea had never existed. It might not have been called Christianity, but certainly the world religion of the Mediterranean people with all its dogmas of the trinity, of the God-man, of divine incarnation, and also with its dualistic ethics, would have been the same as in Christianity even if the new faith had not been hitched on to the Jewish traditions. A religion of the nature of Christianity was developing at the time of Christ, and it is not at all astonishing to recognize in the religion of Persia a kind of pre-Christian Christianity.

We recognize with pleasure the great importance which Professor Deussen attributes to the part played by Zarathustra in the formation of Christianity.

As to the question "Are we still Christians?" we believe that it can not be answered by any positive yes or no. The question suggests an attitude, and the problem of to-day is not so much whether or not there is any justification for us to continue the use of the name, but whether or not the Christianity of to-day has the intrinsic power to adapt itself to the demands of the present time. Christianity has changed often during the course of its development. In the beginning it insisted on doctrines which are now absolutely forgotten. In some phases of the aboriginal Christian belief the eschatological expectations were so pressed into the foreground that Christianity seemed to exist only on their account. In other phases of the development of Christianity the resurrection of the body was emphasized in contrast to all other beliefs in immortality, and so we have throughout the history of the church one or another dogma standing in the foreground, which in the course of time has been forgotten and superseded by other questions which again were themselves of transient significance. There was a time when Christianity was supposed to stand and fall in the belief in the flatness of the earth, and even such a reformer as Luther condemned Copernicus outright as a fool who did not hesitate to subvert not only theology and the revelation of God but also science itself.

The present problems of Christianity are by no means more radical than former ones, only we are becoming more and more

conscious of the difference between a scientific world-conception and another one based upon sentiment, upon anti-scientific tendencies, or at any rate upon non-scientific data, and in answering this question we do not deem it our duty to choose between the two horns of the dilemma. It seems to us that the question is whether or not the future generation will break with traditional Christianity, and the answer will be that Christianity as represented by the churches will gradually adapt itself to new conditions. It will accept the results of science as a matter of course, and will look upon generations which still objected to science, as narrow and misguided. How long it will take for the leaders of the church to make a compromise and to concede to science what belongs to science will be difficult to say, but it is sure to take place in the United States where the churches depend upon the congregations, while the same process will be retarded in Europe, especially in England and Germany, as long as the state church represents established traditionalism while the people's religion becomes more and more alienated from it. The result, however, will finally be the same. In the United States the transition will be gradual, while in Europe, especially in Protestant Europe, there may be a revolution of the people who will clamor for the abolition of state churches.

P. C.

#### DEUSSEN ON THE BIBLE IN PRESENT THOUGHT.

David Friedrich Strauss, the author of the famous *Life of Jesus*, distinguished as a critic but not so well equipped as a philosopher, raises the question, "Are we still Christians?" in the work of his old age, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, and answers it with a clear and positive "No." But the person who can pick out the philosophical kernel from the historical and therefore accidental shell, who is not stopped by mere words and can recognize a thing even when it appears under a different name and in a new dress, that man after all the achievements of historical research, natural science and philosophy, will answer the question which Strauss raised and answered in the negative, "Are we still Christians?" with an equally clear and positive "Yes." For the essence of Christianity extends much farther than its name, and consists in an idea that is as everlasting as the universe and will never die away. This is the Indian-Platonic-Christian idea that our earthly existence is not an end in itself, as all eudemonic ethics assumes, but that on the contrary the supreme task of life consists in purging ourselves of the selfishness inborn in us all by the path of self-

denial which constitutes the essence of all genuine virtue, and in so doing to consummate our eternal destiny, which, however, remains unknown to us and must so remain if the purity of moral action be not imperilled.

He who has grasped in its greatest depth this idea in which consists the peculiar essence of Christianity will no longer hesitate to give unto science that which is science's, even though in so doing he must sacrifice many ideas which comprised the joy and consolation of our fathers, because they cannot be reconciled with a scientific comprehension of the universe.

Since we are no longer limited to sources like the Bible and Herodotus for the history of Israel and of Christianity which has grown out of it, many things connected with the Bible have acquired a different aspect through the deciphering of the hieroglyphs and of the Babylonian and Assyrian cuneiform writings, the inscription of King Mesha, the discoveries in Tel-el-Amarna and Elephantine, and a more exact knowledge of the Iranian world-conception.

Since the monuments of ancient Egypt speak to us again after the silence of a thousand years the old dream of an Egyptian primitive wisdom (Acts vii. 22) has vanished and with it the possibility of deducing Hebrew theism from that of the Egyptians which was a very different kind. On the other hand Assurbanipal's library contains well-authenticated prototypes from which the myths of the creation of the world, of paradise, of the ten patriarchs and above all of the deluge have developed under the hands of the ancient Hebrews in a significant ethical transformation upheld by the spirit of prophecy.

On the other hand, the letters of Tel-el-Amarna tell us about an empire of Mitani whose rulers bore Iranian names as early as 1400 B. C., whence it becomes possible to refer to an Iranian source the myth of the fall of man which we find in the Yahvist redaction (850 B. C.). These Amarna letters give us a picture of the condition of Palestine before the time of the Hebrew invasion into which the narratives of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob which are of such great ethical value can in no wise be inserted, so that we must renounce all historical certainty with reference to the three patriarchs.

But we shall be compelled to abandon still other ideas that have become dear to us. For if it can hardly be doubted any longer that Deuteronomy is the law book of King Joshua (621 B. C.)

and that Leviticus together with its adjacent portions is the code of the second temple, proclaimed by Ezra and Nehemiah (444 B. C.) what then remains of Moses except the hazy figure of a mythical hero to whom we can refer only the first organization of the Hebrews wandering around in the desert as Bedouins, and with it the first rudiments of the later legal code? The timorous rôle which legend makes him play when he is called to be leader of the children of Israel will not tally with his powerful and often violent appearance as legislator. In general the entire sojourn of Israel in Egypt and the catastrophe at its exodus become very uncertain from the fact that Egyptian monuments seem to know nothing of either.

We do not tread firmer ground until after the successful conquest of the promised land in the time of the judges and the first kings. There are many passages in the Old Testament that go to prove that in this period other gods besides Yahveh were worshipped as the tutelary deity of Israel, and that the claim of monotheism was first raised by the earlier and finally successfully carried out by the later prophets. An invaluable complement to these passages is found in the inscription of King Mesha of the Moabites, which shows that Yahveh was for the Hebrews, just as Kamosh for the Moabites, the special tribal deity to whom worship and allegiance were due, and to whom the other gods stood in the same relation as strange kings to the king of his own land, for while obedience is not due them, yet no one doubted their actual existence.

At first the Israelites became gradually encouraged to declare in the crude way which we find in Deutero-Isaiah that all other gods were stone and wood, and to proclaim Yahveh as the only real God, to whom was referred the creation of the universe, and with it very consistently also the authorship of evil, and as whose creature, with equal consistency, man was created out of nothing and sank again at death into his original nothingness. These views of God and man were not at all suited to become the foundation of a universal religion. For this end the ancient Hebrew concepts required a transformation that was not possible from the heart of ancient Hebraism alone but could be accomplished only through the infiltration of a foreign element.

Thus we would have to postulate and construct hypothetically a new element as a medium between the Old and the New Testaments if such a one did not lie plainly before our eyes in the

Iranian world-conception of Zarathustra. A picture of this religion of the great and mighty empire of Persia to which the Jews were subject for two centuries must therefore be introduced into our exposition and on this basis we shall show how it first became possible through Iranian influence to exonerate God from the authorship of evil and to establish him as the principle of morality, while to this same influence was due also the consciousness of the eternal destiny of man and a spiritualization of the Messianic hopes.

Thus was the ground prepared for the appearance of Jesus, whose life can be presented only on the basis of the three synoptic gospels with the complete exclusion of the fourth, if we would not forego the possibility of obtaining a historically established and psychologically consistent idea of the unique personality of Jesus as well as of his teaching, in comparison with whom a Buddha would seem insipid and a Socrates cold.

Further it can not be too strongly emphasized that St. Paul relies upon his own revelations, that consequently the Pauline Christ upon which the church's figure of Christ rests is originally not an historical but an ideal Christ. The need to see this exemplified in the life of Jesus led to the composition of the Fourth Gospel which, as our exposition goes to prove, rests altogether on a Pauline basis and hence comprises the latest but also the most mature and the most universal document of the New Testament.

The last chapter of our book makes the attempt to separate the imperishable kernel of Christianity from the perishable shell, whereby the deep intrinsic relation of this kernel to the fundamental views of the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer becomes clearly evident. In consideration of this kernel which regards moral consciousness as the only source of revelation with its remarkable phenomena of the categorical imperative, the freedom of the will and responsibility, the instinctive approval of the good and rejection of the bad in others as in ourselves, but which contains in these metaphysical facts which are not explainable from nature, the whole and positive gospel of an everlasting empire which lies beyond this world of phenomena, we may dare even after the undermining of faith in the Bible by historical and scientific criticism, to answer the question raised at the beginning, "Are we still Christians?" by a confident "Yes!"

\* \* \*

[Professor Deussen accepts the principles of higher criticism, and would not oppose the truth of science in whatever form it may

present itself; yet he wishes to keep the religious spirit of Christianity, and among other things his admiration for Jesus. So he retains the philosophical elements of the doctrine of Jesus while he sacrifices the traditions. It will be interesting to add to Professor Deussen's general comments his explanation of the resurrection (pages 226-228):]

Faith in the resurrection of Jesus has become the foundation for the origin of the Christian church. How this belief could have arisen among the discouraged disciples mourning the loss of their master can only be conjectured from the contradictions and confused state of parts of the Gospel tradition. But if we would not go so far as to dispute the credibility of the Evangelists' accounts, if we would not assume that it had all been arbitrarily fabricated at a later time when no one could verify the rumors by the actual state of things, still two facts seem to stand out with historical certainty from the midst of the legends in which they are framed: first, that Jesus actually died on the cross, for it would be impossible for the belief in a triumphant and glorious resurrection could have been connected with the survival of a weak personality enfeebled by suffering of all sorts; and second, that the women who came on the morning after the Sabbath to anoint the body found the grave empty in which they supposed it to be, a fact which gave rise to the belief that the Lord, newly risen, had departed from the grave, and later to the rumor that he had been seen in various places. But we can only surmise how to account for the strange chance—or, if you prefer, the dispensation—by which the women found the grave empty. That the disciples should have secretly stolen their master from the grave and thereupon have founded the report of his resurrection, is so very contradictory to their later ethical conduct that such a possibility, suggested in Matt. xxvii. 64, must be absolutely rejected. But still it seems to me that we can not get around the probability of a small *pia fraus*. For when the rumor spread that the Lord was arisen there were some, or at least one, who knew how the matter stood, namely the one who had either disposed of the body elsewhere from the first or, if the women were really supposed to have been present at the burial, who had taken it away from there and had buried it in another place, though whether at the direction of Joseph of Arimathea or for other reasons we cannot say. Some one therefore must have known where the body was to be found because he himself had brought it there, but this one kept silent when the rumor of the

resurrection arose, and the fact that he kept silent is the small *pia fraus* which apparently is not to be passed by.

Of course we have not only the imaginative and inconsistent accounts of the gospels with regard to the appearance of Christ after the resurrection but we have also a testimony which weighs more heavily than all of them, namely that of St. Paul of whose reliability as an *anima candida* there can be no doubt and who thus expresses himself in 1 Cor. xv. 3-8:

"For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures; and that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that, he was seen of James; then of all the apostles. And last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time."

The last of the six appearances of Christ mentioned by Paul, the one which befell himself, furnishes us with the key to all the rest. In view of St. Paul's natural inclination towards ecstasy, it is comprehensible how a subjective vision might appear as an objective occurrence to his emotional disposition, convulsed by violent internal struggles and transformations, when he thought he had seen objectively in the flesh the Lord whose followers he had so zealously persecuted and to whom he surrendered himself in a sudden conversion with the whole fervor of his ardent temperament. Of such a kind must also have been those earlier appearances, not only the one to Peter and Jacob but also to the twelve disciples and even the five hundred brethren, for it is a psychological fact confirmed by instances from all lands and times that in a gathering of sympathetic people religiously stimulated the visions which appear to one or another can exert a certain contagion and communicate themselves to all present.

#### IN MEMORIAM CHARLES S. PEIRCE.

(Born 1839, died 1914.)

Concerning genius, its advent discovery and nurture, history informs us that with rare exceptions its worldly case is one of the utmost austerity. On reflection this appears not at all strange.

*Pro re nata*, genius issues as an outlaw. It breaks over and through the accustomed rules and conceptions to the confusion and perplexity of a world otherwise comfortable in conventions regarded by it as settled possessions. Hence it is unwelcome. Hence the futility of all extant provisions in its favor. Had any Nobel foundation been in existence in 1841, would any of its benefits have found its way to Hermann Grassmann? Not in a thousand years. His case is typical of the general case of genius. Neglect and poverty are its portion in life. Then afterwards lapse of time reveals to a stupid, jealous and oftentimes spiteful world that it has conspired for the suffocation of a divine messenger.

In the late sixties the distinguished Prof. Benjamin Peirce of Harvard, lecturing before the Boston "Radical Club" on "The Impossible in Mathematics," spoke of his son Charles and of his expectations that the latter would develop and fertilize the vistas he had been able only to glimpse. On April 19, 1914, after at least a half century of assiduous probings into the most recondite and the most consequential of all human concerns, in a mountain hut overlooking the serene Delaware, in privation and obscurity, in pain and forsakenness, that son, Charles S. Peirce, left this world and left also a volume of product the eminent value of which will sooner or later be discovered, perhaps only after it has been re-discovered. For his issues have so far anticipated the ordinary scope of even professional intellectual exercise that most of them are still only in manuscript. Publishers want "best sellers." At least they want sellers that will pay the expenses of publication, and buyers of printing that calls for laborious mental application are scarce. Let me here with the utmost solicitude beg all to whom it falls to handle his books and papers to beware how they venture to cast away any script left by him.

Is this panegyric unwarranted? If so, then why should Professor James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* call Mr. Peirce "our great American philosopher"? Why should Professor Schroeder base his great work "Exact Logic" on the prior work of Mr. Peirce? Why should the editors of the great *Century Dictionary* employ Mr. Peirce to write so many of its logical, mathematical and scientific definitions? Why should the editors of Baldwin's Dictionary make a similar draft? Why should the editors of the *New York Evening Post* and of *The Nation* for years refer their books of serious import to Mr. Peirce for examination and review? Why should Dr. Carus recognize in Mr. Peirce a foeman

worthy of his incisive steel on the fundamental problem of necessity?

Of course genius is unconformable. "T is its nature to." It is often very hard to get along with. It tries the patience to the limit. It is so immersed in and so saturated with the inspiration of non-conformity that it often neglects to observe what is really and plainly only a merely defensive right on the part of the world of conformity. There ought to prevail a mutual spirit of forgiveness. If much is to be forgiven because of much love why should not much be forgiven to much promising and well directed power?

Mr. Peirce died a faithful man. His earlier studies led him far towards the goal of materialism, but in the course of those studies he was led to the discovery of that touchstone of values, that at first until the conception and word became mangled and aborted out of its true intent and utility he called Pragmatism, the principle that all rational significance of conceptions and of the terms embodying the same lies between the four corners of their *conceived* consequences in and to actual practice mental and otherwise. Since all logic is only a comparison and criticism of conceptions, this principle affects and effects our whole rational life and conduct. He was thus led to his conception of *reality* as that which has the natural prerogative of persistence as a possession forever. He perceived that intellectual entities, like, say, the law of gravitation or the ratio of the radius to the circumference of a circle, have just as abiding a persistence as any material entity and hence just as *real* an obtaining. Hence actual medieval realism, when better introduced and explained, is more pragmatically valuable than any case of nominalism or conceptualism can possibly be. The recognition of ideal realities opens out into the recognition that all existence is grounded in and upon that ideal substance the best names for which are *Form*, alias *Reason*, alias *Mind*, alias *Truth*, alias *the Good*, alias *Beauty*. The perception of Reason immanently in and throughout the universe and identical in nature with human reason solves at once the vexed question of the relation of body and mind, invites the soul to faith and repose and at the same time stimulates the soul to a vivid aspiration after cooperation with the Universal Spirit in accordance with its course of procession.

So lives Charles S. Peirce. The Universal Spirit has him and

the world that neglected him will care for him—after many days perhaps, but most assuredly.

FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.

CHICAGO.

### ASSOCIATED PRIME NUMBER MAGIC SQUARES.

Associated magic squares are those in which any two numbers that are placed symmetrically equidistant from the center of the square are equal in summation to any other couplets so situated. When  $n$  is an even number these squares are necessarily constructed entirely of couplets, but when  $n$  is odd, the central cell contains the middle number of the series, and all other numbers are arranged in couplets.

#### ASSOCIATED MAGIC SQUARES IN WHICH $n$ IS ODD.

As in the case of paneled magics it is necessary to find  $4 + 8 + 12 + \dots + 2(n-1)$  couplets, each couplet summing twice a certain prime number which must occupy the central cell.

Since all magic squares of the 3d order are associated and constructed from the same formula, the square shown in Fig. 1 and first made by Mr. Henry E. Dudeney (1900) has the lowest possible summation,  $S = 111$ .

67	1	43
13	37	61
31	73	7

Fig. 1.

431	263	23	413	59
143	131	461	53	401
71	269	251	233	431
101	443	41	311	353
443	83	473	233	11

Fig. 2.

1223	881	413	179	311	461	1013
1151	173	83	1233	131	443	1181
251	521	683	773	1877	263	713
323	233	1223	641	53	1043	353
563	1013	5	503	533	761	1031
101	833	1031	23	1133	1103	131
263	821	371	1103	863	401	53

Fig. 3.

For squares of the 5th order twelve couplets are needed and an associated magic square of this order is shown in Fig. 2,  $S = 1255$ .

Squares of the 7th order require twenty-four couplets, and Fig. 3 is an example, having a summation of 4487.

911	1571	1427	1373	857	1313	2141	1097	1013
863	2213	2267	1181	2441	23	653	2621	41
5	647	347	2633	1151	1307	317	2423	2273
1511	2381	71	1973	1301	2351	2477	131	47
1451	887	2243	401	1367	2333	431	1847	1283
2687	2543	257	383	1433	761	2663	353	1223
461	311	2417	827	1583	101	1787	2087	2729
2693	113	2081	2711	293	1553	467	521	1871
1721	1637	533	821	1877	1361	1307	1163	1823

Fig. 4.

Fig. 4 shows an associated magic square of the 9th order in which forty couplets are used, the summation being 12,303.

#### ASSOCIATED MAGIC SQUARES IN WHICH $n$ IS EVEN.

These squares demand the use of  $n^2/2$  couplets, but these couplets are not required to sum twice a given prime number as in squares where  $n$  is odd, which fact accounts for their lower summations in proportion to values of  $n$ .

It is capable of algebraic proof that an associated magic square of the fourth order must be constructed from a balanced series of numbers as shown in Fig. 5. The smallest series of prime numbers,

	x	y	z
a			
b			
c			

Fig. 5.

	f	g	h
7	13	17	23
31	37	41	47
73	79	83	89
97	103	107	113

Fig. 6.

73	41	113	13
23	103	31	83
37	89	17	97
107	7	79	47

Fig. 7.

filling this requirement, is given in Fig. 6, and Fig. 7 shows an associated magic square made therefrom with  $S=240$ . It is believed that this square was first made by Mr. L. S. Frierson, December 25, 1911.

An associated square of the 6th order requires eighteen couplets, and an example of this square,  $S = 630$ , is given in Fig. 8.

197	71	83	79	37	163
17	97	109	29	179	199
167	151	53	137	103	19
131	107	73	157	59	43
11	31	181	101	113	193
47	173	131	127	139	19

Fig. 8.

271	1	227	353	421	329	163	101
491	439	151	337	113	311	61	137
269	383	47	197	233	11	443	457
131	23	479	281	401	79	179	467
43	331	431	109	229	31	467	379
53	67	439	277	313	469	127	341
379	449	199	397	173	359	71	19
409	347	7	89	157	283	509	239

Fig. 9.

For a square of the 8th order, thirty-two couplets must be used as shown in Fig. 9.  $S = 2040$ . For certain arithmetical reasons a pandiagonal magic square of the 10th order cannot be made

953	607	113	349	919	317	181	337	827	347
127	257	751	421	727	659	347	907	23	131
167	757	571	929	137	971	103	7	761	547
397	109	359	179	739	389	719	977	373	709
557	307	541	911	491	677	839	107	53	467
523	937	883	151	313	439	79	449	683	433
281	617	13	271	601	251	811	631	881	593
443	229	983	887	19	853	61	419	233	823
839	367	83	43	331	263	569	239	793	863
643	163	653	803	673	71	641	877	383	37

Fig. 10.

from a series of consecutive numbers,<sup>1</sup> and for similar reasons, an associated square of this order cannot be made from a series of

<sup>1</sup> See "Notes on the Construction of Magic Squares of Orders in which  $n$  is of the General Form  $4p+2$ ," by W. S. Andrews and L. S. Frierson, *The Monist*, April 1912, Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 304.

couplets, the summation of which, individually, is evenly divisible by 4. Fifty couplets are required for a square of this order, and fifty-one can be found summing 840, but for the above reasons they are inadmissible. Fifty other couplets can, however, be found which individually sum 990, which is not evenly divisible by 4 and can therefore be used. An associated magic square made therefrom is shown in Fig. 10.

The writer believes that all of the associated magic squares mentioned in this article show the lowest possible summation.

CHARLES D. SHULDHAM.

WYOMING, N. J.

#### CURRENT PERIODICALS.

In the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for March, 1914, L. Dugas gives the text and variants of, together with a commentary on, the fragment *La Feuille de charmillé* of the philosopher and poet Jules Léquyer, of whom one of his friends, Le Gal La Salle, said: "He has left pages worthy of the greatest thinkers; he has not taken rank among them." An American mathematician, A. R. Schweitzer, studies the guiding ideas of genetic logic of mathematics. Viewing mathematics as a science of discovery, the author attempts a general description of its logical position, the establishment of parallels between certain mathematicians and certain philosophers—such as Grassmann and Herbart and Schleiermacher—and the examination of examples of mathematical "activity." To compare, as the author does, the definition of mathematics given by Bertrand Russell in his *Principles of Mathematics*, which is a description of the logical nature of mathematics itself, with the definition, given by C. S. Peirce, of mathematics as the discovery of certain relations, seems to overlook the clear distinction that has existed since Kant between logic and the theory of knowledge on the one hand, and psychology on the other. Take an analogy: it is the concern of chemistry to analyze a given chemical compound; not to decide how it was brought into the laboratory. Examples of the guiding ideas of mathematics are then illustrated and discussed. (1) The principle of comparison is, in the words of E. H. Moore, that "the existence of analogies between central features of various theories implies the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular theories and unifies them with respect to those central features." (2) The principle of continuation is

that the existence of a class of particular elements (or *operanda*) which are subject to certain particular operations implies the existence of a class of general elements subject to general operations. (3) Mach's principle of economy requires that every scientific end be attained with the minimum expenditure of thought. (4) The principle of special situation is a particularization of the principle of continuation. The guiding ideas of mathematics are the same as those of non-mathematical disciplines, but mathematical ideas have a distinctive character, owing to the fact that they are perceptive in their nature; and there is, in essentials, only one guiding idea in mathematics: the principle of comparison. It is pleasant to see the growing tendency towards a union of science and philosophy: in this article we meet with citations from *Mind* and *The Monist* by the side of citations from *The Quarterly Journal of Mathematics* and *The Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*. Xavier Léon continues and concludes his article on the socialism of Fichte according to *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*. Edmond Laskine has a critical study on the transformations of law in the nineteenth century. G. Lechalas has a note on the remarkable infidelity with which painters often reproduce the rainbow. S. Ginzberg and Louis Couturat continue a discussion on particular propositions. Georges Guy-Grand writes on foreign politics and democracy. The usual supplement contains notices of events in the philosophical world, new books, periodicals and theses.

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The first number (January, 1914) of Vol. XV of *Scientia* (*Rivista di Scienza*) is a particularly interesting one. Beginning with this number, *Scientia* is printed on better quality and lighter paper, the edges are cut, and the number of pages remains the same. The first article is by H. H. Turner and is on "The Periodicities of Sun-Spots (A reply to Mr. E. W. Maunder)." In *Scientia* for January, 1913, Maunder had stated his view that "the sun-spot period is essentially one: there are no sub-periods: there are no multiple periods..."; and here the author criticizes Maunder's use of the term "periodicity." M. Abraham writes most clearly and instructively on the new mechanics. The principles of the old mechanics of Galileo and Newton—in particular the second and third laws of Newton—allow us to describe the motions of masses under the influence of their mutual gravitation, but do not suffice when the forces of electricity and magnetism, of light and

of heat come into play; and the *Principles of Mechanics* of Heinrich Hertz closes the phase of evolution which wished to bring the whole of physics under the old mechanics. Yet certain principles of mechanics (Lagrange's equations and the principle of least action—presumably this means Hamilton's principle) keep their value in the new mechanics when we generalize the expression of Lagrange's function and of "action." The question as to how it is that optical experiments with light from terrestrial sources do not show any influence arising from the earth's motion (Michelson) was examined by Lorentz (1892-1904) and resulted in the notion of "local time" and "the hypothesis of contraction," the latter being independently due to Fitzgerald. To be distinguished from this theory of Lorentz's is the theory of relativity set up by Einstein in 1905, which decided that the traditional ideas of geometry and kinematics have no signification. This theory is founded on two postulates: (1) the equivalence of systems having a uniform motion of translation with respect to one another; (2) the propagation of light in space is effected with the same velocity in all directions. This theory, which was developed mathematically by Minkowski in 1908, was, for the most part, regarded with scepticism by physicists whose philosophy was formed under the influence of Mach and Kirchhoff. There is a very illuminating comparison of the theory of relativity with the theory of Lorentz. The crisis of the theory of relativity began when this theory undertook to make gravity enter into the domain of its considerations, and both in Einstein's theory of 1905 and in that of 1913 gravity is an unsurmountable obstacle. Still, the theory has an honorable place in the history of the criticism of the conceptions of space and time; it has assured for itself, at any rate, an "honorable burial." But, whatever the fate of the theory of relativity, the new mechanics will continue to develop. Its object is to keep mechanics in touch with the other disciplines of physics. Augusto Righi gives a short account of recent results and conclusions as to the nature of the X-rays. They seem most probably to be of the same nature as the rays of light, and thus to be a manifestation of electromagnetic waves in the ether. Marcus Hartog writes on "Samuel Butler and recent mnemonic biological theories." The main thesis of Butler's *Life and Habit* (1877) had been anticipated by Hering in 1870 (*Memory, etc.*, Eng. Trans., 4th ed., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago and London, 1913), and Butler, when he got to know this, wrote *Unconscious Memory* (1880, 1910). The development of

Butler's views in these works, in *Luck or Cunning*, and in the *Notebooks*, is traced, and the facts are thus summed up: "Butler popularized the teaching of Hering before its existence was known to him, anticipated Semon in his detailed comparison of memory with heredity, and from a small suggestion of Hering's, planned out a physical explanation of memory in terms of vibrations, which was destined after his death to be more fully elaborated by Rignano (*The Inheritance of Acquired Characters*, Eng. Trans., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago and London, 1911)." It may be remembered that there was an article on Butler in *The Open Court* for August, 1913. The first part of an article by Philippe Sagnac deals with the origins of the French revolution. It was slowly born from the social and political regimen which Richelieu and Louis XIV established and Louis XV and Louis XVI maintained and aggravated. The prestige of royalty, of the church, and of the nobility had decreased, philosophy had helped to form public spirit, and the science of the time had helped to destroy the credit of the sacred books. A brilliant edifice, centuries old, was undermined, and there was the irresistible force of almost the whole of a suffering nation which was conscious of its rights. Charles Guignebert examines how the life of faith and the progress of theology strengthened and complicated the two primitive triads, eastern and western, in the dogma of the Trinity, and then how the inevitable conflict between the two conceptions came to pass. R. Maunier has a critical note on Egyptian art. There are general reviews by M. Gortani and G. Bourgin on the recent progress of geodynamics and the evolution of towns, respectively. Finally, there is the usual collection of reviews and notes and supplement.

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The first article in *Scientia* for March, 1914, is by T. J. J. See on "The law of nature in celestial evolution." We have found, says the author, the fundamental law of sidereal evolution by first studying the most complex systems (the star-clusters), and, after making out the true secret of their formation, have generalized the law deduced from this study by the examination of sidereal systems of lower order. False premises misled Laplace, Sir John Herschel, Lord Kelvin, Newcomb, Sir George Darwin, and Poincaré; while the true path had been opened by Sir William Herschel, the first modern astronomer to give serious thought to the origin of clusters, in a series of papers published in the *Philosophical Transactions* from 1784 to 1818, and now accessible in Herschel's

*Collected Works* (London, 1912). The neglect of Herschel's conceptions of cosmogony was due to the greater accessibility of Laplace's writings. The modern "capture theory" of stars under the clustering power of universal gravitation (See), and consequent development of sidereal systems is essentially an extension of the views of Herschel. The process of capture also leads to the arrangement of the internal structure of a nebula in concentric shells of uniform brightness. The light of the nebulae is due chiefly to luminescence at low temperature, as by electric discharges in high vacua. There are many quotations from the papers of W. Herschel, and the other chief authorities in cosmogony are also briefly cited. The Herschel-See theory applies equally to sidereal systems of all types. "This quality of universality assures us the fundamental law of sidereal evolution, and alone makes possible the development of cosmogony as a new science of the stars, applicable, with unbroken continuity, to the entire sidereal universe." Camillo Acqua points out that, quite lately, phenomena of reaction in plants have been discovered, which are very perceptible and almost general for many agents of the outer world: a mechanism for receiving excitations, a transport of the excitation along plasmatic filaments of communication, which may represent physiologically—although they are not differentiated from the morphological point of view—the nervous fibers of animals. The reply to the question as to whether psychological phenomena exist in the case of plants "depends on the extension which may be given the psychological conception. The problem is proposed equally for plants and for lower animals which are situated at the end of the zoological scale. The hypothesis that even in these animals we must meet a psychological principle appears to be probable; but a decisive answer is not, and perhaps never will be, possible, since we would by such an answer penetrate into a part of that unknowable where the experimental method loses its efficacy and where the human mind had to confess its impotence." Emile Durkheim writes on the dualism of human nature and its social conditions; and maintains that it is only by historical analysis that we can give an account of how man was formed. The author's work on *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris, 1912) illustrates this general truth by an example. When seeking to study sociologically religious phenomena, the author was led to attempt to explain the particularities of our nature. The principle on which this explanation rests was not perceived by critics, and the present article is an exposition of it. S. Langdon

writes on "Babylonian magic," giving an abstract analysis of the principles and categories of Sumero-Babylonian magic; the article concludes with a few typical examples of both negative and positive magic chosen exclusively from the late period. Werner Sombart, in a study of love, luxury, and capitalism, does not propose to analyze the relations which exist between wealth, liberty of the amorous life, desire of certain groups of the population to be esteemed by others, and life in the large towns, on the one hand, and the appearance of luxury, on the other. Setting out from the fact that since the beginning of the middle ages a great luxury ruled, and attained great proportions towards the end of the eighteenth century, the author tries to find its explanation. The late F. W. Henkel gives a general review on the question of nebulas, and Arthur Kronfeld gives one on the new problems of psychiatry in Germany. Besides reviews of books and periodicals, etc., there is the usual supplement containing French translations of the English, German, and Italian articles. ❖